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International Trial Observers
DAVID WEISSBRODT*
Since the Dreyfus trial in 1899, governments have sent observers
to foreign political trials both to increase their understanding of the
affairs of other nations and to express concern about the fairness of
the proceedings themselves. It is now common for a number of gov-
ernments, including those of Canada, the Federal Republic of Ger-
many, Japan, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States,
to send official observers to foreign trials of political or human rights
significance.
This practice is not limited to governments. Nongovernmental
organizations, including Amnesty International, the International
Association of Democratic Lawyers, the International Commission of
Jurists, the International Federation of Human Rights, and the In-
ternational League for Human Rights have also, in the past two de-
cades, sent observers to significant political trials in all parts of the
world.
The use of trial observers has become so widespread and accepted
that their status approaches that of a customary institution in inter-
national law. Yet this considerable governmental and nongovern-
mental activity has received little scholarly attention. In order to
guide governments, nongovernmental organizations, and those who
actually serve as observers, this study considers the legal principles
which might apply to the work of observers, discusses the practical
o 1982 David Weissbrodt.
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problems of selecting trials and observers, reviews the experience of
some observers, and suggests approaches which might improve the
effectiveness of future observers.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. Monitoring the Trials of Citizens Abroad
Governments often send embassy officials to observe foreign trials
that involve their nationals. These observers are sent principally to
protect the national from discrimination and to inform the embassy
of the proceedings in the event of inquiries from the home country.
The 1963 Vienna Convention requires host countries to permit
prompt and reasonable consular access to arrested persons,' and ac-
cess has been interpreted to include attendance at trials.' But observ-
ing trials for the protection of nationals well predates the Vienna
Convention.3 For example, the Italian consul to the United States
attended the 1921 trial of Sacco and Vanzetti, who were Italian citi-
zens residing in the United States.'
Military officials also commonly send observers to trials of their
personnel charged with criminal offenses abroad.' The N.A.T.O.
Status of Forces Agreement explicitly permits the governments of ac-
cused military personnel to send such observers.' These observers
help to assure a fair trial, monitor the efforts of the local defense at-
torney (usually retained by the military), and provide information so
that the government can respond to questions from family and
friends at home.7 According to the Status of Forces Agreement, when
an observer believes that a soldier has been unfairly treated, that con-
cern is to be expressed through diplomatic channels.' In practice,
I Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, April 23, 1963, art. 36, 21 U.S.T. 77,
T.I.A.S. No. 6820, 596 U.N.T.S. 261.
2 See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, PROTECTION OF AMERICAN NATIONALS AR-
RESTED, ON TRIAL, IMPRISONED 11 (1976) [hereinafter cited as AMERICANS ARRESTED].
3 See E. BORCHARD, THE DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION OF CITIZENS ABROAD 408-09 &
n.4 (1915).
4 R. MONTGOMERY, SACCO-VANZETTI: THE MURDER AND THE MYTH 9-10 (1964);
F. RUSSELL, TRAGEDY IN DEDHAM 139 (1971).
S See generaly Williams, An American's Trial in a Foreign Court; The Role of the Militay's
Trial Observer, 34 MIL. L. REV. 1 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Williams].
6 Agreement Between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty Regarding the Status of
Their Forces, June 19, 1951, 4 U.S.T. 1792, T.I.A.S. No. 2846; see Sciacca, Executive Discretion
to Enforce the Fair Trial Guarantees of /he NA4 TO Status of Forces Agreement, 6 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. &
POL. 343, 345 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Sciacca].
7 See Brown, Function of the Trial Observer Under the NA TO Status of Forces and Other Interna-
tional Agreements, JAG J., Mar. 1957, at 9; Williams, supra note 5; Sciacca, supra note 6, at
345-46; U.S. Dep't of Army Pamphlet No. 360-544, You and the Law Overseas 14 (undated).
8 See Department of Defense Directive No. 5525.1, Status of Forces Policies and Information
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however, this information is likely to be communicated more infor-
mally to the trial participants. 9
B. Observing Trials of Foreign Persons
Similar to the governmental custom of observing trials of citizens
abroad is the developing practice of sending observers to trials of
political or human rights interest. The trial of Captain Dreyfus was
very likely the first to be attended by a legal observer sent by a for-
eign government.'° Despite the fact that the trial involved a French
national in a French court, Queen Victoria sent her Lord Chief Jus-
tice to observe in response to widespread public concern about the
fairness of the proceedings." Lord Russell noted in his report to the
Queen that the telephone and telegraph had made it impossible to
treat political trials as purely domestic concerns when they called
(Jan. 20, 1966), which implements the fair trial guarantees for U.S. service personnel under
the NATO Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). Where it appears likely that an accused
American soldier will not obtain a fair trial, the accused's commanding officer must request a
release of criminal jurisdiction from the foreign authorities. If this request is denied, diplo-
matic channels are invoked to obtain an agreement that the foreign authorities refrain from
exercising jurisdiction over the defendant. Id at 4-5. Where a waiver ofjurisdiction cannot
be obtained, the provisions of NATO SOFA Article VII, I 9(g) (which specifically guarantees
the right to have a representative of the accused's government present at trial) are invoked
and an observer is selected to attend the trial of the accused. Fuller details regarding the role
of the military trial observer in assuring fair treatment of the accused may be found in the
regulations of the joint services setting out the procedures for implementing Department of
Defense Directive 5525.1, id; see Army Regulation No. 27-50/ Secnav Instruction 5820.4E/
Air Force Regulation No. 110-12, at 1-4 (Dec. 1, 1978); USAREUR Regulation No. 550-50/
CINCUSNAVEUR Instruction No. 5820.8F/ USAF Regulation No. 110-1, at 11-13 (Aug.
20, 1968). See a/no Holmes v. Laird, 459 F.2d 1211 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 869
(1972), criticized in Sciacca, supra note 6, for failure to understand that trial observers are an
ineffective safeguard; L. SOHN & T. BUERGENTHAL, INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF
HUMAN RIGHTS 86-87 (1973).
9 Interview with Max Johnson, U.S. Army civilian legal advisor, in Mons, Belgium
(Mar. 16, 1979).
10 An even earlier example of diplomatic observers - not necessarily lawyers - may
have occurred at the 1858 trial of Felice Orsini who was accused of having attempted to
assassinate Emperor Napoleon II. The London Thes reports that "nearly every member of
the diplomatic corps" attended the trial. The Attempt to Assassinate the Emperor of the French,
London Times, Feb. 27, 1858, at 9, col. 1. In 1653 it appears that the Venetian Secretary in
England attended the trial of John Lilburne and reported the proceedings to the Venetian
Ambassador in France. 29 Calendar of State Papers and Manuscripts, Relating to English
Affairs. . . 1653-1654 at 119, 122 (A. Hinds ed. 1929); see D. GREGG, FREEBORN JOHN 322
(1961). Still earlier, the Pope sent two diplomatic commissioners to the independent State of
Florence in 1498 to observe the heresy trial of the Florentine monk, Girolamo Savonarola. P.
VAN PAASSEN, CROWN OF FIRE 300 (1960).
1t Lord Russell, Paper /Conceming the Ti'al of Drgfas/ (Sept. 16, 1899), reprinted i R.
O'BRIEN, THE LIFE OF LORD RUSSELL OF KILLOWEN 314 (1900) [hereinafter cited as Drey-
fus trial report]. The second trial of Dreyfus in 1899 was also observed by a'British barrister,
Thomas Terrell, Q.C. See Decision Allegedly Reached, N.Y. Times, Aug. 20, 1899, at 1, col. 7.
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into question the very foundations of justice. 2 Dreyfus was ulti-
mately pardoned largely as a result of the tremendous storm of do-
mestic and international criticism that fell upon the French
government."i
While many political trials are attended by foreign press repre-
sentatives, reporters often serve only to inform the public of the more
spectacular aspects of the trial. In contrast, foreign diplomats and
legal observers bring special expertise and prestige to bear upon the
proceedings.14 They ordinarily understand the proceedings more
fully than overseas correspondents, and constitute a more reliable
source of information for governments, if not also for the public. Ad-
ditionally, such observers may use their prestige to influence the fair-
ness of proceedings more directly than the media.
During the mid-1930s progressive nongovernmental American
and British organizations sent distinguished private observers to tri-
als in Nazi Germany out of concern for the treatment of fellow social-
ists and unionists. 15 After the 1933 Reichstag fire, the World
Committee for the Relief of the Victims of German Fascism was
formed in London to investigate the Nazi arson charges against Ge-
orgi Dimitov and other Communists. At the trial the Committee was
represented by American attorney Arthur Garfield Hays.' 6 Other
foreign attorneys observing the trial included Californian Leo Gal-
lagher and British attorney Douglas Benabue. " Also in 1933, govern-
ment observers appeared at the trial of several British engineers
working in the Soviet Union who were accused of espionage, bribery,
and "wrecking." Their trial was attended not only by British em-
bassy officials, but also by many members of the diplomatic corps
from other countries.'
12 Dreyfus trial report, sup-a note 11, at 316.
13 G. CHAPMAN, THE DREYFUS CASE 285-304 (1955). After the Dreyfus case, an Amer-
ican lawyer, Mr. W.F. Doyle, observed the 1916 trial of Sir Roger Casement in London, but it
is not clear whether the observer was present of his own accord. See Casement Found Guilty,
London Times, June 30, 1916, at 6, cols. 1-4. Similarly, a British solicitor, John Lawrence,
attended a treason trial of 126 people in Memel, Lithuania. British Lawyers at Meml Tr1,
London Times, Jan. 7, 1934, at 11, col. 5.
14 Distinguished foreign lawyers can also obtain audiences with the critical officials, who
may refuse to see the press. Se, e.g., N. Albala, J. Lagadec & P. Mertens, Iran: Rapport de
mission, 6-14 dkembre 1978, at 10 (undated) (unpublished report to the International Asso-
ciation of Democratic Lawyers) [hereinafter cited as Iran - Albala et al. AIJD (Dec. 1978)].
15 Interview with Elwyn Jones, Lord Chancellor of England, in London (Sept. 19, 1978).
16 Reich Opens TrialofFire Supects, N.Y. Times, Sept. 22, 1933, at 1, col. 2; Reichsiag Fire,
Times of London, Sept. 21, 1933, at 12, col. 4.
17 Torgler AJms Innocence in Fire, N.Y. Times, Sept. 26, 1933, at 1, col. 2; M. LUBBE, THE
REICHSTAG FIRE TRiAL 266, 267 (1934).
18 Soviet Indictment Readto 5Btons, N.Y. Times, Apr. 10, 1933, at 7, col. 3; Briton Confesses
He Is Spy in Soviet, N.Y. Times, Apr. 13, 1933, at 9, col. 4.
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The modern practice of sending and receiving nongovernmental
trial observers began in earnest after World War II with the advent
of such organizations as the International 'Association of Democratic
Lawyers and the International Commission of Jurists. The Interna-
tional Association of Democratic Lawyers sent an observer to a 1949
Smith Act trial in the United States' 9 and to an important political
trial in Spain.20 Several international observers were invited by the
Polish government to attend the Poznan trials in 1956.21 The Inter-
national Commission of Jurists began attending South African trials
that same year.22 Amnesty International (AI) was formed in 1961
and sent its first observer to a French trial in 1962.23
The practice of sending and receiving nongovernmental observers
substantially increased in the 1960s and 1970s. Since 1949 at least 64
nations have received international nongovernmental trial observ-
ers,2 4 and 331 separate trials or appellate proceedings have been ob-
served by over a dozen organizations.25  Of these, Amnesty
International has mounted 169 observer missions since its inception
while the International Commission of Jurists has sent 116 since 1952
and the International Association of Democratic Lawyers has sent
seventy-one.26 Most observer missions have taken place in the last
two decades. The International League for Human Rights, the Bel-
gian League for Human Rights, and the International Federation of
Human Rights have also sent trial observers.
Because of the limitations of diplomatic confidentiality, institu-
19 Lepfrocs des donee leaders Communistes alex Etats-Uns ez la lumire du rapport dun obsenvateur
de l'Association Internationale desJuristes Dbnocrates, 1 LAw IN THE SERVICE OF PEACE 68 (1949).
20 D. Forsythe, International Institute of Human Rights, Chart of Missions Concerning
Political Prisoners 1952-1973, at 1 (unpublished manuscript) (1973); International Associa-
tion of Democratic Lawyers, Rappel chronologique des principales missions (unpublished
memorandum) (1973).
21 Sentence Light in Poznan Tial, N.Y. Times, Oct. 9, 1956, at 1, col. 7. The International
Commission of Jurists nominated four distinguished lawyers to attend the Poznan trials, but
the Polish authorities refused them entry because they might contribute to propaganda hos-
tile to Poland. The Poznan Trials, 6 BULL. INT'L COMM'N JUR. 1 (1956). In a Cold War
atmosphere the criticism of Poland was so intense that the government finally invited three
very independent observers of their own choosing and thus helped to confirm the interna-
tional practice of receiving trial observers.
22 See Gardiner, The South Afican Treason Trial, 1J. INT'L COMM'N JUR. 43 (No. 1, 1957).
23 AMUINESTY INTERNATIONAL, ANNUAL REPORT 1961-1962, at 7, 10 (1962) [hereinafter
cited as AI ANNUAL REPORT (1962)]. See also note 166 in/ia.
24 D. Forsythe, supra note 20; Al ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 23 (1962-1980); Interna-
tional Commission of Jurists, Report on the Activities of the International Commission of
Jurists 1971-1977 (1977) (mimeo); International Association of Democratic Lawyers, Rappel
chronologique des principales missions 1952-1972 (1973) (unpublished memorandum); notes
and reports on file in the Human Rights Library, University of Minnesota Law School.
25 See sources cited at note 24 supra.
26 Id
STANFORD JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
tional memories, and widely dispersed records, it is difficult to deter-
mine how often governments have sent trial observers even in the
recent past. Foreign ministries may not be informed of local embassy
decisions to observe trials of particular interest. The results of these
diplomatic trial observations may not be separately reported, but
may be included in more general surveys of political developments.
Embassy staffs may not remember trial observation experience; of-
ficers knowledgeable about such incidents have often been trans-
ferred to other posts.
However, in February 1980 the United States State Department
queried its diplomatic posts abroad about whether they had sent ob-
servers to trials of political or human rights interest. 27 The responses
indicate that attendance at trials is fairly common: Ninety-eight
United States diplomatic posts reported that embassies in twenty-
four countries had experimented with the use of trial observers at
political or human rights cases.28 Since suitable trials may not occur
in all the countries from which posts responded, twenty-four positive
replies show a relatively substantial number of posts with observer
experience.
The United States embassies in South Africa and South Korea
have the longest record of observing major trials. The embassies in
those countries also send detailed reports of their observations to the
State Department in Washington. United States diplomatic posts in
Bolivia, Ghana, Guyana, Haiti, India, Lebanon, the Philippines, Po-
land, Portugal, Taiwan, Thailand, Togo, and Zaire have also suc-
cessfully sent observers to political trials. American diplomats have
attended only minor, nonpolitical trials in Bulgaria, Peru, and the
Soviet Union.
Other governments have also sent observers to trials of political
and human rights interest. For example, the Australian, British, Ca-
nadian, German, and United States embassies, together with several
nongovernmental organizations, successfully sent observers to the
trial of the Thammasat 18 in Thailand.2 9 Australian, British, and
Canadian embassy officials, like those of the United States, have ob-
served South African trials. Political trials in Kenya and Mali have
27 U.S. Department of State Telegram 51659 to all diplomatic posts (Feb. 26, 1980).
28 There were 137 diplomatic posts which received the inquiry.
29 See Simons, Thai Youths Deny Charges in Open Trial, Washington Post, Sept. 6, 1977, at
A 18, cols. 1-4; Letter from Daniel P. Sullivan, U.S. Department of State, to Peter Anderson,
member of Amnesty International U.S.A. Group 37 (Aug. 30, 1978). See generalo Garrett,
Human Rights in Thailand- The Case ofthe Thammasat 18, 2 UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS (No. 4,
1980), at 43.
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also been observed by foreign diplomats.3" West German and Dutch
embassy officials attended political trials during the period of the
Colonels in Greece.3' About thirty diplomats attended the trial of
former dictator Macias in Equatorial Guinea.32
The seventy-two nations which have received diplomatic and
nongovernmental trial observers include Angola, Bangladesh, Benin,
Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada,
Chile, Comoro, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Dominican Republic, Ecua-
dor, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, France, Federal Republic
of Germany, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana,
Greece, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran,
Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Laos, Lesotho, Libya,
Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mexico, Morocco, Namibia, Nicaragua,
Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Rhodesia
(Zimbabwe), St. Kitts, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, South
Korea, Spain, Sri Lanka, Switzerland, Tanzania, Taiwan, Thailand,
Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States, Yu-
goslavia, and Zaire.33
The United Nations has also been involved in trial observation,
although to a lesser extent than governments or nongovernmental
organizations. For example, the U.N. High Commissioner for Refu-
gees has sent employees to Thailand to observe trials of pirates who
prey upon Vietnamese refugee boats, thereby expressing the interest
of the U.N.H.C.R. in those proceedings. Tha U.N.H.C.R. also regu-
larly arranges for defense counsel and sometimes sends local counsel
to observe trials of refugees throughout the world.
The United Nations was also asked to send an observer to the
Macias trial, but declined out of fear that the death penalty would be
imposed. More recently the U.N. was asked to send an observer to a
trial in Nicaragua, but the trial ended after only one day - before
30 The U.S. embassies in Kenya and Mali indicated that foreign diplomats have at-
tended political trials in those countries, but the embassies did not clearly state whether the
U.S. embassies sent representatives to the trials.
31 M. Ellman, Report on Trial at Athens 3rd to 8th July, 1968, at 3 (Jul. 20, 1968)
(unpublished report to the International Commission of Jurists) [hereinafter cited as Greece
- Ellman/ICJ (1968)]. The Israeli government invited foreign diplomatic observers to the
trial of Adolph Eichmann; the U.S. and British refused to attend, but other diplomats ob-
served the proceedings. Trial of Eichmatm Opens Before Israeli Tribunal, N.Y. Times, Apr. 11,
1961, at 1, col. 6 & 14, col. 2.
32 See A. ARTucio, THE TRIAL OF MACIAS IN EQUATORIAL GUINEA 22 (International
Commission ofJurists, 1979) [hereinafter cited as EQUATORIAL GUINEA -TRIAL OF MACIAS
(1979)].
33 Se notes 19 & 27 supra.
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the U.N. Human Rights Division could decide on the propriety of
sending an observer.
There seems to be no reason why the U.N. could not accept an
invitation by a host country so long as the observer remained free to
form an independent judgment of the proceedings and the U.N. was
able to choose the invitations for which observation would be use-
ful. 4 The criteria for deciding which trials merit sending a U.N. ob-
server should be quite similar to the factors weighed by governments
and nongovernmental organizations as discussed below. A U.N. ob-
server would, of course, have a more impressive and independent
presence at any trial, simply because of the organization's prestige.
Furthermore, as part of the settlement which resolved the March
19, 1981, occupations of the Dominican Republic's embassy in Co-
lombia, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights of the
Organization of American States agreed to observe several political
trials in Colombia. Since that time members of the Commission and
their local representatives have observed various stages of these
proceedings.35
34 In determining whether to send an observer, it has been suggested that the U.N. con-
sider such factors as (I) whether the government had invited an observer, so as to avoid
infringing on the domestic jurisdiction of the state, (2) whether the U.N. can be reasonably
certain that adequate procedures will be observed, (3) whether the U.N. observer might be
used to legitimize an unfair proceeding or show trial, (4) whether attendance at the trial will
assist the defendant, and (5) whether the U.N. has a particular interest in the case, for exam-
ple, if witnesses to an earlier U.N. fact-finding mission had been selected for persecution.
While these considerations seem, in general, sensible, they may not adequately cover all fu-
ture contingencies. Hence, these five factors should not be rigidly applied as prerequisites to a
U.N. trial observer mission, but merely thought of as considerations. Also, it is difficult to
understand the basis for the second factor indicated above. If the trial is expected to be fair,
there is less reason to send an observer. Indeed, one of the ordinary objectives of sending an
observer is to encourage fairness at a trial and to report upon unfairness.
One commentator has proposed that trial observers be made an integral part of the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. Terry, Third-Party Trial Observers: A Proposal
for Codftcation and Implementation of International Procedural Due Process in the Americas, 4 AKRON L.
REV. 202, 215-19 (1971). There are so many trials in the various countries of the Western
Hemisphere that such a concept appears impractical as proposed, but the Commission might
be given the discretion as to which trials deserve observation.
35 Organization of American States, Report on the Situation of Human Rights in the
Republic of Colombia, OAS Doc. OEA/Ser. L/V/1I. 53, doc. 22, at 9-14, 143-44, 180-81
(1981). In order to assist the negotiation for the release of the embassy hostages in Colombia,
the U.S. Department of State sent a telegram to the U.S. Embassy in Bogot&. urging the
Colombian Government to accept international observers and summarizing the international
practice of receiving observers:
Over the past 20 years, private international human rights and legal organiza-
tions have developed and utilized the practice of sending observers to trials in differ-
ent countries. The trials in question have involved issues of human rights or have
had important human rights implications.
From 1952 to 1978, more than 50 countries have allowed in trial observers. In
fact, it would appear that it has become a widespread international practice that
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While over seventy nations have received diplomatic and non-
governmental observers, some nations have been less cooperative.
Diplomats have been refused entry to political trials in Czechoslova-
kia upon being informed that no more room remained in the court-
roomy6 Similarly, in the Soviet Union, diplomats attempting to
observers are received at trials. The practice has been based on Article 10 of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Article 14 of the International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights which provide for fair and public hearings. In
the Americas, countries which have allowed in trial observers comprise the U.S.,
Canada, the Dominican Republic, Brazil, Ecuador, Mexico, Guyana, Nicaragua,
Cuba, Paraguay and Chile.
Organizations which have highly developed the practice of sending trial ob-
servers and have considerable experience and expertise in so doing are Amnesty
International and the International Commission of Jurists. The I.C.J. based in Ge-
neva is an eminent organization of jurists with consultative status at the U.N. and
Council of Europe and with observer status at the O.A.S. Other organizations
which utilize this practice effectively include the International League for Human
Rights (a N.Y.-based NGO [nongovernmental observer] with consultative status at
the U.N.), and the International Federation for Human Rights (a Paris-based NGO
with consultative status at the U.N.).
Observers sent by organizations to attend trials are jurists, in many cases emi-
nent ones, selected for their impartiality and independence.
In most, if not all, cases, governments are notified by the organizations that an
observer will be attending the trial. Permission is not requested, and the practice
has been that governments have generally accepted the observers (with the excep-
tion of some East European countries).
The objectives of the trial observer are as follows: to attend and observe the
trial - sometimes their mere presence assures greater fairness and represents reas-
surance to the defendant; and to evaluate the fairness of the trial in terms of applica-
ble national and international standards of law and due process. Observers evaluate
the openness of the trial, the fairness of the proceedings, the demeanor of the partici-
pants (judge, prosecutor), and whether any international norms have been violated,
for example, mistreatment or torture of defendants, forced confessions, whether ade-
quate defense has been provided and received; and report their findings to the or-
ganization which has sent them. The organization then decides whether to make
the observer's report public.
Observers generally attend all phases of a trial unless its length is prohibitive or
the trial is extended over long periods of time. In many instances, observers are
afforded more privileges than the public. For example, they have been allowed into
closed trials and into closed military proceedings. They have been given preferen-
tial seating arrangements. This has been done to enhance their prestige, to ensure
that they hear well, and to prevent any appearance of their sitting either with the
defense or the prosecution. Observers generally make an effort to meet with the
defense attorneys, the prosecution and the judge in order to discuss the proceedings.
They also seek to see the defendants privately and in many cases, have been permit-
ted to do so.
Governments generally do not restrict and regulate what observers can see or
consider. It would be considered unacceptable for restrictions to be so imposed.
Since the organizations which send the observers are private, independent non-gov-
ernmental groups, and the observers selected for their impartiality and a great deal
of freedom in the carrying out of their mission.
U.S. Dept. of State, unclassified telegram 086082 to U.S. Embassy in BogotA (April 4, 1980).
36 Even in being refused admission to the courtroom, but in remaining publicly visible,
observers may make an effective statement of international concern about a political trial. At
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observe supposedly public trials have been told that the courtroom
was not yet open, and then suddenly informed that there were no
seats available.37 Last-minute United States embassy requests to ob-
serve trials in China and Romania have been refused by the govern-
ments in those countries, and the Somalian government has also
refused an American trial observer.3 8 But despite these exceptions,
the common practice of receiving trial observers over the past
twenty-five years suggests that there is international recognition of
foreign trial observers. Through time and usage, this recognition has
arguably become an international legal norm, one which compels
even reluctant nations to receive observers at trials of human rights
concern.
39
the Ginzburg and Scharansky trials the Soviet government gave frequent public briefings.
Families of the defendants were permitted to take notes during the trials without hindrance.
Both Scharansky and Ginzburg were permitted to make closing statements without interrup-
tion. The Soviet government even issued a press release purporting to summarize Scharans-
ky's closing statement; the summary was not objective but it was far more complete than
could have otherwise been expected. The presence of the diplomatic observers and the media
did not prevent other violations of the defendants' rights. For example, the defendants were
not permitted to submit exculpatory documents into the record. Nevertheless, even the at-
tempt to observe these political trials obviously had an impact.
37 Letter from Frances Elliott, British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, to David
Weissbrodt (Apr. 23, 1979) [hereinafter cited as British Foreign Office Letter].
38 The earliest instance in which U.S. diplomats attempted to observe a political trial
may have occurred when the U.S. government unsuccessfully requested an opportunity to
attend the trial of Cardinal Mindzenty in Hungary. See 5 FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE
UNITED STATES 463 (1949). In some respects U.S. interests were directly at stake in that case,
because the U.S. minister in Hungary was implicated in the accusation against the Cardinal.
39 Seegeneral,, J. BRIERLY, LAW OF NATIONS 59-62 (6th ed. 1963); A. D'AMATO, THE
CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAw (1971); C. DEVISSCHER, THEORY AND RE-
ALITY IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 148-56 (Corbett trans. 1957); C. PARRY, THE
SOURCES OF EVIDENCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 56-82 (1965); H. THIRLWAY, INTERNA-
TIONAL CUSTOMARY LAW AND CODIFICATION 46-60 (1972); K. WOLFKE, CUSTOM IN PRES-
ENT INTERNATIONAL LAW (1964); Akehurst, Custom as a Source of International Law, 47 BRIT.
Y.B. INT'L L. 1 (1974-75); Briggs, The Colombian-Peruvian Asylum Case and Proof of Customary
International Law, 45 AM. J. INT'L L. 728 (1951); Jessup, Non-Universal International Law, 12
COLUM. J. INT'L L. 415 (1973); Kopelmanas, Custom as a Means of the Creation of International
Law, 18 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 127 (1937); Kunz, Nature of Customagy International Law, 47 Am. J.
INT'L L. 662 (1953); MacGibbon, Customay International Law and Acquiescence, 33 BRIT. Y.B.
INT'L L. 115 (1957); Schacter, Towards a Theoy of International Obligation, 8 VA. J. INT'L L. 300
(1968); Silving, 'Customary Law- Continuity in Municibal and International Law, 31 IOWA L. REV.
614 (1946); Tunkin, Remarks on the Judicial Nature of Customary Norms of International Law, 49
CALIF. L. REV. 419 (1961); Virally, The Sources of Intenational Law, in MANUAL OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 116, 128-43 (M. Sorensen ed. 1968); Waldock, General Course in Public
International Law: The "Common Law" of the International Community- International Custom, 106
RECUEIL DES COURS 39 (1962); Wright, Custom as a Basis for International Law in the Post- War
World, 2 TEx. INT'L L.J. 147 (1966).
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II. THE LEGAL BASIS FOR INTERNATIONAL TRIAL OBSERVERS
A. Customag' International Law
There are two criteria for ascertaining whether a custom, such as
the practice of receiving trial observers, has attained the status of a
rule of customary international law.4o First, the custom must com-
prise a general practice among nations.4 ' Second, the custom must
be accepted as giving rise to a legal obligation.42 The first criterion,
general practice among nations, is usually measured by the duration,
repetition, continuity, generality, and uniformity of custom.
4 3
Duration is measured according to the nature of the custom.'
The required duration should probably depend upon the duration of
the existence of conditions which permit or give rise to the custom. 5
In the case of foreign trial observers, deficiencies in international
transportation and communication hindered the practice and
delayed its full onset prior to the Dreyfus case. 46 The advent of tele-
communications and increasingly rapid travel has made it possible to
learn of important upcoming trials and to dispatch observers swiftly.
Since the practice of receiving foreign trial observers has grown as
quickly as technology has permitted, it should be judged to have met
the duration standard.
Equal in importance and related to the question of duration 47 is
the recurrence of the practice over time.48 Repetition of a practice
among nations is central to the concept of international customary
40 Kopelmanas, supra note 39, at 129; Kunz, supra note 39 at 665; Waldock, supra note
39, at 42.
41 See K. WOLFKE, supra note 39, at 65; Akehurst, supra note 39, at 1.
42 Also referred to as "opiniojuris." See North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, [19691 I.C.J.
4, 29-30, 45-46 [hereinafter North Sea Cases]; A. D'AMATO, supra note 39, at 66; C. DEVIss-
CiER, supra note 39, at 150; C. PARRY, supra note 39, at 61; H. THIRLWAY, supra note 39, at
47; K. WOLUKE, supra note 39, at 70; Akehurst, supra note 39, at 31; Kunz, supra note 39, at
667; MacGibbon, supra note 39, at 125; Schacter, supra note 39, at 311; Tunkin, supra note 39,
at 422; Virally, supra note 39, at 133; Waldock, supra note 39, at 45.
43 A. D'AMATO, supra note 39, at 56-66; Waldock, supra note 39, at 43-45. Cf Akehurst,
supra note 39, at 12-27 (qualifies proposition by explaining that the amount of practice neces-
sary to establish a customary rule is much greater in some instances than in others).
44 A. D'AMATO, supra note 39, at 56-59; K. WOLFKE, supra note 39, at 67-68; Akehurst,
supra note 39, at 15-16; Silving, supra note 39, at 625.
45 Silving, supra note 39, at 625. Cf North Sea Cases, supra note 42, at 44 (given the
swiftness of modern communications, passage of short period of time not a bar to formation of
rule of customary international law if other factors of consistency, uniformity, and repetition
are present).
46 See text accompanying note 10 supra.
47 North Sea Cases, supra note 42, at 44.
48 A. D'AMATO, supra note 39, at 59.
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law.49 A practice or custom is most likely to have ripened into a rule
of law if it is regularly observed by those'states which it affects. In
the case of foreign trial observers, considerable repetition has taken
place over the past twenty-five years. The acceptance of more than
400 observers50 attests to the frequency of the practice. Since many
jurists suggest that only a few occurrences of a given -practice will
suffice to meet this test, 1 the sending and acceptance of observers
most likely qualifies.
In addition, to be accepted as a rule of customary law, a practice
ought to be continuous over time and not lapse into periods of dis-
use.52 While trial observers may not have been sent and received on
any regular basis between the World Wars,5 3 the practice has been
continuous since the mid-1950s. Since a recent trend toward con-
tinuity is probably of greater importance than continuity during the
early years of the practice, 4 this requirement is arguably met.
Another factor to consider is the degree to which a practice has
been observed by states which are geographically, economically, and
ideologically diverse.5 5 A consistent practice within a group of homo-
geneous countries (for example, those of Western Europe), while a
regional custom, 56 would not suffice to create a binding international
norm. 7 Trial observers, however, have been accepted in countries
on five continents,58 in both industrialized Western states and devel-
oping Third World nations,5 9 and in countries with market as well as
socialist economies. 60 Therefore, this consideration has been most
likely met.
The final consideration in determining whether trial observation
has entered into customary international law is uniformity of accept-
ance among nations. A practice need not be unanimously accepted
to be uniform;6' the number of states needed to create a rule of cus-
49 Tunkin, supra note 39, at 419; Waldock, supra note 39, at 44.
50 Se note 24 supra.
51 Eg.,'K. WOLFKE, sura note 39, at 68.
52 Kunz, supra note 39, at 666.
53 See generally note 24 sup ra.
54 A. D'AMATO, supra note 39, at 60; Akehurst, supra note 39, at 20-21.
55 See, e.g., North Sea Cases, sura note 42, at 43; Tunkin, supra note 35, at 427-28.
56 See, e.g., Asylum Case, [1950] I.CJ. 266, 276-77; Case Concerning Right of Passage
Over Indian Territory, [1960] I.C.J. 6, 38.
57 Waldock, supra note 39, at 44.
58 The exceptions are Antarctica and Australia.
59 Western industrial states which have received foreign trial observers include the
United States, the United Kingdom, and West Germany. Included among Third World na-
tions receiving trial observers are Cameroon, Guyana, and India. See note 24 supra.
60 For example, Canada, France, Tanzania, and Yugoslavia. See note 24 suipra.
61 Kunz, sura note 39, at 666; Waldock, supra note 39, at 44.
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tomary international law varies according to the scope of the rule's
applicability among nations.62 Here, the relevant inquiry is how
many states actually hold political trials to which observers might be
sent and how many of those states refuse to permit the practice.63 Of
the many states which hold political trials, only a few have at-
tempted to avoid receiving foreign trial observers. Czechoslovakia,
for example, expelled observers in 1967 and 1979. In 1976 and 1977,
it permitted an observer to remain in a courthouse while refusing
him entry to the courtroom itself supposedly because of insufficient
room. In 1970, 1971, and 1978, Czech officals adjourned trials en-
tirely rather than face international scrutiny in reports of trial
observers.64
There are other examples of refusing foreign trial observers.
Greece accepted international observers to twenty-seven trials from
1959 to 1974, but refused an I.C.J. observer for the Mangakis trial in
1970.65 Iran accepted a dozen observers from 1965 to 1978,66 but in
1970 barred an observer from a trial and deported him from the
country; his Iranian interpreter was arrested and sentenced to ten
years in prison.67 Other nations that have barred observers by vari-
ous means at one time or another include Bulgaria,"8 Chile,69 Colom-
bia, 70 the Dominican Republic under Trujillo (visa refused), 71 Egypt
(visa delayed),72 Nicaragua (trial delayed after one day of observa-
62 Waldock, supra note 39, at 44.
63 See Akehurst, supra note 39, at 20, and I.C.J. opinions cited therein.
64 See note 24 sufra.
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 AI ANNUAL REPORT, 1971-1972, at 49 (1972); AI ANNUAL REPORT, 1970-1971, at
68-69 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Iran - Heldman/AI (1970)]. The Iranian government was
also so irked by a particularly critical report in 1972 that it refused "official" observers for six
years until 1978, but did sparingly permit foreign observers in their "private" capacity. See
Iran - Albala ef aZ /AIJD (1978), supra note 14; M. Zavrian, Rapport sur une mission A
T hran du 12 au 18 septembre 1973 (Sept. 23, 1973) (unpublished report to the F~d~ration
Internationale des Droits de l'Homme) [hereinafter cited as Iran - Zavrian/FIDH (1973)];
N. Albala, Report on Mission to Iran, January/February 1972 (Feb. 14, 1972) (unpublished
report to Amnesty International) [hereinafter cited as Iran - Albala/AI (1972)].
68 W. Sporn, Report on the Case of Dr. Henry Spetter (Aug. 14, 1974) (unpublished
report to Amnesty International) [hereinafter cited as Bulgaria - Spetter/AI (1974)].
69 13 Go on Trial in Chile; 2 US Lawvers Barred, N.Y. Times, April 23, 1975, at 14, col. 4.
The two lawyers were from the Center for Constitutional Rights in New York; international
organizations have been more successful in sending observers to trials in Chile.
70 Soon after Amnesty International issued a very critical report on Colombia, it at-
tempted to send a trial observer, but the Colombian government refused. See AI, AMNESTY
INTERNATIONAL REPORT 122-25 (1980).
71 International Commission of Jurists, Press Release (Nov. 29, 1961) [hereinafter cited
as Dominican Republic - Trujillo (1961)].
72 International Commission of Jurists, Press Release (Jan. 18, 1962); The Cairo Tal of
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tion), Poland (place and time of trial kept secret or entry to country
refused),"4 a former colony of Portugal (visa refused or observer de-
tained by secret police)," 5 South Africa (trial adjourned after two and
one-half days of observations),76 Spain (on one occasion, observers
refused; on another, observers were refused by local officials and then
admitted)," Taiwan (observer barred),78 and the U.S.S.R. (court-
room not yet open and then courtroom said to be full; visa refused to
nongovernmental observer, but trials theoretically open). 9
Not all nations which have been hostile to trial observers object to
them all the time. The recalcitrant states may, indeed, accept the
principle of trial observers but feel that one of the exceptions dis-
cussed below is applicable in their particular instance. Also, the na-
tions which have accepted observers far outnumber those which have
refused them. The practices of some countries - for example,
Czechoslovakia, Greece, and Spain - have not been consistent from
year to year. Even those countries which have been responsible for
most of the refusals, for example, Czechoslovakia and the U.S.S.R.,
do not generally deny the request of foreign observers to attend trials;
they maintain a theoretical right to open trial while denying admis-
sion to observers by such ploys as saying that the courtroom is full.
Since virtually all countries which hold political trials have agreed to
accommodate international trial observers at one time or another
and since none has explicitly denied the right to attend, the practice
of receiving international observers is sufficiently uniform to be
deemed a part of customary international law.
Since the practice of receiving international trial observers meets
French Dilomats, 14 BULL. INT'L COMM'N JUR. 34 (1962) (the visa was finally granted, but
only on the second day of trial).
73 AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, THE REPUBLIC OF NICARAGUA: AN AMNESTY INTERNA-
TIONAL REPORT 42 (1977) [hereinafter cited as AI NICARAGUA REPORT].
74 Darnton, UN. Worker Reported in Shock Over Polish Tial as NA TO Spy, Minneapolis
Tribune, Apr. 13, 1980, at 16A [hereinafter cited as Poland - Hadding/ICJ (1980)]; M. de
Montfort, Report of an Amnesty International Mission to Warsaw, 4-8 June, 1977 (unpub-
lished report to Amnesty International) [hereinafter cited as Poland - de Montfort/AI
(1977)].
75 AI ANNUAL REPORT, 1965-1966, at 9 (1966); International Commission of Jurists,
Press Release (Sept. 13, 1960).
76 See J. Archer, Report on Visit to South Africa (June 4, 1975) (unpublished report to
the International Commission ofJurists) [hereinafter cited as S. Africa - Archer/ICJ (1975)].
77 S. Suckow, Report on Observer Mission - Appeal Before the Supreme Court of
Spain in the Matter of Case 1001, Madrid, February 11, 1975 (Feb. 17, 1975) (unpublished
report to the International Commission of Jurists) [hereinafter cited as Spain - Suckow/ICJ
(1975)].
78 J. Seymour, Report of a Mission to Taiwan, September 1975 (undated) (unpublished
report to Amnesty International) [hereinafter cited as Taiwan - Seymour/Al (1975)].
79 See British Foreign Office Letter, supra note 37.
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the tests of duration, repetition, continuity, generality, and uniform-
ity, it satisfies the requirement of general acceptance among nations.
It is more difficult to state with assurance that the practice satisfies
the second criterion of customary international law, that of accept-
ance or "opiniojuris."
In order to met the opiniojuris requirement, the practice must be
one which is accepted as law in the international community.8" Ac-
cording to the weight of authority, there would have to exist mutual
agreement among nations that foreign observers are entitled as of
right to attend trials of human rights concern. Otherwise, the opinio
juris requirement would not be satisfied and the practice, although
persistent and widespread, would not constitute a rule of customary
international law.8 A growing minority of jurists hold that frequent
repetition may generate a conviction of legal duty82 and that opinio
juris may be inferred or presumed upon a prima facie showing that
the practice is unusually well-established and widespread. 83
Whatever the theoretically correct view of opiniojuris, it is debata-
ble whether sovereign nations feel legally constrained to admit for-
eign observers into their courts of law. A noncomplying state could
argue that past observers have been accepted only as a matter of
comity, political expedience,84 imitation, courtesy, or protocol.8 5
However, most countries have accepted observers in the past in rec-
ognition of an internationally guaranteed right to an open trial.8"
Hence, a strong argument can be made that the acceptance of
international trial observers has become a rule of customary interna-
tional law. The practice is well established and accepted within the
international community; those nations which on occasion resist ac-
cepting trial observers have not condemned the practice itself. Even
if a nation believes it is not bound by customary international law to
admit foreign observers to its political trials, it may feel constrained
to do so to be consistent with international practice and to demon-
strate the fairness and openness of its criminal justice system.
There are several other international legal principles which sus-
tain the right of observers to attend trials throughout the world. The
first of these is the fundamental right to a fair and open trial.
80 Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(1)(b).
81 See sources cited supra note 45.
82 C. PARRY, supra note 39, at 62.
83 North Sea Cases, sura note 42, at 230-32 (dissenting opinion of Judge Lachs);
Waldock, supra note 39, at 48-49.
84 See, e.g., Asylum Case, [1950] I.C.J. 266.
85 Tunkin, supra note 39, at 420.
86 See note 87 infra.
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B. The Rzght to a Fair and Open Tn'al
The right to a public trial has been established in several interna-
tional human rights instruments. The Universal Declaration of
Human Rights provides in Article 10 that "[e]veryone is entitled in
full equality to a fair and public hearing. . . of any criminal charge
against him." '87 Article 11 adds that "[e]veryone charged with a pe-
nal offense has the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty
according to law in a public trial. .. ."8 Both of these provisions
were adopted without dissent by the United Nations General
Assembly.89
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights pro-
vides that:
[I]n the determination of any criminal charge against him, or
of his rights and obligations in a suit at law, everyone shall be
entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, in-
dependent and impartial tribunal established by law.90
This covenant has been ratified by over sixty nations, including some
which refused foreign trial observers before the treaty came into
force.
There are also regional treaties which guarantee the right to an
open trial. The American Convention on Human Rights provides
that criminal proceedings shall be public,9 while the European Con-
vention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms establishes the right to public hearing for everyone in the
"determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal
charge against him. . ."" There have been only a very few cases
challenging a member nation of the European Convention for failing
87 G.A. Res. 217A(III), U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948) [hereinafter cited as Universal
Declaration]..
88 Id
89 The words "and public" of Article 10 were added by Mr. Perez Cisneros of Cuba and
adopted by a vote of twenty-two in favor, none against, with nine abstentions. The General
Assembly later unanimously passed Article 10. All of the draft texts of Article 11 contained
provisions for public trial and no effort on the part of any delegates was made to delete these
words. Article I1 passed the drafting body with forty-two votes in favor, none against, and
two abstentions; the General Assembly later approved it without dissent. A. VERDOODT,
NAISSANCE ET SIGNIFICATION DE LA DECLARATION UNIVERSELLE DES DROITS DE L'HOMME
125 (1964) [hereinafter cited as VERDOODT].
90 G. A. Res. 2200 (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 54, U.N. Doc. A/6316, Arti-
cle 14(1), adopted Dec. 19, 1966, entered intoforce Mar. 23, 1976.
9' O.A.S. Treaty Series No. 36, at 1, O.A.S. Off. Rec. O.E.A./Ser. L/V/II.23 doc. rev. 2,
art. 8(5), signed Nov. 22, 1969, entered into force July 18, 1978.
92 213 U.N.T.S. 222, art. 6(1), signed Nov. 4, 1950, entered intoforce Sept. 3, 1953 [hereinaf-
ter cited as European Convention].
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to provide a public hearing.93 In one case in which military discipli-
nary proceedings took place in camera, the European Court of Human
Rights did find a violation of the right to public hearing guaranteed
in the European Convention.94
The right to a public trial seems to have been an unquestioned
fundamental assumption for drafters of international human rights
treaties either because of a long domestic history of public trials or
due to domestic constitutional, statutory, and common law protec-
tions.95 All draft texts of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
93 Very few cases may have arisen under the European Convention because the domes-
tic law of all of the European nations subscribing to the Convention provides for public trials.
Se ANNALES DE LA FACULTE DE DROIT ET DES SCIENCES POLITIQUES ET ECONOMIQUES DE
STRASBOURG, LA PROTECTION INTERNATIONALE DES DROITS DE LHOMME DANS LE CADRE
EUROPEEN 127-39 (1961). The following cases were declared inadmissible by the European
Commission of Human Rights: Xaganst Austia, 35 EUR. COMM. OF HUMAN RIGHTS COL-
LECTION OF DECISIONS 109 (Application No. 3959/69, decision of 21 July 1970) (applicant
protested in camera proceeding of the Austrian Administrative Court, found not to be con-
cerned with the applicant's civil rights or obligations within the competence of the Commis-
sion); tupport against the Federal Republic of Germany, 27 EUR. COMM. OF HUMAN RIGHTS
COLLECTION OF DECISIONS 61 (Application No. 2804/66, decision of 16 July 1968) (appli-
cant asserted proceedings in Berlin Regional Court to determine his civil liability were not
public; Commission found that the main proceedings before the Regional Court were public);
[1958-1959] Y.B. EUR. CONY. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 382 (Application No. 462/59, decision of 7
July 1959) (applicant protested that certain appellate proceedings were not conducted in
public; held, this did not constitute a violation of the public trial provision.); Xaganst Austna
[1964] Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 212 (Application No. 1931/63, decision of 2
October 1964) (applicant was disciplined by Bar Association in a private hearing; these pro-
ceedings did not affect applicant's civil rights or obligations within the competence of the
Commission).
94 ENGEL AND OTHERS CASE, [1976] Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 490 (Eur.
Court of Human Rights). Applicants were members of the Netherlands Armed Forces and
were punished on different occasions for breaches of the rules of military discipline. Each
applicant appealed to the Supreme Military Court which confirmed the penalties after in
camera proceedings. The government of the Netherlands left the admissibility of the claim of
a lack of a public trial to the discretion of the European Commission on Human Rights.
[19721 Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 538. The European Court on Human Rights
found that the in camera proceedings violated Article 6, section 1 because they were not in
public, [1976] Y.B. EuR. CONY. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 498, but declined to give the applicants
any compensation, id at 500.
The European Commission has considered the question of whether a hearing must be
oral, with parties present in order to satisfy the requirement of a fair and public hearing. In X
against the Federal Republic of Germnany, [1963] Y.B. EUR. CONY. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 462,
482-84, the Commission found that an appeals procedure may be conducted fully in writing,
without an oral appearance, where the defendant, represented by competent legal counsel,
had originally appeared and orally stated his case which was fully transcribed. Accord, A. and
B. X Against the Federal Republic of Germany, [1961] Y.B. EUR. CoNV. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 286,
294 (the public hearing provision does not apply to an appellate tribunal when it decides
whether the requirements for lodging and appeal to a higher court are met, and when it does
not rule on the rights and obligations of the applicant); see J. FAWCErT, THE APPLICATION
OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 151 (1969).
95 See ALBANIA CONST. art. 102; AUSTRIA CRIM. PROC. CODE ch. 18, § 228 (1975); BAR-
BADOS CONST. art. 18(9); BELGIUM CONST. art. 96 (1831, amended 1893, 1920, 1921); BOLIVIA
CONST. art. 18, para. 2, art. 19, para. 4; BRAZIL PENAL CODE art. 792 (1941); BULGARIA
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contained a provision for a public trial; the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights simply copied the provision for a public
trial from the text of the European Convention.96 Most likely the
drafters of the international conventions guaranteed a public trial for
the same reasons and to accomplish the same purposes that have tra-
ditionally been attributed to public trials. These purposes include
fairness and protection of the defendant, accurate fact-finding, pub-
lic education, and the airing of important issues.
The right to a public trial, as provided in international and re-
gional instruments, is primarily intended to help ensure a fair trial
and protect a defendant from abuse of criminal process.97 This right
belongs to the accused, as demonstrated by the language stated
above. Moreover, the right to a public trial is listed in the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the European
Convention with other provisions protecting the rights of the defend-
ant, such as the right to be presumed innocent 98 and the right to
utilize counsel in one's own behalf,99 indicating that the drafters of
the documents viewed the right to a public trial as a right belonging
to the defendant as well as one that would help ensure a fair trial.100
CONST. art. 137(2); CANADA BILL OF RIGHTS 2(F); COLOMBIA PENAL CODE ch. II, art. 507
(1975); CZECHOSLOVAKIA CONST. art. 103, § 2; DOMINICAN REPUBLIC CONSr. art. 8, § 2();
ECUADOR CONST. art. 95; FRANCE PENAL PROC. CODE art. 309 (1978-79); GAMBIA CONST.
art. 20(9); GREECE CoNsT. arts. 93(2), 96(3), 97; GUATEMALA CONST. art. 240, para. 3;
GUYANA CONsT. art. 144(9); HAITI CONST. art. 122; HUNGARY CONST. ch. III, § 49(1); IRAQ
INTERIM CONST. art. 20(c) (1970); IRELAND CONST. art. 34, § 1 (1937, amended 1939, 1941);
ISRAEL CoNsT. DOGS. IX, Court Law 38; JAMAICA CONST. ch. III, § 20(3); JAPAN CONST.
art. 37; KENYA CONST. art. 77, §§ 10-11 (1963, revijed 1965, amended 1967); MALTA CONST.
art. 40(3), (4) (1964, amended 1965, 1966, 1970, 1972, 1974); MAURITIUS CONST. art. 10(9),
(10); MEXICO CoNsT. art. 94; MONGOLIA CONST. art. 70; MOROCCO PENAL PROC. CODE
art. 301 (1959); NETHERLANDS CONST. art. 175; LAW OF THE ORGANIZATION OF THE JUDICI-
ARY, No. 62-11, art. 2 (Niger 1962); PERU CONST. art. 233(3); PHILIPPINES CONST. art. 4,
§ 19; POLAND CONST. art. 63.1 (1952, amended 1954, 1957, 1960, 1961, 1963); PORTUGAL
CONST. art. 211; ROMANIA CONST. art. 110 (1965, amended 1968, 1971, 1974, 1975); RWANDA
CONST. art. 88; SIERRA LEONE CONST. ch. II, § 13(3); S. KOREA CONST. art. 110; TRINIDAD
AND TOBAGO CONST. ch. 1, § 5(2)(f)(ii); U.S.S.R. CONST. art. 157; U.S. CONST. amend. VI;
URUGUAY CONST. art. 22; VIETNAM CONST. art. 133; YUGOSLAVIA CONST. art. 227; ZAMBIA
CONST. art. 20, §§ 10-11.
96 See note 90 supra and accompanying text.
97 The Declaration of Human Rights and the American Convention on Human Rights
speak only in terms of the criminal process. The International Convenant on Civil and Polit-
ical Rights and the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms provide a public trial for both criminal and civil matters. The criminal
process will therefore be the focus of the above discussion, though in most cases arguments
made concerning a criminal public trial would apply equally well to a civil public trial.
98 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, sup-'a note 90, art. 14(2); Euro-
pean Convention, supra note 92, art. 6(2).
99 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 90, art. 14(3)(b);
European Convention, supira note 92, art. 6(3)(c).
100 This same reasoning was applied to pretrial proceedings in Gannett Co. v. DePas-
International Trial Observers
A public trial helps ensure the integrity of the judicial process.
Surveillance by the public and the media pressures both judge and
prosecutor to carry out their duties with impartiality and profession-
alism. Blackstone wrote that the judge must rule "in the face of the
country. . . which must curb any secret bias or partiality that might
arise in his own breast."' 0'1 Bentham spoke of publicity as "the soul of
justice; it ought to be extended to every part of the procedure, and to
all causes."'0 2 Other commentators have stressed the openness of a
trial as promoting judicial trustworthiness.10 3
Public trials may also facilitate accurate fact-finding. A witness is
thought to be more apt to speak the truth in public than in pri-
vate.1°4 Publicity given to the trial may also serve to produce new
witnesses who would not have been made aware of an ongoing trial if
conducted in secret.'05 Again, public scrutiny helps to assure that all
procedural safeguards are properly, fully, and equitably applied; this
fairness in turn serves to promote the full and accurate discovery of
the truth.
There is also a social interest in the openness of trials that extends
beyond the defendant's interest in a fair trial. Public trials serve to
educate the public and can lead to reforms and refinements in the
quale, 443 U.S. 368, 387 n.18 (1979), in the context of the sixth amendment. The inclusion of
the right to public trial guarantee in the same amendment that contained other fair trial
rights indicated that open trials were associated with the rights of the accused. In Gannett the
Court permitted pretrial proceedings to be closed. More recently, however, the United States
Supreme Court refused to view the right to an open trial as belonging to the defendant so that
it might be waived. Instead, the Court held the open trial to be an "indispensable attribute of
an Anglo-American trial" whereby the Constitution affords the public the right to attend
criminal trials - even in the absence of a specific constitutional provision. Richmond News-
papers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 569 (1980). In so holding, the Court traced the history of
public trials from the Norman Conquest of England to the present day and significantly
noted the "nexus between openness, fairness, and the perception of fairness ... " Id at 570;
ef Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560 (1981) (permitting televised trials).
101 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES* 372.
102 1 J. BENTHAM, THE RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 523 (1827).
103 See 6 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1834, at 438 (J. Chadbourn ed. 1976); Powell, The
Right to a Fair Tial, 51 A.B.A.J. 534, 538 (1965); Note, Pretrial Hearings, 11 TEX. TECH. L.
REV. 159, 163-65 (1979); Note, The Supreme Cour4, 1978 Tm, 93 HARV. L. REV. 60, 66-67
(1979); Note, The Right to Attend Criminal Hearings, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1308, 1324-26 (1978).
104 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES* 375.
105 6J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1834, at 438 (J. Chadbourn ed. 1976). See Estes v. Texas,
381 U.S. 532, 583 (1965). "Clearly, the openness of the proceedings provides other benefits as
well: it arguably improves the quality of testimony, it may induce unknown witnesses to
come forward with relevant testimony, it may move all trial participants to perform their
duties conscientiously, and it gives the public the opportunity to observe the courts in the
performance of their duties and to determine whether they are performing adequately." (foot-
note omitted). Id.
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criminal process."°6 The ability of the public to participate in the
trial by observation may also serve to promote both the retributive
and deterrent aspects of the criminal justice system.10 7
The most controversial trials also raise complex questions of great
import to society at large.' Such questions must ultimately be re-
solved by the public through legislative change or reform. An open
trial focuses the public's attention on the ethical, political, and legal
questions raised by a case.' 0 9
Thus, apart from international custom and written guarantees,
there are sound public policy reasons for safeguarding the right to an
open trial. As will be seen, many of the public benefits of open trial
are enhanced by the presence of impartial international observers.
C. International Tial Observers and State Soverezgnty
Occasionally, a government recognizing the right to public trials
has refused to permit foreign observers to attend trials on the ground
that the presence of an observer might impermissibly interfere in its
domestic affairs. In one instance, after having permitted foreign ob-
servers on several other occasions, the Iranian government refused a
French observer in 1972 on the ground that the trial was "a matter of
internal affairs."' As noted above, a very substantial practice of
sending and receiving observers has developed in the last twenty-five
years. Hence, this claim of interference must be regarded as suspect,
but worthy of scrutiny.
The interplay of Articles 2(7), 55, and 56 of the U.N. Charter
provides a point of departure for determining whether certain con-
duct interferes in a state's domestic affairs. Article 55 provides that
the United Nations "help promote. . . universal respect for, and ob-
servance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms.""' In Article
56 all "members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action
106 Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 428 (1979) (Blackmun, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
107 Mueller, Problems Posed by Publicil to Crime and Criminal Proceedings, 110 U. PA. L. REV.
1, 6-7 (1960).
108 See Dreyfus trial report, supra note 11; IN RE ALGER Hiss (E. Tiger ed. 1979). Other
controversial U.S. trials include Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Regents
of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
109 See Note, Trial Secreqy and the First Amendment Rght of Public Access tojudicial Proceedings,
91 HARV. L. REv. 1899, 1904-09 (1977); Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 495
(1975) ("information appears to us to be of critical importance to our type of government in
which the citizenry is the final judge of the proper conduct of public business.").
110 C. Bourguet, La repression en Iran: Rapport sur une mission it T6hran du 21 au 28
f~vrier 1972, at 7 (Mar. 4, 1972) (unpublished report to the International Association of Dem-
ocratic Lawyers) [hereinafter cited as Iran - Bourguet/ AIJD (1972)].
111 U.N. CHARTER art. 55 & art. 55, para. c.
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in cooperation with the organization for the achievement of the pur-
poses set forth in Article 55.
"112
Pursuant to that authority the United Nations has promulgated
the International Bill of Human Rights,1"' which recognizes a right
to public trial and a number of other elements of fair criminal pro-
ceedings. However, observing a trial calls for observing the internal
workings of a nation, at least with respect to its system of justice. Not
only does trial observation call for review of the judicial and
prosecutorial functions, but the practices of the police and the prison
system are also opened to scrutiny. Many nations are not anxious to
be so closely examined, believing these matters to be primarily do-
mestic concerns. Governments which object to such scrutiny may
rely on Article 2(7), which provides as follows:
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the
United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within
the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the mem-
bers to submit such matters to settlement under the present
Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application
of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.114
Under article 2(7) two critical questions arise: (1) What are matters
which are "essentially within the domestic jurisdiction"? (2) What
sort of conduct constitutes "intervention"?
1. Are human rtights violations matters of essentially domestic concern?
Most, if not all, governments have in practice considered viola-
tions of human rights and fundamental freedoms to be matters of
international concern." 5 Press reports and the debates of the United
112 U.N. CHARTER art. 56.
113 The International Bill of Human Rights is comprised of four documents: (a) The
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. RES. 217A, U.N. Doc. A/8 10, at 71; (b) the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, openedfor signature Dec. 19, 1966, G.A.
RES. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (16) 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967), entered into force Mar. 23,
1976; (c) the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for
signature Dec. 19, 1966, G.A. RES. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (16) 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316
(1967), enteredintoforce Jan. 3, 1976; and (d) Optional Protocol to the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, openedfar signature Dec. 19, 1966, G.A. RES. 2200, 21 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (16) 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967), entered into force Mar. 23, 1976; see Sohn, The
Universal.Declaration vfHuman Rights, 8 J. INT'L COMM'N JUR. 17 (1967); E. SCHWELB, HUMAN
RIGHTS AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY (1964); J. CAREY, U.N. PROTECTION OF
CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 12-19 (1970); Newman, Interpreting the Human Rt'hts Clauses of
the U.N. Charter, 5 HUMAN RIGHTS J. 283, 285 n.7 (1972); Humphrey, The InternationalLaw of
Human Rights in the Middle Twentieth Centuq in THE PRESENT STATE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND OTHER ESSAYS 75,85 (M. Bos ed. 1973); E. LUARD, THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION
OF HuMAN RIGHTS 53 (1967).
114 U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 7 (emphasis added).
115 See Buergenthal, Domestic Jurisdiction, Intervention, and Human Rights: The International
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Nations organs during the past decade disclose numerous occasions
when governmental representatives from perhaps every nation have
criticized the human rights misconduct of other countries."1 6 Ironi-
cally, some of the same governments claim interference in their own
internal affairs. Such claims appear to be made mostly for reasons of
political expedience, rather than out of any belief in their underlying
validity.
2. What s intervention?
The practices of U.N. bodies and individual states indicate that
discussions and recommendations regarding human rights do not vi-
olate the non-intervention principles of Article 2(7). 17 However,
other more direct actions might constitute intervention. The prac-
tices of the U.N. and other international organizations indicate that
the appropriate response to human rights violations may depend on
the gravity and frequency of the violations. There seems to be a con-
Law Perspective, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 111, 114-16 (P. Brown & D.
MacLean eds. 1979). But see Watson, Autointerpretation, Competence, and the Continuing Validity of
Article 2(7) of the UN Charter, 71 AM. J. INT'L L. 60, 71-77 (1977) (practice is irrelevant).
The legal debate which still rages over the meaning of Article 2(7) establishes that its
meaning is not so "plain" as to prevent recourse to these materials. See Preuss, Article 2 Para-
graph 7 of the Charter of the United Nations and Matters of DomesticJurisdiction, 74 RECUEIL DES
COURS 545, 605 n.2 (1949) [hereinafter cited as Preuss]. It was frequently pointed out by
delegates at the United Nations Conference on International Organization in San Francisco
in 1945 that the terms "to intervene" and "essentially within the domestic jurisdiction" were
ambiguous phrases which derived no content from contemporaneous international law. Most
important, however, the framers intended that, as a constitutional provision, Article 2(7) had
to be "flexible" so that its meaning could be derived through a process of evolution in state
practice and international organization. Id at 597 et seq.
116 For example, at the 1980 session of the U.N. Commission of Human Rights, Syria
critiqued Israel's treatment of the Palestinians. Cuba criticized the United States for its treat-
ment of native Americans; the Soviet Union followed with human rights criticisms of
Kampuchea, and of the U.S. for its "political prisoners," poor prison conditions, and treat-
ment of blacks and native Americans. The Ethiopian delegate then discussed human rights
violations in the Soviet Union, Chile, and South Africa. The Philippine delegate mentioned
Kampuchea. Israel proceeded with a discussion of repression in the Soviet Union and Syria.
The Ukranian delegate mentioned human rights problems in Kampuchea and Northern Ire-
land. Vietnam discussed problems in Kampuchea, the U.S., Canada, China, Australia, and
the Philippines. The Iranian delegate mentioned Afghanistan and Kampuchea as being simi-
lar. The Hungarian delegate then expressed concern over Iran's detention of the U.S. diplo-
mats. Italy was concerned over Sakharov in the Soviet Union. Czechoslovakia expressed
concern over Guatemala and Equatorial Guinea. Nongovernmental organizations then were
permitted to discuss Guatemala, the U.S., Chile, Argentina, Brazil, Indonesia, Singapore,
Uruguay, Kampuchea, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Tunisia, Poland, France, the United Kingdom,
and Czechoslovakia. The U.N. Commission on Human Rights took actions concerning Chile,
South Africa, Israel, Cyprus, Kampuchea, Nicaragua, Guatemala, Argentina, Bolivia,
Burma, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Malawi, Paraguay, South Korea, Uganda, and Uruguay. See
generaly U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1408.
117 Ermacora, Human Rzghts and Domestic Jurisdiction (Article 2, § 7, of the Charter), 124
RECUEIL DES COURS 371, 432 (1968).
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sensus in the U.N. that massive and flagrant human rights violations
may justify the most strident condemnations." 8 If a human rights
situation threatens international peace, even Security Council action
may be justified. At the other end of the spectrum, individual
human rights violations generally do not provoke U.N. action be-
yond debate unless they represent a consistent pattern of gross viola-
tions or the Optional Protocol to the Civil and Political Covenant" 9
applies. 120
On several occasions United Nations bodies have appointed fact-
finding commissions to consider particularly grievous human rights
situations. 12 1 Some of these investigative commissions have been
mandated without the consent of the state subject to inquiry, 2 2 but
it appears clear from U.N. practice that the actual sending of U.N.
fact-finding commissions requires consent to avoid domestic interfer-
ence.'2 ' Since representatives of an international organization are
not admitted as of right, this suggests that individual sovereign states
may also send observers only at the sufferance of the receiving state,
even though domestic observers may attend as a matter of right.
While the United Nations, other intergovernmental organiza-
118 G.A. Res. 32/130, 32 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 45) 150, U.N. Doc. A/32/45 (1977).
119 See note 113 supra.
120 Of course, it is unclear whether this graduated approach is merely a record of U.N.
prudence or represents the jurisprudence of Article 2(7).
121 See, e.g., Report of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protec-
tion of Minorities on Human Rights in Democratic Kampuchea, 35 U.N. CHR, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/1335 (1979); Interim Report of the Ad Hoe Working Group of Experts of the Com-
mission of Human Rights, 30 U.N. CHR, U.N. E/CN.4/1135 (1974); Report of the Ad Hoc
Working Group of Experts of the Commission on Human Rights, 26 U.N. CHR, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/1020 (1970); Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group to Inquire into the Situation of
Human Rights in Chile, 33 U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/33/331, at 1 and Annex I (1978).
122 Ermacora, International Enquiy Commissions in the Field of Human Rights, 1 HUMAN
RIGHTS J. 180, 188 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Ermacora, Enquiq Procedures]; van Bouen, Fact-
Finding in the Field of Human Rights, 3 ISRAEL Y.B. HUMAN RIGHTS 93, 107-15 (1973) [herein-
after cited as van Bouen]. Although the League of Nations enquiry commissions were never
appointed without the consent of the concerned parties, see W. SHORE, FACT-FINDING IN THE
MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE 25 (1970) [hereinafter cited as SHORE], the U.N.
has conducted extended enquiries in South Africa, Israel, and Chile over the objections of
those governments. Rapporteurs have, in addition, been asked to provide substantial reports
on human rights conditions in such nations as Equatorial Guinea (U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1371
(1980)), Kampuchea (U.N. Doc. E/CH.4/1335 (1979)), and Nicaragua (U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/
Sub.2/426 (1979)), as well as on the disappeared persons in Chile (U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1362
(1980)). Communications regarding human rights violations under Economic and Social
Council Resolution 1503 (XLVIII) E.S.C. Res. 1503, 48 U.N. ECOSOC, Supp. (No. IA),
U.N. Doc. E/4832/Add.1 (1970), must have the express consent of the concerned state before
they can be the subject of thorough on-site investigations, but direct contacts under resolution
1503 have permitted some related fact-finding.
123 Leary, When Does the Implementation oflnterationalHuman Rights Constitute Interference into
the Esrentially Domestic Afairs of a State - The Interactions of Articles 2(7), 55 and .56 of the UN.
Charter, in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AND PRACTICE U. Tuttle ed. 1978).
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tions, and governments may be capable of interfering in the domestic
affairs of nations, nongovernmental organizations are not subject to
the same sovereignty objection. The principle of non-intervention
regulates relations between states but not the conduct of individuals
or nongovernmental organizations, which are merely groups of indi-
viduals. The rationale for the principle of non-interference: govern-
ments mutually wish to avoid disturbing each other's domestic
tranquility, because states possess military, economic, and other coer-
cive powers which must be kept in check if nations are to remain at
peace. Since nongovernmental organizations lack such powers, they
do not have the capacity to interfere impermissibly in the internal
affairs of states, providing they do not violate domestic law.
It is true that nongovernmental organizations often criticize gov-
ernments for their human rights violations and send fact-finding mis-
sions to determine whether violations are occurring. But it would be
difficult for a state to characterize these activities as a threat to its
sovereignty, since for the most part private trial observers attend pro-
ceedings which should be open to the public and press in any event.
Observers rarely make public statements about the trial while it is in
progress. Moreover, observers are generally distinguished lawyers
who can be trusted not to disrupt the proceedings. Hence, a govern-
ment cannot legitimately contend that nongovernmental trial ob-
servers interfere in its internal affairs. In fact, only one or two lower-
level officials in a few countries have actually raised such an objec-
tion, and most nations have freely admitted observers to trials.
Limited governmental observation at foreign trials is arguably
not sufficient to constitute interference with another state's sover-
eignty. Attendance by diplomats is very similar to consular visits to
trials involving a country's own citizens who are arrested abroad. No
challenge to sovereignty need be implied; attendance merely reflects
interest in the case as an important event.
Except for Lord Russell's report on the Dreyfus trial, no embassy
has ever issued a public report as a result of trial observation -
much less a report during the proceedings themselves. While the
presence of the diplomatic observer may make the litigants and the
court somewhat more careful, that extra caution will presumably en-
sure that the nation's own laws and procedures are fairly enforced -
hardly an illegitimate interference in the internal affairs of another
country. While major governmental fact-finding missions, like U.N.
missions, probably require the consent of the observed nation, low-
key diplomatic observation should not be considered undue interfer-
ence with a state's internal affairs.
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D. Sovereignty Over Frontiers and Admisszn of Observers
In one respect questions of national sovereignty may arise in
many nongovernmental observer missions since every state has the
right to regulate entry across its frontiers.' 24 Accordingly, a nation
may refuse an observer the right to cross its borders just as it may
refuse entry to any foreigner. The Dominican Republic under Presi-
dent Trujillo 125 and the Soviet Union have denied visas to trial ob-
servers.1 26 Nongovernmental organizations may respond by selecting
trial observers who do not, because of their nationalities, require
visas. These individuals may still be turned back at point of entry, as
happened to an I.C.J. observer in Poland during 1980.127 But once
observers actually arrive - particularly at a courthouse - most gov-
ernments do not refuse them entry to fulfill their missions. It might
also be suggested that a nation's absolute sovereignty over its borders
should be limited when the sole reason for denying entry is to deny
access to trials of human rights importance.128 Certainly, nations
that do not admit observers are roundly criticized and it is always
inferred that they have reason to conceal the proceedings. 129 Fear of
embarrassment usually suffices to overcome any reluctance to admit
a trial observer.
E. Domestic Limitations on the Right to Public Trial and the Role of
International Observers
Articles 10 and 11 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights' 30 provide for public trial without apparent exception. How-
ever, Section 2 of Article 29, in reference to the entire Declaration,
limits the exercise of the rights to the "just requirements of morality,
public order and the general welfare . .,,13 Accordingly, the right
124 See, e.g., Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1891); Chae Chan Ping v. United
States, 130 U.S. 581, 630-04 (1889); J. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 162 (6th ed. 1963).
125 See note 71 supra.
126 Trial ofIntellectuair in Moscow, International Commission of Jurists, Press Release (Jan.
24, 1968); International Commission of Jurists, Press Release (Dec. 25, 1970); Repression in
Eastern Europe 1 INT'L COMM'N JuR. REV. 1, 5 (1969); ICJ Protests Against Bukousy Trial,
International Commission ofJurists, Press Release Jan. 11, 1972); Disident OrthodoxP Aist 6aes
On Trial in Moscow, N.Y. Times, Aug. 26, 1980, at 5, col. 1.
127 Poland - Madding/ICJ (1980), supra note 74.
128 See G. GOODWIN-GILL, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE MOVEMENT OF PERSONS BE-
TWEEN STATES 162-63 (1978).
129 See, e.g., Amnesty International, Violations of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan 14-15 (mimeo 1979) (refusal to let an ob-
server see an allegedly tortured prisoner gives greater credibility to torture charges).
130 Universal Declaration, supra note 87.
131 Id at 77.
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to a public trial is constrained by morality and national security. 13 2
Many national constitutions and laws also make exceptions to the
right to public trial in the interest of public order and morality.133
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights lists
five separate exceptions to the right to a public trial: (1) moral con-
cerns, (2) public order, (3) national security, (4) privacy interests of
the parties, and (5) prejudice to the judicial process because of pub-
licity.134 . The European Convention adds an exception where the
interests of juveniles require privacy.' The scope of these excep-
tions is conceivably so broad as to place practically no restraint on
secret trials.13 1 In practice, however, the exceptions do not signifi-
cantly undercut the right.
1. Moral Concerns.
The public may be excluded from the courtroom where the pros-
ecution or testimony may have a corrupting influence. 37 The public
132 During the debate on Article 11, the delegate of the U.S.S.R. stated that in the inter-
est of public morality or national security, it was necessary to carry on the judicial process in
secret. At the request of the French delegate, the delegate from Yugoslavia explained that
Section 2 of Article 29 covered the situations of concern to the Russian delegate. This was
apparently found satisfactory. The Russian delegate also proposed similar exclusions for Arti-
cle 10 at the Third Committee of the General Assembly. The majority rejected the proposed
amendment (which also included the right of the defendant to be heard in his native lan-
guage) on the basis that its provisions did not belong in a Declaration intended to be general
in nature, and that by providing for a "fair" trial, the concerns expressed by the amendment
had already been addressed. Urged by the delegates of Uruguay and Australia, the French
delegate expressed his opinion that the defeat of the Russian amendment did not indicate
that the delegates had voted against the purpose of the Russian amendment. VERDOODT,
supra note 89 at 128-29, 135.
133 See, e.g., STRAFPROZE BORDNUNG ch. 18, § 229 (Austria 1975); CODIGo DE
PROCESSO PENAL art. 792, § I (Braz. 1941); BULG. PENAL CODE ch. 14, sec. 1, art. 2 § 2
(1974); EGYPT CONST. ch. IV, art. 169- (1972); CODE DE PROCEDURE PENALE art. 306 (Fr.
1978-79); GAMBIA CONST. 20 (9) and (10)(a) (1971); JAMAICA CONST. ch. III, § 20(4) (1972);
MOROCCO PENAL PROC. CODE art. 303 (1959); LAW OF THE ORGANIZATION OF THE JUDICI-
ARY, No. 62-11, art. 2 (Niger 1962); CODIGO DE PROCESSO PENAL art. 407 (Port. 1972); ROM.
PENAL PROC. CODE art. 290 (168); SIERRA LEONE CONST. ch. 11 § 13(3) (1979); ACT OF THE
ORGANIZATION OF THE JUDICIARY tit. 14, § 172(1) (W. Ger. 1949); YuGO. CONST. art. 227
(1974).
134 See note 90 supra.
135 See note 92 supra. The American Convention on Human Rights simply provides one
overall exception: "Criminal proceedings shall be public; except insofar as may be necessary
to protect the interest of justice." See note 91 supra.
136 J. FAWCETT, THE APPLICATION OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS 150 (1969) [hereinafter cited as FAWCETT]; Z. NEDjATI, HUMAN RIGHTS UNDER
THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION 116 (1978).
137 E.g., United States v. Kobli, 172 F.2d 919 (3rd Cir. 1949) (youthful spectators may be
excluded in cases involving matters which would have a demoralizing effect on their imma-
ture minds, but not all adult spectators may be excluded for this reason); State v. Adams, 100
S.C. 43, 84 S.E. 368 (1915) (defendant cannot complain that during his trial for bastardy, the
court excluded from the courtroom all negroes and boys); Tilton v. State, 5 Ga. App. 59, 62
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may also be excluded to protect a witness who, because of acute em-
barrassment or fear, may not testify truthfully. The latter situation
almost always involves a minor in a sex related case. 3 ' Moral rea-
sons may thus be measured in terms of impact on the observers and
on the observed. Even when most spectators are cleared from the
courtroom, certain members of the public who have a special connec-
tion to the proceedings, such as members of the bar or members of
the press, are often allowed to remain. 139 Where there is not a total
exclusion of interested observers, an international observer should
also be permitted to remain, since the rationale for permitting mem-
bers of the bar or press to attend applies equally well to the foreign
observer.
2. Public order (ordre public).
Public order, or "ordre public" as it appears in the Declaration, is
an ambiguous term which can mean public order both in the narrow
sense of a secure and orderly public proceeding and in the broad
sense of general public welfare. " In the context of the right to a
public trial, it almost certainly means maintaining order in the court-
room rather than avoiding post-trial disruptions caused by the com-
ments of trial observers.
Traditionally, the public can be excluded from a trial to main-
tain the order of the courtroom. 14 ' The exclusion order need not
cover persons with a special connection to the trial, such as members
of the press or bar, provided they are not disruptive. 142 Trial observ-
ers also should be admitted if they do not disrupt the proceedings or
S.E. 651 (1908) (court may exclude all minors and women from sexually related trial but not
everyone; jury felt pressured to convict and defendant suffered by not having the public hear
his testimony).
138 E.g., Geise v. United States, 262 F.2d 151 (9th Cir. 1958) (exclusion proper where in a
rape case, witnesses are 7, 9, and 11 years old; members of the bar, press, relatives or close
friends of the defendant, and witnesses not excluded); Hogan v. State, 191 Ark. 437, 86 S.W.
2d 931 (1935) (exclusion proper during testimony of ten-year-old rape victim).
139 E.g., State v. Croak, 167 La. 92, 118 So. 703 (1923) (exclusion order excepted counsel,
jury, officers of the court, relatives of the accused and of the prosecuting witness, persons who
had some special interest in the case, and those who specially requested to be admitted); see
notes 137-38, supra.
140 See FAwCirr, supra note 136, at 150; Van Der Meersch, Does the Convention have theforce
of 'ordre public' in municipal law?, in HUMAN RiGrs IN NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
97-150 (A. Robertson ed. 1968).
141 E.g., United States ex rel Orlando v. Fay, 350 F.2d 967 (2d Cir. 1965) (when defend-
ant and sympathizers attempted to prevent orderly presentation of case, public excluded ex-
cept for members of the press and bar); Davis v. United States, 247 F. 394 (8th Cir. 1917)
(error to exclude spectators who were decorous; original order excluded all except relatives of
the defendants and members of the bar and press).
142 See sources cited at note 141 supra.
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issue disruptive reports outside the courtroom during the trial. In
rare cases the presence of a trial observer may encourage disruptive
behavior by defendants or witnesses, but the interest in having an
impartial observer should outweigh this rare possibility.
3. National securiqy.
National security considerations arguably justify not only excep-
tions to the right to a public trial, but exceptions to many other
human rights as well."4 3 And unlike the exceptions for morality or
public order, the determination that national security requires a pri-
vate trial is not made by the court itself.
The most important recent discussion of national security as bal-
anced against due process is Agee v. United Kingdom.'4 4 Agee, a former
employee of the United States Central Intelligence Agency, argued
that Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights was
violated by the unreviewable decision of the British Home Secretary
to deport him for undisclosed national security reasons. He argued
that to make deportation a matter of administrative discretion based
on secret evidence at secret hearings would "not only provide carte
blanche to a government determined to use administrative discretion
to avoid the perils of having to employ due process of law but would
fly in the face of the principle of equality before the law."' 145 The
European Commission on Human Rights found that unless the gov-
ernment's administrator acted illegally, Article 5 due process protec-
tions were not violated and Agee's application for relief was
inadmissable1 46 The Commission considered Agee's deportation to
be a noncriminal matter beyond its scope. This decision suggests
that criminal proceedings that a government might wish to keep se-
cret on national security grounds would almost certainly be subject
to far greater public scrutiny.
Bulgaria and the People's Republic of China are the only nations
which have actually raised the issue of national security to exclude
international trial observers. In the Spetter case the Bulgarian gov-
143 National security is the basis of an exception to the following rights: the right to
peaceful assembly (International Covenant, art. 21; European Convention, art. 11; American
Convention, art. 16); freedom of movement and residence (International Covenant, art. 12;
American Convention, art. 22); freedom of expression (International Covenant, art. 19; Euro-
pean Convention, art. 10; American Convention, art. 13); freedom of association (Interna-
tional Covenant, art. 22; European Convention, art. 11; American Convention, art. 16).
144 Agee v. United Kingdom, 7 DECisioNS AND REPORTS OF THE EUR. COMM. OF
HUMAN RIGHTS 164 (Application 7729/76, Decision of 17 December 1976).
145 Id at 168.
146 Id at 176.
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emnment excluded the public on the ground that state secrets might
be disclosed.1 47 China excluded foreign observers from the trial of
the so-called Gang of Four, also on the ground that national secrets
might be disclosed.' 48  Such claims of national security are easily
made and require careful international scrutiny to determine if they
are justified. Moreover, foreign observers and lawyers have often
been admitted to proceedings otherwise closed to the public on na-
tional security grounds.
14 1
4. Privac interests of the parties.
The "interest of the private lives of the parties" is a phrase
fraught with ambiguity. One commentator has suggested that the
wording could exclude from public trial matters that, if revealed,
could be "uncomfortable, politically inconvenient, or commercially
damaging."'5 0 A Belgian court has attempted to limit the scope of
this exception by interpreting "private" to mean "familial" - the
exception would apply only when "the repercussions of a public
hearing would be so grave and far-reaching as to endanger the emo-
tional ties or family situation of the individual concerned or his near
relations." '151
Even if the "interest of the private lives of the parties" is limited
to matters intrafamilial, the breadth of the exception is still not clear.
In Scott v. Scott, 152 the British House of Lords specifically found that
divorce proceedings were not properly held in camera and held that
there were only three exceptions to the right to public trial:
147 Bulgaria - Spetter, supra note 68.
148 Mao r Widow, 9 Others on Trial in Peking, Wash. Post, Nov. 21, 1980, at 1, col. 2.
149 In Portugal and Syria trials are not open in cases involving moral turpitude and inter-
national security, but lawyers are permitted to attend all trials; in Portugal foreign observers
have also been permitted to attend such proceedings. In Thailand foreign observers were
admitted to military proceedings which were officially closed to the public. In the trial of the
Thammasat 18, the observers and the press were excluded only during testimony concerning
the charge of high treason. Letter from Thomas Conlon, United States Embassy in Thailand,
Counselor for Political Affairs, to Peter Andersen, member of Amnesty International, at 3
(Sept. 1, 1978).
The public was cleared from an Israeli court during the testimony of the Secret Police to
avoid revealing their identity to those who might wish to take vengeance on them. The Al
observer, however, was allowed to remain during the testimony. J. Mortimer, Report on a
Legal Mission to Israel 1-6 June 1975, at 6 (June 9, 1975) (unpublished report to Amnesty
International) [hereinafter cited as Israel - Mortimer/AI (1975)]. Similarly, the I.CJ. ob-
server was admitted to the Sithole trial in Rhodesia even though the trial was held in camera.
See AfSica, I INT'L COMM'N JuR. REV. 57-58 (1969); interview with Niall MacDermot in
Geneva, March 6, 1981.
150 FAWCmT, supra note 136, at 149.
151 Tribunal Correctional, Brussels (17.3-1966) 8668/B/65 as quoted in FAWCETr, supra
note 136, at 151 n.l.
152 [1913] A.C. 417.
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The three exceptions which are acknowledged to the applica-
tion of the rule prescribing the publicity of Courts of Justice
are, first, in suits affecting wards; secondly, in lunacy proceed-
ings; and thirdly, in those cases where secrecy, as for instance
the secrecy of a process of manufacture or discovery or inven-
tion - trade secrets - is of the essence of the cause. 53
The ambiguity of the International Convention language, "interest
of the private lives of the parties" could conceivably cover divorce
proceedings as well as recognized domestic exceptions such as guardi-
anship and lunacy proceedings, although Scott v. Scott holds other-
wise. Indeed, several American cases have held that divorce
proceedings may be conducted in camera. 154
Even if this exception is broadly applied, it should only mini-
mally interfere with the work of the trial observer. Most proceedings
that deal with the private affairs of the parties will be of negligible
interest to international observers, 155 except insofar as they desire
simply to ensure the proper functioning of the system. In this in-
stance, the observer could be admitted so long as any report made no
reference to private matters and discussed only the adequacy of the
procedures themselves.
5. Pr'udice to the judicial process because ofpublicity.
"Special circumstances" must be shown before this exception to
the right to a public trial can be invoked. For example, where wide-
spread coverage of pretrial proceedings would make a fair trial im-
possible, closed proceedings may be justified.56 Also, where there is
danger of sensationalizing the use of narcotic drugs that are generally
unknown to the populace, in camera proceedings may limit the spread
of drug abuse.
5 7
Where "special circumstances" exist, publicity should be re-
stricted only to the extent strictly necessary. If jury prejudice is the
153 Id
154 E.g., In re Shortridge, 99 Cal. 526, 34 P. 227 (1893); C. v. C., 320 A.2d 717, 722-23
(Del. Super. Ct. 1974); State of Florida ex reL Gore Newspaper Co. v. Tyson, 313 So. 2d 777,
788 (Fla. 1975) (press and public not properly excluded from divorce proceedings when no
reasons of any kind were put forward by parties to show why a private trial should have been
conducted).
155 Since "lunacy" proceedings have been abused for political purposes in the Soviet
Union, there may be a particular need to place observers in such cases. Even if the subject of
the mental commitment proceedings may be found incompetent to waive any rights of pri-
vacy so that an observer can attend, the family in such cases should be given the right to
permit foreign observers to attend.
156 Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
157 Tribunal Correction, Brussels (27.1-1965) 645/Soc./63, quotedin FAWCarr, supra note
136, at 150 n.2.
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concern, the proceedings should be open to the public once the jury
is selected and sequestered; if publicity concerning narcotic drugs is
thought dangerous, the public could perhaps be excluded only dur-
ing testimony concerning the nature and effect of the drugs.
In the case of a trial observer, exclusion from the courtroom
might never be "strictly necessary." '158 Most observer reports are is-
sued after the trial and could not prejudice the proceedings. Any
matters thought dangerous or adverse to the interests of justice could
be excluded from the observer's report. Observations regarding fair-
ness could still be made without "prejudicing the interests ofjustice."
The basic right to a fair and open trial is the principal support for
the right of observers to attend trials. Observers help guarantee the
fairness of the trials they attend. While there are specific exceptions
to public attendance, only in rare circumstances should they be
raised to exclude qualified trial observers.' 59
III. THE ROLE OF OBSERVERS
A. General Considerations
The trials which international observers attend are often contro-
158 The Pakistani government misused the interest of justice and public order exceptions
to the right of public trial in the Bhutto case; the press and an ICJ observer attended four days
of testimony and then were barred from the remainder of the trial in the "interest of justice"
and to maintain order in the courtroom. J. Williams, Report on Appeal of Zulfikar Ali
Bhutto to the Supreme Court of Pakistan 11 (1978) (unpublished report to the International
Commission of Jurists) [hereinafter cited as Pakistan - Williams/ICJ (1978)]. The observer
concluded that the grounds "were spurious and dictated not by the needs of the administra-
tion of justice, but by a desire to inhibit pro-Bhutto publicity." Id. at 12. The Soviet Union
and Czechoslovakia have also been criticized by members of the Human Rights Committee
in regard to their failure to provide public trials as required by their treaty obligations under
the U.N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. See U.N. Docs. CCPR/C/1/Add. 22, at 14;
CCPR/C/SR. 109, at 46 & 59; CCPR/C/SR, 60 & 65, at 6; see generally J. Walkate, The
Human Rights Committee: Monitoring the Implementation of the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights 54-55 (1980) (unpublished memorandum).
159 In some countries the right to a public trial may be less important in assuring the
success of observer missions than the prestige of the observer and the sponsoring organization.
For example, the International Commission ofJurists sent an American observer to a Moroc-
can trial which was otherwise closed to the public; the observer was promptly given passes to
attend. See S. Suckow, Observer Report on Trial Held Before a Military Court in Kenitra,
Morocco, January 15-18, 1974 (unpublished report to the International Commission of Ju-
rists) [hereinafter cited as Morocco - Suckow/ICJ (1974)]. Foreign observers were permitted
even when the Greek government of the Colonels was regularly denying the public the right
to attend trials by such tactics as filling the room with government agents, selecting a small
courtroom, f.lsely saying that the room was full, and taking the names of all attendees and
harassing them afterwards. See J. Bourgaux, Le procs d'Ath~nes 2 (Feb. 1, 1973) (unpub-
lished report to the International Association of Democratic Lawyers) [hereinafter cited as
Greece - Bourgaux/AIJD (1973)]; C. Grobet, Le procs de M. Stathis Panagoulis 18-20
janvier 1973, at 6-7 (undated) (unpublished report to the International Commission of
Jurists).
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versial. Because of their highly political nature, the government is
often tempted to treat the defendant unfairly. The government may
wish to publicize the sensational aspects of the trial, or avoid public-
ity and expedite the outcome. In either case, procedures may be
abused to achieve the desired ends. The role of the trial observer is to
try to ensure that a defendant receives all the procedural protections
guaranteed by law, regardless of any bias of the populace or
government.
An observer can be a more effective monitor than the public be-
cause of his or her expertise and prestige. An observer is usually a
trained lawyer who has participated in previous trials. He or she
thus knows better than the public or press whether the defendant has
been treated fairly by the prosecutor and judge. In most cases, the
observer prepares an account which may be published by the spon-
soring organization or government. The participants in the trial usu-
ally understand the observer's presence to mean that the proceedings
may receive international attention. Consequently, they may act dif-
ferently than they would before even a large domestic crowd. The
combination of experience, credentials, and organizational or gov-
ernmental affiliation makes the observer more effective in helping to
bring about a fair trial than the public or even the press.
A trained observer is also apt to note that important witnesses or
pieces of evidence are missing from the trial. He or she may be able
to pursue independent fact-finding to discover evidence which should
have been presented at trial.
The immediate goal of the observer is to determine whether the
defendant has received a fair trial under applicable law. There is no
doubt, however, that the work of observers also contributes to public
awareness and influences the ultimate public judgment of the trial.
Through press releases, reports, lectures, and other means observers
communicate their impressions to the public at large."o They may
thus encourage reform, express outrage at corruption, or praise fair-
ness - helping to shape the public reaction to the trial specifically
and the criminal process generally. Observers facilitate the public
debate and reckoning that are among the primary purposes of public
trial.
B. Reasons for Sending Trial Observers
There are four principal reasons for sending an observer to a trial
of human rights interest. These purposes may substantially affect the
160 See text accompanying notes 305-16 and 364-82 infra.
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choice of trial, the selection of an observer, and other steps in the
process of trial observation.
The first function that an observer can perform is to gather facts
firsthand and prepare an impartial, independent, and objective re-
port.' 61 Second, an observer's presence necessarily makes the partici-
pants - particularly the judge and prosecutor - more circumspect
in the face of authoritative and independent criticism. 62 Third, an
observer gives the defendant, the defense attorney, and the defend-
ant's supporters a sense of international assistance and renewed confi-
dence. 163  Fourth; the observer represents an organization or
government and expresses its concern about the fairness of the
proceedings.'6'
161 Projet d'un Code de d~ontologie des observateursjudiciaires de ]a F~d~ration Interna-
tionale des Droits de l'Homme arts. 2-3. See note 463 infia.
162 One Amnesty International observer stated in his report, "During my stay in Maseru,
I had several discussions with the Minister of Justice and with the prosecutor, as well as a
short conversation each with the ChiefJustice and the Director of Prisons. I like to think that
some of the matters discussed in these conversations would rebound to the cause of justice in
the present trial." B. van Niekerk, Report to Amnesty International on Visit to Lesotho at 4
(Nov. 18, 1974) (unpublished report to Amnesty International) [hereinafter cited as Lesotho
- van Niekerk/AI (1974)].
In its 1965-66 Annual Report Amnesty International noted: "the mere presence of a
lawyer from a reputable and genuinely impartial organization may cause the judicial authori-
ties to hesitate in imposing harsh sentences." Al, ANNUAL REPORT 1965-66, at 9 (1966).
Military observers under NATO may have less impact on the judge's conduct of the trial. See
J. Williams, An American's Trial in a Foreign Court: The Role of the Military's Trial Ob-
server at 65 (April 1966) (unpublished thesis in University of Virginia Law Library) [herein-
after cited as Williams Thesis].
163 Professor Noll reported about his mission to Turkey: "I had the impression that my
presence in Turkey was useful to the cause of freedom and Rule of Law. Many persons to
whom I spoke told me that it was important to attract international legal interest in the
situation in Turkey, and they felt encouraged by the struggle of the International Commis-
sion of Jurists on behalfofthe Rule of Law." P. Noll, Observer Mission to Turkey, 27 Febru-
ary to 6 March 1973, at 6 (undated) (unpublished report to the International Commission of
Jurists) [hereinafter cited as Turkey - Noll/ICJ (1973)]. An even clearer instance: "When
the foreign observer enters the court, one of (the defendants) . . . jumps up with his arms
stretched out and shouts a clearly audible 'merci'. Obviously the accused feel the presence of
an observer as moral support. For many of them it is proof that the world is concerned about
them." H. Woesner, The Political Trial of Kenitra, June-July 1973, at 4 (July 26, 1973)
(unpublished report to Amnesty International). In another case an Iranian defendant was
emboldened by the presence of an Amnesty International observer to remove his shirt in the
courtroom to show marks of torture, even though the remainder of the room was filled with
Savak agents. Iran - Albala/AI (Feb. 1972), supra note 67, at 4; see also A. Leaud, Rapport
au procs de Jesus Diz Gomez et aZ at 1 (Sept. 19, 1975) (unpublished report to Amnesty
International) [hereinafter cited as Spain - Leaud/AI (1975)]; ef. Williams Thesis, sufira note
162, at 76 (defense counsel embarrassed by observer's presence). Occasionally, the observer
may sympathize with the prosecution. See, e.g., Galvin, War Crimes Trials in Nicaragua, GUILD
NOTES, Nov. 2, 1981, at 1, 17.
164 In two cases the basic idea was simply to let the countries know that the world was
watching. A. Larson, Report on the Trial of 37 South West Africans Under the Terrorism
Act at 1 (Mar. 28, 1968) (report to the Program Board of the Division of Overseas Ministries,
Lutheran World Federation) [hereinafter cited as South West Africa - Larson/LWF (1968)].
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These functions may conflict. If an observer overtly attempts to
influence the conduct of the trial, his or her impartiality and inde-
pendence may be questioned. If an observer openly comforts the
defendant, his impartiality becomes suspect and his report may be
subject to question.'65 Conversely, an observer might be so aloof that
the defendant's supporters may feel betrayed and the defendant may
be subjected to unfair procedures on which the observer fails to
comment. 1
66
If an observer consciously attempts to fulfill all four of these
objectives, she must carefully consider each step in her mission so as
to minimize the potential for conflict. Some observers initially do
not acknowledge that they have any role other than the preparation
of an accurate and impartial report. Nevertheless, when questioned
about the effects of their mission upon the trial participants' behav-
"J'ai 6t6 envoy6 par. . d' informer des autorit~s iraniennes du souci des trois organisations
representatives de l'opinion publique. Iran - Zavrian/FIDH (1973), supra note 67, at
I.
Nongovernmental organizations may also have specific concerns related to their mem-
bership or purpose. For example, the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions sent
observers to the 1978 trials of Tunisian labor leaders. Interview with John Vanderveken,
Assistant General Secretary of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, in
Brussels (Mar. 14, 1979). The International Association of Democratic Jurists sent an ob-
server to the trial of 17 persons accused of membership in the Communist party. Greece -
Bourgaux/AIJD (1973), supra note 159. The Lutheran World Federation sent an observer to
a trial of Lutherans in Namibia. R. Deffenbaugh, Namibian "Terrorism" - South African
"Justice" 5 (1976) (unpublished manuscript) [hereinafter cited as Namibia - Deffenbaugh/
LWF (1976)]. The I.C.J. as an organization of lawyers tried to send an observer to a Polish
trial where it was feared defense attorneys would not be able to speak freely (The Poznan
Trials, 6 BULL. INT'L COMM'N JUR. 1 (1956)) and to a Spanish trial where labor lawyers were
charged. S. Suckow, Report on the Trial of 2 Labour Lawyers and 8 Workers in Barcelona
March 4-5, 1975 (Mar. 13, 1975) (unpublished report to the International Commission of
Jurists). The International Press Institute co-sponsored an observer for the South African
trial of the Rand Daily Mail Editor-in-Chief. Actionfor the Rule ofLaw, 36 BULL. INT'L
COMM'N JUR. 46 (1968).
165 Interestingly, the first British observer sent by Amnesty International to France sat
with the defendant's counsel at trial and evidently saw her role as lending "solidarity" to the
defense. See note 23 su/pra. The International Commission of Jurists observer at a South
African trial noted the difference between his role and the role of an observer from the Law-
yer's Committee for Civil Rights Under Law: "Mr. Peay . . . felt able to identify with 'the
defense team' in a way that I, as a representative of the ICJ and other organizations, did not.
He had close contacts with the accused and their families and the accused were left in no
doubt that the presence of observers at the trial mirrored the concern of international legal,
Christian and diplomatic circles at the trial and its implications." S. Africa - Archer/ICJ
(June 4, 1975), supra note 76, at 7.
166 In one instance the 40 defendants were deprived of counsel during the trial - a fact
which the observer reported, but he made no attempt to comment or arrange for representa-
tion, even though the accused could have received the death penalty. See Turkey - Noll/ICJ
(1973), supra note 163, at 2. By way of contrast, the National Lawyers Guild observer at a
war crime trial in Nicaragua was clearly sympathetic to the prosecution. Galvin, War Crimes
Trials in Nicaragua, 10 GUILD NOTES 1, 17 (Nov. 2, 1981).
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ior, they usually admit that they have had a decided impact. 67
Different trials may require a different, distinct balance of pur-
poses. When New York Criminal Court Judge William Booth at-
tended a trial in Namibia on behalf of the International Commission
of Jurists (I.C.J.), he stayed in the home of one of the chiefs of the
defendants' tribe.'68 While Judge Booth sacrificed part of his appear-
ance of impartiality, he dramatically demonstrated the support of
the I.C.J., the United States, and the world black community for the
oppressed Namibian people.
On another occasion, Alexander Lyon, a British barrister and
member of Parliament, arrived at a trial in Namibia to find that the
defendants had no counsel. He was instrumental in arranging for the
defendants to obtain competent defense counsel.1 69 Although Lyon's
conduct may have compromised the appearance of impartiality
which an observer should maintain, in those circumstances it was ap-
propriate that he actively assure a fair trial rather than merely report
that the defendants lacked counsel.
Because of the inherently contradictory functions of observers,
and because it is impossible to predict the precise situation in which
they may be placed, past experience teaches that they must be left
free to use their own judgment in the situations which they
encounter.
70
167 The Belgian observer Aronstein noted his dual role as an independent, objective re-
porter and as an influence for greater respect for human rights and fairness. Aronstein, Acquit-
tement k Madrid, 127 REVUE SoCIALISME 37 (1975).
168 Letter from Reverend Colin O'Brien Winter to the International Commission of Ju-
rists (Feb. 18, 1972).
169 A. Lyon, Trial of the Strikers in Windhoek, Namibia 1-3 (Feb. 8, 1972) (unpublished
report to the International Commission of Jurists). Yet a further example of such active
intervention by an observer was provided by a U.S. military observer, who was attending the
trial of a young American black soldier for robbery in Germany. The American lawyer was
observing the trial pursuant to the NATO Status of Forces Agreement and ordinarily any
unfairness of the trial should have been reported to the attorney's military supervisors, who
would have determined if the issue should be raised with German military authorities, who
might then discuss the problem with the prosecutor and others in the criminal justice system.
Williams Thesis, supra note 162, at 51-53. Instead, the observer merely mentioned to the
defense counsel that he did not believe that the defendant's translator was accurately render-
ing the English-German translation of the defendant's statements. Immediate action was
taken by the court to find a more satisfactory translator. Interview with Max Johnson, supra
note 9.
170 It has also been suggested by Mr. Martin-Achard that the other cardinal rule for an
observer is that he should do nothing which would damage the defendant's case, even if the
observer is not able to help in any way. Martin-Achard, Political Trials and Observers, 6 INT'L
COMM'N JUR. REv. 24 (1971). There may be a hierarchy of norms surrounding the observer,
however; the first objective must be obedience to the instructions of the sending organization
or government. Those instructions usually require an accurate report of the observer's find-
ings; the other functions of encouraging procedural fairness and reassuring the defendant
must be considered subsidiary to the observer's loyalty to her instructions. Accordingly, Mr.
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C. Choice of Trials
Private organizations and governments may have distinct pur-
poses for sending observers and may thus have different criteria for
determining which trials merit observation. There is, however, sur-
prising uniformity among the private organizations themselves. Am-
nesty International, the International Association of Democratic
Lawyers, and the International Commission of Jurists appear to se-
lect trials for observation in very similar ways and, in fact, often send
observers to the same trials.17' Some of the criteria used by govern-
ments and organizations are described below.
Much ink has been spilled in defining what constitutes a political
offense, political trial, or political prisoner.172 Trials that involve of-
Martin-Archard's suggestion may stray too far from the impartial reporting function in some
circumstances.
Trial observers have occasionally been requested to act on unrelated human rights
problems, which came to their attention during their missions. An International Commission
ofJurists observer assisted a detained AI member in South Korea. See A. Sanguinetti, Report
on the Trial of Saw Sung in Seoul, November 23, 1972, at 5 (Nov. 30, 1972) (unpublished
report to the International Commission of Jurists) [hereinafter cited as S. Korea -
Sanguinetti/ICJ (1972)]. The AI member was released the next day, but this experience
raises a question as to whether the observer exceeded his mandate. Ultimately, the observer
must decide under the circumstances what efforts are appropriate and consistent with the
desires of the sending organization.
171 See, e.g., Greece - Bourgaux/AIJD (1973), supra note 159, at 4 (six observers).
172 Many attempts at defining the term "political offense" are made in addressing the
issue of the scope of the exemption from extradition for those accused of politically motivated
crimes. See, e.g., Deere, Political Ofenses in the Law and Practice of Extradition, 27 AM. J. INT'L L.
247, 248 (1933); Bassiouni, Ideologically Motivated Offenses and the Political Ofenses Exception in
Extradition - A Proposed Judiial Standardfor an Unrua Problem, 19 DEPAUL L. REv. 217, 218
(1969); Epps, alidit y of the Political Ofender Exception in Extradition Treaties in Anglo-American
Jurisfruence, 20 HARV. INT'L L.J. 61, 64-68 (1979); Gold, Non-Extradition for Political Ofenses:
The Communist Perspective, 11 HARV. INT'L L.J. 191, 198-201 (1970); Garcia-Mora, The Nature
of Political Ofenses: 4 Knotty Problem of Extradition Law, 48 VA. L. REv. 1226 (1962); Hannay,
International Terrorisn and the Political Offense Exception to Extradition, 18 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 381, 383-410 (1980). Other writers have endeavored to discuss political crime in the gen-
eral context of criminal culpability for ideologically motivated offenses under domestic law.
See, e.g., S. SCHAFER, THE POLrrICAL CRIMINAL (1974); Lerner, Political Ofenders, in ENCY-
CLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (1933); Ingraham & Tokoro, Political Crime in the United
States and Japan: A Comparative Study, 4 ISSUES IN CRIMINOLOGY 145, 145-48 (1969); Fried-
man, Criminzal Responsibility and the Political Offender, 24 AM. U.L. REv. 797 (1975); Ferrari,
Political Crime, 20 COLUM. L. REv. 308, 308-16 (1920). As for the question of what consti-
tutes a "political trial" to those concerned with the sending of international trial observers,
see Martin-Achard, Political Trials and Observers, 6 INT'L COMM'N JUR. REV. 24, 24-31 (1971).
Protocol 1 to the Geneva Convention of August 12, 1949, gives the representatives of the
protecting power the right to attend proceedings in which prisoner of war status is adjudi-
cated, "unless, exceptionally, the proceedings are held in camera in the interest of State secur-
ity." Protocol 1 to the Geneva Convention of August 12, 1949, openedfor signature June 10,
1977, art. 45(2), 1 Official Records of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and
Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts 115, 144
(1978); see also Geneva Convention of August 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 (1950). For a
broader, but thorough discussion of the definition of "political prisoner" as that term is corn-
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fenses against the state, such as treason,173 are inherently "polit-
ical."' 74 There are other cases in which the defendant may desire to
make a political statement, either in committing the crime itself or in
mounting a trial defense.1 75 There is a third kind of case in which
the government may use a trial to make a political point of its
own.176 There are also cases in which two or more of these factors
may coincide. 177 For example, both the government and the defend-
ant may seek to raise different political issues in the same proceeding.
Rather than attempt to define what constitutes a "political" trial,
most embassies and organizations send observers when the proceed-
ings will generate sufficient international concern to justify observa-
tion. The South African inquest regarding the death of Stephen
Biko certainly justified international concern, whether or not it was a
strictly political trial.1 78 Several governments and organizations sent
observers to the inquest.
These broad criteria may explain the observation of trials that are
only arguably political in nature, but they do not help organizations
monly used in the terminology of international human rights, see Forsythe, Political Pisoners."
The Law and Politics ofProtection, 9 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 295, 296-300 (1976).
173 E.g., the sedition trial in Angola attended by an International Commission of Jurists
observer in 1960 and the "Aspida Trial" in which army officers were accused of treason in
Greece during 1969, to which Amnesty International sent an observer. See note 24 supra; see
also Gardiner, The South Aflican Treason Trial, I J. INT'L COMM'N JUR. 43 (1957).
174 In a Spanish trial observed by a Swiss lawyer sent by the International Federation of
Human Rights, the defendants were charged with the printing and distribution of political
leaflets, as well as possession of a crude explosive device. E. Ziegler-Muller, Le procs des sept
syndicalistes Basques devant le Tribunal d'Ordre Public No. 2 de Madrid, 19 novembre 1974
(Nov. 20, 1974) (unpublished report to the F~dration Internationale des Droits de l'Homme)
[hereinafter cited as Spain - Ziegler-Muller/FIDH (1974)]. In a Turkish trial the issue was
whether a political party possessed a right to exist; the I.C .J. sent an observer. Simon, The
Trial of the Tura)te Emerkci Parirt (Turkish Workers Party) Before the Conrtitutianal Court of Turk,
24 Iwr'tL COMM'N JuR. REV. 53 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Turkey - Simon/ICJ (1980)].
175 Defendants were charged with bank robbery and murder; all were members of an
opposition party. C. Grobet, Le procs de membres du M.I.L. devant le Tribunal Militaire
de Barcelone, 8 janvier 1974 (Jan. 9, 1974) (unpublished report to the International Commis-
sion of Jurists) [hereinafter cited as Spain - Grobet/ICJ (1974)].
176 In 1977 the International League for Human Rights sent an American lawyer to the
Breytenbach and ANC trials in South Africa, which the observer concluded were "show tri-
als" "designed to show the government's continued firmness." M. Garbus, Recent Political
Trials in South Africa 5 (July 1977) (unpublished report to the International League for
Human Rights) [hereinafter cited as S. Africa - Garbus/ILHR (1977)].
177 Former Pakistani President Ali Bhutto was charged with a politically motivated mur-
der, but the government's purpose in bringing him to trial was equally political; that is, to
prove the corruptness of the previous regime. See Pakistan - Williams/ICJ (1978), supra note
158, at 4.
178 See L. Pollack, The Inquest into the Death of Stephen Bantu Biko: A Report to the
Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law (Feb. 24, 1978) (unpublished report) [here-
inafter cited as S. Africa - Pollack (1978)]; see also D. Napley, Stephen Biko Inquest (Dec. 8,
1977) (unpublished memorandum).
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select trials or guide commentators and courts in determining
whether observation is justified. Since there are no coherent guide-
lines for choosing between trials, embassies and nongovernmental or-
ganizations exercise considerable discretion. Frequently,
international media coverage of a particular trial may generate pres-
sure to attend. I 79 Sometimes a private organization already has de-
veloped considerable expertise and interest in the situation which
gives rise to the trial. 8° Because observer missions are expensive,
some organizations are influenced by the relative costs of different
missions or by the possibility of raising funds to attend a specific trial.
Without prejudging the fairness of the trial, an organization may
send an observer when a special court for political offenses is estab-
lished.181 Organizations are also influenced by the stature of the per-
son on trial,8 2 by the desire to investigate charges that the
defendants confessed under torture,'83 by the use of retroactive or
repressive laws as the basis for prosecution, 8 4 by concern about the
general state of human rights in the country, as represented by a par-
ticular trial,'85 by the historical significance of the trial itself as with
the Eichmann trial, 8 6 by a government invitation to attend the
trial, 87 or by anticipated procedural irregularities, including a bi-
179 See, e.g., IC News, 35 BULL. INT'L COMM'N JUR. 38 (1968).
180 Certainly, the International Commission of Jurists has maintained a steady scrutiny
of trials in South Africa. The ICJ has sent 26 observer missions to South Africa over a 25 year
period. See, e.g., Gardiner, The South African Treason Trial, I J. INT'L COMM'N JUR. 43 (1957);
The South African Treason Trial Second Phase, 8 BULL. INT'L COMM'N JUR. 37 (1964); R. Falk,
Observer's Report on the State v. Tuhadelini and Others, in EROSION OF THE RULE OF LAw IN
SOUTH AFRICA (Int'l Comm'n Jur. ed. 1968); LC] Sends Observers to Pretora Trals, Int'l
Comm'n Jur., Press Release (Jan. 14, 1974) [hereinafter cited as S. Africa - MacDermot/ICJ
(1974)]; note 24 supra.
181 See, e.g., AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, TUNISIA IMPRISONMENT OF TRADE UNIONISTS
IN 1978 (1979).
182 See, e.g., C. Sheppard, REPORT ON THE TRIAL OF ANANDA MARGA LEADER
PRABHAT RAINJAN SARKAR IN PATNA, INDIA 1-2 (1976) (religious leader); W. Hassemer,
Report on Trial Observation in Tunis, 12-15 June 1977, at 2 (July 7, 1977) (unpublished
report to Amnesty International and the International League of Human Rights) (opposition
leaders) [hereinafter cited as Tunisia - Hassemer/AI/ILHR (1977)]; C. Morand, Report on
the Trial of Mr. Breytenbach, 21-26 November 1975, at I (Dec. 16, 1975) (unpublished re-
port to the International Commission ofJurists) (one of the most prestigious Afrikaaner poets)
[hereinafter cited as S. Africa - Morand/ICJ (1975)].
183 See, e.g., Amnesty International, Al Concerns in Togo, at I (July 1980) (mimeo).
184 See, e.g., The Ceylon Coup DlEtat Trial, 15 BULL. INT'L COMM'N JUR. 11 (1963).
185 See, e.g., A Political Trial in Portugal, 15 BULL. INT'L COMM'N JUR. 50 (1963); Y.
Terlingen, Interim Report on a Mission to Pakistan 23 April-12 May 1976 (June 2, 1976)
(unpublished report to Amnesty International).
186 See, e.g., Papadatos, The Eichmann Tial, 14 BULL. INT'L COMM'N JUR. 13, 19 (1962).
187 See, e.g., EQUATORIAL GUINEA - TRIAL OF MACIAS (1979), supra note 32 at 1; Do-
minican Republic - Trujillo (1961), supra note 71; Angola - Lockwood (1977), infra note
210; International Commission ofJurists, Press Release (Jan. 5, 1971) (concerning an observer
mission to a trial in the Cameroons); P. Noll, Rapport sur le proc s devant la Cour Martiale a
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ased or politically controlled judiciary, intimidated defense attor-
neys, vague laws, pretrial detention incommunicado, and so on. 88
Trial observation has its limits as a method for preventing human
rights violations. Some of the worst human rights violations occur in
countries where there are no trials but merely summary arrests fol-
lowed by imprisonment or execution."1 9 In some countries there are
virtually no proceedings to observe. For example, in Argentina, legal
arguments are written but the defendants do not appear in court and
may be kept unaware of the evidence against them. Military trials
have been conducted in secret; people have disappeared and been
killed without trial. 190 In Chad there have been no trials since the
outbreak of fighting in 1979.191 In Ethiopia there has been only one
trial in the last two years; the trial was closed and the verdict was
announced at the same time as the execution. Many other people
have disappeared or been killed. 192 Preventive detention laws, as in
Grenada,'93 Malawi,1" Malaysia, 195 and Swaziland,196 do not allow
public proceedings and thus afford no opportunity for observers. In
several countries - for example, Haiti, 197 the Philippines,1 98 Singa-
pore,'9 9 and the Yemen Arab Republic 200 there are political de-
tainees, but the government often does not bother to hold trials.
Tananarive, Madagascar, at 1 (Apr. 14, 1975) (Report on the Lawsuit in front of the Martial
Court of Tananarive, Madagascar) (unpublished report to the International Commission of
Jurists) [hereinafter cited as Madagascar - Noll/ICJ (1975)].
188 Association Internationale des Juristes Dfmocrates, Le procs des intellectuels
Iraniens (Dec. 30, 1965) [hereinafter cited as Iran - Ducreaux/AIJD (1965)].
189 During the reign of Bokassa in the Central Africa Republic there were only a few
closed trials; the results were announced after the fact. Segrnerallv U.S. Department of State,
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1979 to U.S. Senate Comm. on Foreign
Relations and the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 96th Cong. 2d Sess. 39 (1980) [hereinaf-
ter cited as 1979 U.S. Human Rights Report].
190 Seegeneral/y ASSOCiATION OF THE BAR OF THE CrrY OF NEW YORK, REPORT OF THE
MISSION OF LAWYERS TO ARGENTINA, APRIL 1-7, 1979 (1979) [hereinafter cited as ARGEN-
TINA - N.Y. BAR REPORT].
191 AI, ANNUAL REPORT 1980, at 38 (1980).
192 See U.S. Department of State, Report on Human Rightr Aac/ices in Countries Reteiving US
Aid, to US Senate Comm on Foreign Relations and /he House Conrm on Foreign Afairs, 96th Cong.,
1st Sess. 54 (1979) [hereinafter cited as 1979 U.S. Human Rights Report]; see generall, 1980
U.S. Human Rights Report, supra note 189, at 67; Al, HuMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN ETHI-
OPIA (1978).
193 Al, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT 1981, at 157-61 (1981); Al, AMNESTY IN-
T RNATIONAL REPORT 1980, at 138 (1980).
194 AI, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT 1980, at 58-59 (1980).
195 1979 U.S. Human Rights Report, supra note 189, at 386-87.
196 Id at 174.
197 Id at 271-72.
198 Id at 398.
19 9 Id at 409-11.
200 Id at 655.
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Sending an observer is also relatively ineffectual in cases where
flagrant violations, such as torture, occur before trial and cannot be
rectified even if the accused is acquitted.20 ' Nevertheless, a trial ob-
server can publicize pretrial human rights violations. The more basic
problem, however, is that trials represent a respect for human rights
that is missing in many countries. In those nations that hold trials
and attempt to demonstrate their fairness, observers have a useful
function. They can pierce the facade.of fairness and help assure that
a government's promise of justice is fulfilled.
A government may send trial observers primarily for its own in-
formational purposes.20 2 Trials, especially "political" trials, often
bring into clear relief competing forces which governments and inter-
national organizations should understand in order to pursue sensible
diplomacy. Partly for this reason, embassies send observers to impor-
tant trials instead of relying on uneven, insufficient media reports.
Embassies may also wish to communicate with or at least learn about
oppressed groups in other countries and trials may provide exposure
to such groups. Sending an official also demonstrates concern for
fairness and for the issues involved in the proceedings. 20 3
In some respects embassies may feel more reluctant to send ob-
servers than private organizations. First, embassy personnel may be
faced with heavy time demands;2° personally observing a trial may
be a relatively inefficient means of collecting information. Second,
an official observer might be inappropriate in the context of very
201 S. Suckow, Observer Report on Trial Held Before a Military Court in Kenitra, Mo-
rocco, January 15-18, 1974, at 2 (unpublished report to the International Commission of
Jurists) [hereinafter cited as Morocco - Suckow/ICJ (1974)]. A further problem in sending
a trial observer is that the government may publicize the mission as an international seal of
approval not only for the trial, but for their entire human rights record. After Amnesty Inter-
national sent an observer to a trial in Togo, the government took out half-page advertise-
ments in the New York Times and Washington Post claiming that the AI observer had found
no human rights problems in Togo. America Has Right to Truth About Togo, New York Times,
July 16, 1980, at A-12. Al then issued a more complete indication of its substantial human
rights concerns in Togo. See genera4ly AI, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT 1980, at 84-86
(1980).
202 In 1950 the U.S. embassy sent an attache to the London trial of Klaus Fuchs for
transmitting atomic secrets to the Soviet Union. Fuch.s Sentenced to 14 Years, New York Times,
March 2, 1950, at 14, col. 3.
203 See generaly C. Runyon, Some Perspectives on the Human Rights Provisions of the
Foreign Aid Act and Similar Legislation 15 (unpublished memorandum 1977); see also Inter-
national League for Human Rights, Report of the Conference on Implementing a Human
Rights Commitment in United States Foreign Policy 35 (1977); Human Rights, Hearings before
the Subcomm on For. Assistance, Sen. Comm on Foreign Relations, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (testi-
mony of David Weissbrodt), 39 (testimony of Edward Snyder) (1977).
204 See, e.g., U.S. Dep't of State, Providing Consular Services to the American Public
Abroad 1-2 (July 14, 1977); U.S. Dep't of State, The Drug Problem: Americans Abroad
(Aug. 1977).
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delicate bilateral relations. A private organization might be able to
send an observer to the same trial without political repercussions.
Unlike governments, nongovernmental organizations do not have to
maintain a wide range of political, social, and business relations, and
may be concerned solely with one problem, such as human rights.
Moreover, organizations such as Amnesty International and the In-
ternational Commission of Jurists are known for their impartiality
and may select the nationality of their observers so as to preserve the
appearance of independence. In contrast; an embassy usually sends
its own citizens, who come clothed with their national stereotypes
and bilateral relations.
D. Selection of the Observer
Qualified, impartial, and prestigious observers add the weight of
their personal reputations to a mission, independent of the sponsor-
ing organization. Most observers are distinguished attorneys in their
205 ~own countries, and volunteer out of a sense of commitment to
human rights, an interest in other countries, or a desire to help the
sponsoring organization or government. Sometimes a government or
organization sends a permanent employee as an observer.20 6
The International Institute of Human Rights and some observers
have sometimes suggested the creation of an international panel of
observers.20 7 While this might provide experienced observers, private
205 Military trial observers are an exception in this regard; they lack the personal prestige
which is the norm for jurists sent by nongovernmental organizations to trials of human rights
concern. By and large, military observers are young JAG corps lawyers who are assigned to
attend numerous routine trials during their foreign tour of duty. They do, however, carry the
status of their country with them; to highlight this, they normally dress in military uniform at
trial. While military trial observers will initially know little of the language and legal tradi-
tions ofthe country in which they are stationed, they are likely to develop considerable exper-
tise as they may attend as many as several hundred trials in the course of a tour of duty. They
also may help retain counsel for accused service personnel so that they will be familiar with
defense counsel as well as many prosecutors and judges. Williams, sufira note 5, at 21-22.
With little personal prestige and high local visibility, military attorney-observers cannot influ-
ence the proceedings as greatly as respected foreign jurists in politically-charged trials.
206 In trials of exceptional worldwide interest, nongovernmental organizations may send
their own Secretary-General to underline the importance of the trial. See, e.g., S. Africa -
MacDermot/ICJ (1974), supra note 180.
207 Observer Aronstein argues in his report that there ought to be a permanent trial
observer bureau which would be more effective than the somewhat haphazard present efforts.
C. Aronstein, Observations judiciaries sur le proc~s de Julio Millan Hernandez i Madrid du
10 au 15 fevrier 1972 (Feb. 12, 1972) (Judicial observations on the Trial of Julio Millan
Hernandez at Madrid from February 10-15, 1972) (unpublished report to the Belgian
League for the Defense of Human Rights) [hereinafter cited as Spain - Aronstein/BLDHR
(1972)]; see also Letter from Niall MacDermot, Secretary-General of the International Com-
mission of Jurists, to Joe Nordmann, International Association of Democratic Lawyers
(March 27, 1973). In August 1981 the Armand Hammer Conference, "Peace and Human
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organizations have already established informal resources and tend
to rely upon observers who have previously served on missions.2 °8
Furthermore, a permanent panel of observers would frustrate organi-
zations which prefer to use their own members as observers. These
organizations can trust their members to follow instructions and act
in accordance with the organizations' purposes.20 9 Also, there are so
many factors to be considered in selecting an observer for a particu-
lar case that no panel would be sufficiently large to serve all needs. A
panel would only narrow the range of choices and decrease
flexibility.
The factors to be considered in the selection of an observer in-
clude prestige, language abilities, knowledge of the legal system
where the trial will be held, knowledge of international human rights
standards, availability on short notice, trustworthiness, nationality,
ability to enter the country of trial without a visa, and occasionally
even willingness to take some personal risk. The selection of an ob-
server may also be influenced by the purpose of the sending organiza-
tion. If the primary purpose is to obtain an accurate report,
familiarity with the language, 210 legal system,2 1' and background of
Rights-Human Rights and Peace" in Aix-en-Provence, resurrected this concept of an inter-
national or U.N. trial observer corps. Indeed, there was some brave and unrealistic discussion
of appointing a corps- of observers to serve as the "casques bleus des droits de l'homme".
Armand Hammer Conference, Projet de r~gles relatives au corps international d'observateurs
judiciare (mimeographed memorandum, July 28, 1981).
208 Several such observers are internationally known European jurists whom non-govern-
mental organizations have often called upon to attend foreign trials. Representative among
them are the following:
Edmond Martin-Achard (Switzerland); Claude-Serge Aronstein (Belgium); Louis
Blom-Cooper (United Kingdom); Christian Grobet (Switzerland); Niall MacDer-
mot (United Kingdom); and Kurt Madlener (West Germany).
209 See, e.g., J. Dowd & P. Stein, Report on the Trial of Hariman Siregar (Dec. 23, 1974)
(unpublished report to the International Commission ofJursts) [hereinafter cited as Indone-
sia - Dowd/ICJ (1974)] (two members of the Australian national section of the ICJ selected
as observers); Interview with Michael Williams in London (June 1978) (British jurist who was
AI British section co-ordinator for the Middle East selected as observer for an Egyptian trial
in 1978).
210 Certainly, it is very difficult for a common law attorney who lacks knowledge of Por-
tuguese, the Portuguese legal system, or even civil law procedure, to observe a trial ade-
quately in Angola. See Lockwood, Report on the Trial of the Mercenaries: Luanda, Angola June
1976, 7 MANITOBA L.J. 183, 197 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Angola - Lockwood (1977)].
Nevertheless, Lord Russell appeared to have no difficulty in understanding the French proce-
dures applied in the Dreyfus case. Dreyfus trial report, supra note 11, at 319-20.
211 The International Commission of Jurists sent a German legal scholar to Thailand.
M. Kopp, Trial of 18 Thammasat University Students in Bangkok (Aug. 4, 1977) (unofficial
translation of an unpublished report to the International Commission of Jurists) [hereinafter
cited as Thailand - Kopp/ICJ (1977)]. Similarly, the I.C.J. selected as an observer for a
Spanish trial Kurt Madlener, Professor of Spanish Penal Law at the Max-Planck Institute for
International Trial Observers
the proceedings 12 is most important. Unfortunately, such observers
might have too many ties to the receiving nation to preserve an air of
impartiality.
If the sending organization or government wants to encourage
fairness, it might select an observer with very high prestige in the
country of trial.213 But even then the observer might lack expertise
in the language or legal system, and may lack status in the larger
international community.
214
In order to avoid some of these problems, potential observers may
sometimes be recruited from nations with the same language and le-
gal tradition as the place where the trial will be held. For example, if
the trial is in Morocco or Tunisia, an experienced French lawyer
might be an excellent choice from a technical standpoint. But, on
one hand, the organization must consider whether sending a French
observer might be perceived in the former colony as a form of neo-
colonialism.215 On the other hand, lawyers from a former colonial
power may be respected as experts who know how the law ought to
be applied. The judge and prosecutor may feel that they are being
tested upon their adherence to "correct" principles of law. Many of
Penal Law in Freiburg, West Germany. ICJ Observer at the Trial of Carabanchel Ten, Interna-
tional Commission of Jurists, Press Release (Jan. 22, 1974).
Almost all observers have been lawyers - both because attorneys will ordinarily under-
stand the proceedings better than non-lawyers and because lawyer-observers will usually be
more prestigious in the courtroom setting. Embassies may not, however, have a lawyer on
staff for a trial observation, but may prefer to send a non-lawyer as a second-best alternative,
rather than send no one. For example, the U.S. embassy in Guyana sent a political officer to
an important trial, because no lawyer was available and because the political officer had
considerable experience in attending trials of interest to the U.S.
212 The I.C.J. decided to send a Dutch lawyer to a trial in South Africa, which seemed
appropriate given the Dutch ancestry of the dominant white minority, the similarity of the
Dutch and Afrikaans languages, and given the important contacts which the observer was
able to make through the influential Dutch Embassy in South Africa. See L. Velleman, Re-
port on the Second Breytenbach Trial (June 1977) (unpublished report to the International
Commission of Jurists) [hereinafter cited as S. Africa - Velleman/ICJ (1977)].
213 In one case the I.C.J. selected an observer of such prestige that his selection received
considerable publicity in Czechoslovakia; the Czech authorities released the defendants and
no trial was held. See MacDermot, Political Prisoners and Trials 6 INT'L COMM'N JuR. REv. 2,
3 (1971).
214 Dean Larson of Duke University was selected particularly for his prestige in the
United States. See Sentences in South Afica Case Called 'Monstrous Travesjy', Lutheran World
Federation, Press Release No. 4/68, at 2 (Feb. 12, 1968).
215 Amnesty International has published some of its early considerations in selecting an
observer: "The choice of the delegate (observer) is also vital since a Government may think,
for example, that it has reason to distrust the bona fides of a delegate from what may be the
former colonial power or from a country on opposite sides in the 'Cold War'. The I.S. is
particularly anxious to make more use of observers and delegates from countries other than
the United Kingdom. One of the problems, of course, is that it is frequently essential to send
an observer at very short notice indeed and it is difficult to make the necessary arrangements
with comparatively distant capitals." AI, ANNUAL REPORT 1965-66, at 9 (1966).
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the lawyers and judges in Morocco were trained in France and have
considerable respect for the leaders of the French bar.2" 6 If anti-colo-
nialist sentiments are prevalent, however, the organization might
send a Tunisian attorney to a Moroccan trial.217 Similar considera-
tions often apply to British observers. 218
The organization or embassy might consider sending its own staff
members to observe a trial. This approach has both advantages and
disadvantages. Staff members will almost certainly be well informed
of the events surrounding the trial and the reasons for sending an
observer.219 Indeed, the staff member may decide that the trial merits
observation. A staff observer will also be reliable in preparing a re-
port. Unfortunately, staff members will generally be less distin-
guished than outsiders whom the embassy or the organization
might be able to recruit. Although the sponsoring organization or
nation may lend status to the observer,220 a better known individual
216 See F. Jemoli, Rapport de Mission de l'Observateur au Proc~s de Rabat au Maroc
(July 27, 1976) (unpublished report to Amnesty International) [hereinafter cited as Morocco
- Jemoli/AI (1976)]; L. Hincker, Rapport de missions au Maroc (undated) (unpublished
report to Amnesty International) [hereinafter cited as Morocco - Hincker/FIDH]; Y.
Baudelot, Proc&s des "Frontistes" (Jan. 27, 1977) (unpublished report to the Association In-
ternationale de Juristes D~mocrates). Alternatively, an attorney observer from Belgium or
Luxembourg might avoid both the anti-colonialism problem for the French and also the
proximity problem of the Tunisians. See, e.g., J. Hoss, Rapport de la mission effectue au
Maroc du 28 Avril au 31 Mai 1976 (undated) (unpublished report to Amnesty International)
(observer from Luxembourg).
217 The I.C.J. successfully sent a distinguished former Chairman of the Tunis Bar to a
Moroccan trial. See ICJ Nominates an Observer to Marrakesh Trial, International Commission of
Jurists, Press Release (June 15, 1971). But on another occasion observers from Algeria were
criticized severely in the Moroccan press for observing a Moroccan trial. See H. Woesner,
The Political Trial of Kenitra, June-July 1973, at 4-5 (July 26, 1973) (unpublished report to
Amnesty International) [hereinafter cited as Morocco - Woesner/AI/ICJ (1973)]. There
was no similar comment in the press, however, critical of the Amnesty International observer
from Germany. Id at 5.
218 The British observer in a South African trial described the numerous similarities be-
tween the procedures of the two legal systems. See A. Cripps, Report on the Trial in Pretoria
of Sathasivas Cooper, 19-29 August 1975, at 2 (Sep. 3, 1975) (unpublished report to the
International Commission ofJurists). There are also considerable similarities between British
and Israeli criminal procedures. See Israel - Mortimer/AI (1975), supa note 149, at 4.
219 See, e.g., Equatorial Guinea - Trial of Macias (1979), supra note 32, at iii:
"The International Commission ofJurists was fortunate in having available its legal
officer for Spanish-speaking countries, Dr. Alejandro Artucio, a Uruguayan lawyer.
Dr. Artucio is familiar with the Spanish system of law under which the accused were
tried, and in his work at the International Commission of Jurists he had been follow-
ing events in Equatorial Guinea for some years. Accordingly, he had a good knowl-
edge of the circumstances prevailing in the country during the eleven years of
Macias' rule."
220 The prestige of the sending organization and its observer may result in deferential
treatment for the observer. While a lawyer observing for the National Lawyers Guild was
excluded from the courtroom with other spectators during the testimony of the security po-
lice, a British staff lawyer for Al was permitted to remain in the courtroom for identical
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will have more impact upon the trial and her report will receive
greater respect.
While it may seem most convenient to send an observer from the
country where the trial is to be held, Amnesty International and
other organizations have express rules against this practice.22 ' The
International Commission of Jurists, the International Association of
Democratic Lawyers, and others also normally send foreign observ-
ers.222 There are several practical reasons for this policy. While a
local lawyer will probably be informed of the surrounding circum-
stances, and will have the necessary technical skills, he will .not bring
the fresh perspective of the foreign observer.223 The local lawyer may
judge the fairness of the proceedings according to legal standards of
the country. Also, the local attorney may have or appear to have a
political bias which will tend to make his findings less credible. Fur-
thermore, the local lawyer may have less success in handling the
technical aspects of the mission.224 Because of the novelty of the mis-
sion, a foreign lawyer will ordinarily be able to attend political trials
and interview officials, while a native may not have sufficient pres-
tige.225 The foreign lawyer will have a more formidable presence in
the courtroom and may influence the judge and prosecutor to be
fair,226 while the local lawyer may be less effective.
testimony. Compare Israel - Mortimer (1975), supra note 218, with Goodman, Guild Report:
On the Tialaf Sami Ermail, GUILD NOTES, July 1978, at 12.
221 Organizations are often quite sensitive to the appearance of bias which might arise
from nationality. For a trial to be held in the Ivory Coast, Amnesty International selected a
French-speaking Swiss observer and not a French lawyer, because the principal defendant
was French. See Amnesty International, Mission Report on Ivory Coast Trial, July 1974 (un-
published report) [hereinafter cited as Ivory Coast - Picard/AI]. Other organizations may
be less meticulous about such considerations. See, e.g., G. Vournas, The Trial of the Fifteen in
Greece, March 17, 1972 (April 12, 1972) (unpublished report to the International League for
the Rights of Man) (Greek-American lawyer sent to observe the trial of a fellow Greek-Ameri-
can lawyer) [hereinafter cited as Greece - Vournas/ILRM (1972)].
222 See note 24 supra.
223 The foreign lawyer may notice subtle methods by which an accused is unfairly treated
in or out of court. The arrangement of a courtroom, for instance, is a matter which local
attorneys take for granted; to a foreign observer it may appear that the positioning of the
participants is prejudicial to the defendant. See, e.g., Spain - Aronstein/BLDHR (1972),
supra note 207, at 5. The observer, however, should also be able to consult with local lawyers
as to any irregularities oflocal procedure which a newcomer might miss. See, e.g., Bulgaria -
Spetter, supra note 68, at 3-8.
224 On at least one occasion the Tunisian government refused to admit eight observers
from neighboring Arab nations into the country, but permitted the German observer repre-
senting Amnesty International to attend the trial. The independence, uniqueness, and impar-
tiality of the German observer made his presence acceptable to the Tunisian government. 'See
Tunisia - Hassemer/AI/ILHR (1977), supra note 182, at 3.
225 See, e.g., Iran - Albala el a /AIJD (Dec. 1978), supra note 14, at 10.
226 There are many ways in which the observer's presence may influence courts to afford
greater procedural and substantive fairness toward the accused. Positive impacts which ob-
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Sex and race are two other factors which may bear on the choice
of observer. In many countries women have a low status; hence, an
organization might consider carefully whether a woman should serve
as a trial observer. But even in countries where women have a low
status and men dominate the legal profession, a female trial observer
might be so unusual as to increase her impact on the trial.227
Similarly, the race of an observer may be a factor in some in-
stances. For example, Amnesty International sent a Bangladesh law-
yer to North Dakota for the trial of a Native American leader.228
This observer gave Native Americans an opportunity to present their
problems to a potentially sympathetic lawyer from the Third World.
A Caucasian lawyer might have been less effective in gaining access
to information. In addition, the Bangladesh lawyer was so unusual in
North Dakota that he was able to make the judge and prosecutor
very aware of his presence.229 It would probably have been a mis-
take, however, to send the same Bangladesh lawyer to the Guyana
trial of a political activist who was accused of killing a black police
officer for racial and political motives.23" A Bangladesh lawyer of the
same race as the defendant might not have appeared sufficiently im-
partial in such a racially charged situation.
So many factors bear on the selection of an observer that it is
almost impossible to prescribe them in advance.23' Private organiza-
servers have noted include the following (a) prompting the court to allow defense counsel
greater latitude in presenting favorable evidence, see C. Thornberry, State v. Taapoli and
Kashea: Report to Amnesty International and the Lawyer's. Committee for Civil Rights
Under Law on Trial Held 17-21 June 1974, at 4 (unpublished report) [hereinafter cited as S.
Africa - Thornberry/AI/LCCRUL (1974)]; (b) increasing the attention which judges paid
to arguments of the defense, see T. Kellock, Report on Amnesty International Observer's Visit
to Malawi, Sept. 1968, at I (unpublished report) [hereinafter cited as Malawi - Kellock/AI
(1968)]; (c) enlarging the scope of otherwise perfunctory trials, see, e.g., S. Korea -
Sanguinetti/ICJ (1972), supra note 170 at 6; and (d) better than expected results in the form
of lighter sentences for the defendants, see Spain - Aronstein/BLDHR (1972), supra note 207
at 12; South West Africa - Larson/LWF (1968), supra note 164.
227 See, e.g., B. Assheton, Report on Visit to Iran, December 1968-January 1969 (Mar.
17, 1969) (unpublished report to Amnesty International) [hereinafter cited as Iran -
Assheton/AI (1968)] (British woman attended trial in Iran).
228 S. Bari, Report on the Case of US v. Peltier (unpublished report to Amnesty Interna-
tional) (1978) [hereinafter cited as United States - Bari/AI (1977)].
229 Conversely, a U.S. observer and his companion were the only whites other than the
judge in a South African courtroom; they obviously stood out. See S. Africa - Grabus/
ILHR (1977),supra note 176, at 6. In another circumstance a black U.S. judge was selected to
observe a Namibian trial. See W. Booth, Report to the International Commission of Jurists
on Windhoek, Namibia Trial (March 1972) (unpublished mimeo).
230 See generaly D. Weissbrodt, The Third Trial of Arnold Rampersaud (Jan. 27, 1978)
(unpublished report to Amnesty International) [hereinafter cited as Guyana - Rampersaud].
231 The religion of the observer may be a significant consideration; for instance, the I.C.J.
selected a Christian observer for an Indonesian trial in which the judge, prosecutor, and de-
fendant were all Christians, even though only 7% of the Indonesian population was Christian.
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tions normally take into account the many factors discussed above,
but frequently cannot find an ideal observer and select the best per-
son available.
IV. THE PROCESS OF TRIAL OBSERVATION
A. Tming and Duration of Observer Missions
It is often difficult to know when an ordinary trial will begin. In
political cases, it is even harder to know when an organization ought
to send an observer, often from a great distance.232 In some coun-
tries, such as the Soviet Union, the trial intentionally may be set in
an inaccessible location and at a time that is either not indicated in
advance or announced only at the last minute.233 On one occasion
an Amnesty International observer traveled from England to South
Africa only to hear a brief proceeding at which the defense asked for
and received an adjournment. 34 Another observer traveled half way
around the world to find that the trial had already occurred.23 5 Ob-
taining reliable information about the precise date and location of a
trial can be a major problem.
Organizations ordinarily keep in touch with the defense attorney,
who, while usually well informed, may not be able to predict the
actions of the court or prosecutor. A hostile prosecutor may suddenly
seek an adjournment when the observer arrives, or may stall the pro-
See Indonesia - Dowd/ICJ (1974), supra note 209, at 2. Nationality of the observer is often
another important consideration. For example, because of the economic and political con-
nection between the U.S. and South Africa, the linguistic similarities, and the related legal
systems, a U.S. observer is appropriate for South African trials. See, e.g., Arnold, Fighting South
Afriea's Infernal Security Laws, 8 JURIS DOCTOR 49, 50 (No. 5, 1978) (Dean Louis Pollack of
Pennsylvania sent to observe the Stephen Biko inquest).
232 See, e.g., ICJ Observersfor Political Trial in Athens, International Commission of Jurists,
Press Release, March 26, 1970.
233 See note 37 supra; see also J. Lockyer, Report on the Case of Leonard Peltier 3 (Nov.
1976) (unpublished report to Amnesty International).
234 C. Thornberry, State v. Taapoli and Kashea: Report to Amnesty International and
the Lawyer's Committee for Civil Rights Under Law on Trial Held 17-21 June 1974, at 2
(unpublished report). Even if the observer is not able to attend the trial, it may still be worth
sending such a mission, because the observer may be able to obtain sufficient information
about the proceedings from family members who have attended, from defense attorneys, and
from interviews with other trial participants to render a report and even to influence any later
proceedings. Cf. Amnesty International, Trials of Members of the Committee for the Defense
of the Unjustly Prosecuted in Czechoslovakia, 22-23 October 1979 (Jan. 15, 1980) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Czechoslovakia - Goldman/Al (1980)] (observer not admitted, but performed
useful research anyway); Spain, 15 INT'L COMM. JUR. REv. 25, 29-32 (1975) (same).
235 Letter from John Thorne to Jim Reif (Jan. 22, 1974). The observer naively expected
the Iranian consulate in San Francisco to notify him of the starting date of the trial. As might
be expected, the consulate never notified the observer. The observer was notified by a friend
in Iran on the day of the trial's commencement. He left the next day, but arrived too late.
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ceedings to render her visit less effective.236 The organization must
carefully monitor the pretrial process and make extremely difficult
predictions about when the trial will actually occur.
Embassies have several advantages over private organizations in
knowing when to send an observer and in being able to send an ob-
server at the last moment. Because of their proximity, embassies are
usually able to monitor the proceedings. If a government wishes to
send an observer from outside the country,237 its embassy can follow
developments and can make last-minute arrangements for accommo-
dations. More commonly, a member of the embassy staff can attend
the trial at relatively short notice and with minimal inconvenience.
Private organizations ordinarily rely on long distance telephone
and local contacts to keep informed of trial dates. In some situations
friendly embassies have discreetly assisted by passing along informa-
tion to nongovernmental organizations. 38
The problem of timing is exacerbated by the limited availability
of trial observers. Most outside observers cannot spend more than a
week or two on missions since they ordinarily have busy professional
lives. 239 Political trials may take more than a week or two.240 The
sending organization therefore must anticipate the most important
time to be present.24' Ordinarily, the impact of the observer is great-
236 See, e.g., J. Archer, Report on Visit to South Africa (1975), supra note 76, at 2; Ohserver
Mission to South Africa, 3 INT'L COMM. JUR. REV. 58 (1969).
237 Defendant in Seoul Trial.Denies He Incited Students, N.Y. Times, Aug. 26, 1980, at 3, col. 1
(observer sent from State Department Legal Advisor's Office to trial of Kim Dae Jung).
238 Another possible approach is exemplified by the arrangement the I.C.R.C. made with
Israeli authorities to be informed of any military trials of civilians one week in advance of the
date of trial. But the "ICRC took steps to ensure that the period of notification was observed
... which was not always the case." INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS,
ANNUAL REPORT 1978, at 32 (1979).
239 Aronstein, Acquittement h Madrid ou le Franquisme Ordinaire, 62 REVUE NOUVELLE 451
(1975) (mission took four days; the trial lasted one day); W. Booth, Report to the Interna-
tional Commission of Jurists on Windhoek, Namibia Trial 7 (Mar. 1972) (unpublished
mimeo) (6 day mission with 5 days attending a much longer trial); Spain - Grobet/ICJ
(1974), supra note 175; W. Hassemer, Report on Trial Observation in Tunis, 12-15 June 1977,
at 4 (July 7, 1977) (unpublished report to Amnesty International and the International
League of Human Rights) (4 day mission including trial); Thailand - Kopp/ICJ (1977),
supra note 211.
240 One I.C.J. observer attended only the first of four hearings in Turkey on February 26,
1980; subsequent hearings were held on March 3, March 18, and April 10. Simon, The Talof
the Turkqe Emerkci Partisi (Turkish Workers' Party) Before the Constitutional Court of Turk9 , 24
INT'L COMM. JUR. REV. 53, 59-60 (1980).
241 Since trials are expected to last a substantial period of time, nongovernmental organi-
zations might consider selecting an observer who is a foreign lawyer temporarily residing near
the trial. Not only would this approach make the observer capable of attending more of the
trial, but it also saves travel expense. But if the organization is so constrained in selecting a
foreign lawyer already in the area, it may not be able to find an observer of the requisite
prestige. Also, this approach to selecting an observer is not possible where there might be
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est if she is present at the beginning or toward the end of the trial.24 2
But if the observer wants to obtain a clear picture of the case, she
ought to observe the testimony of the prosecution's main witnesses.243
For long trials of considerable importance the organization may send
a single observer several times or designate several observers to at-
tend seriatim.2' Embassies have little problem in sending observers
to such trials, except for the temporary diversion of staff from other
matters.245
Although it is obviously best to attend the full trial, most observ-
ers have had little difficulty in making reliable findings based on
brief observation and the materials they are able to collect.246 After
meeting the main participants in the trial, seeing the surrounding
circumstances, and collecting transcripts of proceedings they could
reprisals against the observer. In recent years Amnesty International has often selected for-
eign observers already resident in this country for U.S. trials. A Bangladesh lawyer living in
Minneapolis was sent by Al to attend the trial of the Indian leader Leonard Peltier in North
Dakota; a judge from Iceland was temporarily residing in Los Angeles when she was asked to
attend a lengthy trial of a Chicano activist in that city; a lawyer from India was an interna-
tional human rights scholar at Berkeley when he was asked to attend an appeal hearing in
San Francisco. See Al, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT 1980, at 361-62 (1980); AI, AN-
NUAL REPORT 1979, at 176-78 (1979).
242 A Portuguese trial was held for a period of two months, but sessions were conducted
only two days a week, on Tuesdays and Fridays. The observer attended the first four days
and the final days of the trial. International Association of Democratic Lawyers, Press Re-
lease (Feb. 17, 1971). Another observer attended just the beginning of a Lesotho trial but
believed that his impact would continue. B. van Niekerk, Report to Amnesty International
on Visit to Lesotho (Nov. 13, 1974) (unpublished report to Amnesty International).
243 Two Australian observers shared their mission responsibilities; the first observer at-
tended the beginning and the end of the Indonesian trial which started in August and contin-
ued in a desultory manner until November. The other observer attended a week in the
middle of the trial and they prepared a joint report. Indonesia - Dowd/ICJ (1974), supra
note 209.
244 St. John, The South African Treason Trial, 9 BULL. INT'L COMM'N JUR. 21 (1959) [here-
inafter cited as S. Africa - St. John/ICJ (1959)]; Hambro, The South Afiican Treason Trial-
Second Phase, 8 BULL. INT'L COMM'N JUR. 45 (1958); Gardiner, The South African Treason Trial,
1 J. INT'L COMM'N JUR. 43 (No. 1, 1957) [hereinafter cited as S. Africa - Gardiner/ICJ
(1957)]; The Yasiada Trial and Other Recent Developfents in Turkq, 14 BULL. INT'L COMM'N
JUR. 25 (1962) (three successive observers to the same trial).
245 The U.S. Embassy in South Africa was able to observe the entire month-long trial of
a South African journalist without the sort of hardship which a nongovernmental organiza-
tion would encounter in sending observers to such a long trial. Letter from Douglas Bennet,
Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations, U.S. Department of State, to Donald Fraser,
Chairman of House Subcommittee on International Organizations, Committee on Interna-
tional Relations (Apr. 21, 1978).
246 One I.C.J. observer commented: "The present report is based not only on the under-
signed's personal observations made in the course of a relatively brief attendance at the trial
in the Patna District Court from 11-18 June 1976, but on many meetings with defense and
prosecution counsel, with various other observers, and the examination of hundreds of pages
of documents, briefs and transcripts." C Sheppard, REPORT ON THiE TRIAL OF ANANDA
MARGA LEADER PRABHAT RAINJAN SARKAR IN PATNA, INDIA 3 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
India - Sheppard/ICJ (1976)].
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not attend, most observers can sensibly determine whether the pro-
ceedings were fair. Of course, the demeanor of the judge and prose-
cutor might change when the observer is not present, but observers
can gather second-hand information to learn of such inconsistencies
before preparing their reports.
B. Funding
Funding of trial observer missions is important because it reflects
on impartiality, dictates the number of trials which may be observed,
influences the thoroughness of fact-finding, and bears upon the selec-
tion of an observer.
The source of funding for private observers can taint the imparti-
ality of the mission. Groups that regularly sponsor trial observer mis-
sions take care to use only those funds obtained from neutral sources.
The Amnesty International Secretariat had an annual budget of
1,733,375 pounds in the fiscal year ending April 30, 1980,247 mostly
raised through dues and contributions from members. Neither Am-
nesty International nor the International League for Human Rights
accepts funds from governments. 248 The League operates on a budget
of $75,000 to $100,000 drawn from membership contributions, affili-
ated organizations, foundations, and special fundraising events.249
Most private organizations lack sufficient funds to mount ob-
server missions without specific fundraising efforts for each mission.
However, where fundraising is undertaken on a mission-by-mission
basis, the source of funds may create an appearance of bias. For ex-
ample, if during the late 1960's an organization had undertaken to
observe a trial in Greece, it might have turned to Greek expatriate
groups for some or all of its support. Without such very interested
supporters, the organization might not be able to mount the mission
at all. Yet if the source of funds for the mission were known, the
results could well be suspect.2 5 ' This suspicion is unfortunate since
247 See AI, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT 1980, at 372 (1980); seegerally Note, The
Role of Nongovernmental Organizations in Implementing Human Rights in Latin America, 7 GA. J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 477, 482 (1977); THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS, OBJEC-
TIVES, ORGANIZATION, ACTIVTIES 5 (1972).
248 See AI, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT 1980, at 368 (1980); Wiseberg & Scoble,
The International Leaguefor Human Rghts: The Strategy of a Human Rights NGO, 7 GA. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 289, 295 n.15 (1977); interview with Maureen Berman, Executive Director of the
League, in Geneva (Sep. 5, 1977).
249 Interview with Maureen Berman, Executive Director of the League, in Geneva (Sep.
5, 1977).
250 The National Council of Churches of the U.S.A. gave $37,500 toward the defense of
the accused at the same time that it co-sponsored the observer mission of Dean Arthur Larson
to South Africa. Sentences in South Africa Case Called 'Monstrous Travest , Lutheran World Fed-
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bias arising from the source of funding is more a problem of appear-
ance than of reality. Observers rarely know the source of funding for
their missions. Moreover, observers are ordinarily of such integrity
and independence that neither the source of funding nor an actual
bias of the sending organization would influence their conclusions.
While the danger of bias is more imaginary than real, financial
considerations may determine how many missions can be under-
taken. Hence, effective fundraising is essential. Amnesty Interna-
tional has attempted to allocate resources by establishing a single
account for special projects, including missions, conferences, and
translations. It has been successful in raising money for this account
without tying the contributions to any particular mission. Some-
times organizations seek funds from disinterested sources, such as
other human rights organizations, religious bodies, special United
Nations funds, foundations, and charities.25'
Where financially feasible, private organizations and govern-
ments should consider sending two observers to trials, if merely to
keep each other company on missions to unknown and perhaps
threatening countries. Where the surrounding circumstances are par-
ticularly unsettled, a team of observers can help protect each other
and bring different strengths to the mission.252 Where there are
financial constraints, organizations and governments might cooper-
ate by each sending one observer and coordinating their activities.
Although it may be best for observers from several governments
and organizations to attend a trial, allowing the observers to share
information and keep up morale, there is probably a limit to the opti-
mal number of observers for any trial. For example, at one Tunisian
trial there were five observers.253 In order to husband limited re-
sources and to maximize their impact on important trials, organiza-
tions should seek to coordinate their missions as much as possible.
25 4
eration, Press Release No. 4/68, at 3 (Feb. 12, 1968), supra note 214. Such an overtly dual
financial role should be avoided because it might make the observer appear biased even if no
bias is present. See R. Deffenbaugh, Namibian "Terrorism" - South African "Justice"
(1977), supra note 164, at 253.
251 For example, the Rockefeller Brothers Fund has provided the I.C.J. with a grant of
$20,000 for emergency missions, such as trial observer missions. Interview with Niall Mac-
Dermot, in Geneva (March 6, 1981).
252 See Iran - Albala et a. /AIJD (Dec. 1978), supra note 14 (three observers, one of
whom had already performed two previous missions to Iran).
253 Tunisia - Hassemer/AI/ILHR (1977), supra note 182, at 3.
254 For financial reasons and to increase the prestige of an observer, several organizations
have at times joined to sponsor a single observer. Organizations, if they are co-sponsors of the
mission, can also help disseminate the observer's report. There is some risk that the organiza-
tions may become so identified by such joint sponsorship that they lose their independent
identity. Several human rights organizations with separate identities may be useful: If one
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In one instance several embassies informally agreed to rotate observ-
ers so that two officials from different countries would attend every
day of the trial; such cooperation should be emulated.255
Most observers for private organizations receive reimbursement
for travel, hotel, and living expenses during their missions.256 Em-
ployees of organizations and governments ordinarily receive their
normal salary plus expenses. Where expense is a factor, the sending
organization may seek an observer from a nearby country. Private
organizations may well have considered travel expenses in sending a
Hong Kong lawyer to a trial in South Korea,257 a South African law
professor to a trial in Lesotho, 258 a Montreal lawyer to a trial of Mo-
hawk Indians in upstate New York,259 a lawyer from the Dominican
Republic to a Nicaraguan trial, 260 and Australian lawyers to Indone-
sian trials.26' Similarly, a government must determine whether to
send a local embassy official at relatively low cost or a somewhat
more prestigious, independent, and expensive observer from out of
the country.
Expense is an important factor both in selecting the observer and
in deciding whether a trial can be observed at all.262 Funding can
also influence the quality of a mission's findings. The availability of
organization has severely criticized a particular country's human rights practices, it may be
useful for another organization to send the next trial observer to the same country. See H.
Woesner, Report on Political Trials and an Assessment on the Human Rights Situation in
Chile (undated) (unpublished report to Amnesty International). Joint sponsorship makes
such flexibility less possible.
In addition, joint sponsorship may present problems if the organizations do not agree on
their rules for sending an observer. For example, a trial observer jointly sponsored by AI and
another organization might be instructed by AI not to make statements to the press, while the
other organization schedules a press conference immediately after the observer's return. Ste
E.C. Bamberger, Sithole Hearing (statement to the press, April 2, 1975) (after joint observer
mission of Amnesty International and the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law
to Rhodesia).
255 Interview with delegate of the Federal Republic of Germany to the U.N. Commission
on Human Rights, in Geneva (March 9, 1979).
256 On very rare occasions observers have received fees for their services. Dean Arthur
Larson received a legal fee of $5,000 from the Lutheran World Federation to observe a South
African trial. His expenses cost the Federation an additional $3,000. See note 250 supra.
257 S. Korea - Sanguinetti/ICJ (1972), supra note 170, at 1.
258 Lesotho - van Niekerk/AI (1974), supra note 162.
259 AI, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT 1980, at 365 (1980).
260 Id at 364.
261 Indonesia - Dowd/ICJ (1974), supra note 209.
262 One AI report specifically considers the factor of distance: "Ideally this mission
should have involved a delegate from a nearby Asian country, thus incurring lower travel
costs. But the US-Taiwan political relationship and the short notice we received of the trial
date, made it necessary for someone with suitable experience to go from the USA." Taiwan
- Seymour/AI (1975), supra note 78, at 2. In addition, Al may have selected Professor Sey-
mour because he had only four months previously made high-level contacts with many
Taiwanese officials. Id at 3.
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funds will determine the length of the mission, the number of observ-
ers, the quantity of transcripts read and records copied, and so on.
Financial constraints suggest that trial observer missions must be
carefully selected to prevent sending organizations from overex-
tending themselves.
C. Translators
Ideally an observer should speak the local language.263 While
language ability is one of the most important criteria in selecting an
observer,264 there is often too little time to find a person who speaks
the language and possesses other necessary skills. Thus, observers
often need translators to aid in observation, fact-finding interviews,
and so on. The choice of a translator is fraught with its own political
and practical difficulties. One American observer failed to bring his
own translator to a South African trial in which much of the evi-
dence was presented in Afrikaans and then translated into English by
a court translator. The observer was unable to verify the accuracy of
the translations, much like the Afrikaans-speaking defendants who
could not follow the English legal arguments and procedural ex-
changes.265 Having traveled all the way to South Africa, another
American lawyer found that some parts of a trial he wanted to at-
tend were conducted only in Afrikaans, and therefore decided to
leave.266
A German observer at a Tunisian trial relied on defense attorneys
to provide translations from Arabic to French.267 Unfortunately, the
observer sat with defense counsel to obtain his translation and must
have been identified with the defense far more than is ideal for an
independent observer.2 6 Moreover, relying on the defense attorneys
prevents independent verification of the accuracy of the translation.
The process of translation in the courtroom also requires constant
263 See, e., The Cylon Coup D'Etat Trial, 15 BULL. INT'L COMM'N JUR. 11 (1963) (Cana-
dian lawyer in Sri Lanka, formerly Ceylon).
264 For Moroccan trials it is very useful for the observer to be bilingual, because the trial
is conducted in Arabic, while many police documents are produced only in French. See, e.g.,
Morocco - Hincker/FIDH (1976), supra note 216, at 12-13.
265 Falk, Observer's Report on The State v. Tuhadeleni and Others, in EROSION OF THE RULE OF
LAY IN SOUTH AFRICA 51 (International Commission of Jurists ed. 1968).
266 S. Africa - Velleman/ICJ (1977), supra note 212, at 2 (Martin Garbus was the
observer).
267 Tunisia - Hassemer/AI/ILHR (1977), supra note 182, at 3.
268 An AI observer was severely criticized by the Moroccan government for getting a one-
sided picture of Morocco from his defense lawyer-translator. See ASSOCIATION INTERNATIO-
NALE DES JURISTES DEMOCRATES, MARO0: RAPPORT DE MISSION SUR LA SITUATION DES
DETENUS FRONTISTES 16 (Dec. 1977) (Comments of the Moroccan Secretary General ofJus-
tice critical of Al observer Jemoli); see Morocco - Jemoli/AI (1976), supra note 216.
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whispering,269 which can be disruptive."' Occasionally, however,
translation may call greater attention to the observer and thus in-
crease her impact on the participants.
Troublesome problems arise when translators come from an or-
ganization, political party, or group to which the defendant belongs.
The observer may appear biased and may be unable to verify the
translations. Also, if the translator is not a lawyer, he may have diffi-
culty with the technical language used in court.
2 7
'
In some countries the selection of a translator sympathetic to the
defendant may place the translator - if not the observer - at con-
siderable risk. One German observer asked an Iranian student in
West Germany to join him on a mission in Iran. The observer and
translator were eventually arrested. The observer was expelled from
the country; the translator was sentenced to ten years in prison for
political offenses.272 While this is an extreme example, such risks
must be considered in particularly repressive countries.273
Another error is to rely on the services of a government translator.
Not only may the translator be biased, but the observer may endan-
ger her other contacts. Nevertheless, observers have at times ac-
cepted translators from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs274 and from
the prosecuting team. 5 One translator accepted on recommenda-
tion of the Iranian Minister of Information later turned out to be a
Savak agent,276 as did another translator who had not been checked
sufficiently.277 At a few show trials, simultaneous translation may be
provided by the government 278 and may be trusted because of the
269 See, e.g., L. Oranje, Report of Visit to South Africa February 18-March 6, 1974, at 1
(Mar. 18, 1974) (unpublished report) [hereinafter cited as S. Africa - Oranje/WK (1974)]
(translation "in a whispering tone").
270 German observers at a South African trial remained in the public gallery with their
translators, so as not to disrupt the proceedings, even though another observer who did not
need a translator received special seating at trial. Id at 1.
271 See, e.g., B. Wrobel, Notes on a Mission to Iran, April 9-12, at 12 (May 1977) (unpub-
lished report to Amnesty International) [hereinafter cited as Iran - Wrobel/AI (1977)] (pri-
vate translator hired, but he lacked the vocabulary for translating formal court proceedings).
272 Al, AmNESTY INTERNATIONAL ANNUAL REPORT 1971-1972, at 49 (1972); Al, AM-
NESTY INTERNATIONAL ANNUAL REPORT 1970-1971, at 68-69 (1971).
273 See, e.g., S. Korea - Sanguinetti/ICJ (1972), supra note 170, at 1 (translator under
surveillance).
274 See, e.g., Amnesty International, Report on a Mission to Ethiopia and Sudan, 1-18
February 1975, at 7 (March 25, 1975) (unpublished report) [hereinafter cited as Ethiopia -
Al (1975)].
275 See, e.g., id
276 See Iran -Wrobel/Al (1977),supra note 271, at 2; Interview with Brian Wrobel, Bad
Honnef, Federal Republic of Germany (Sept. 16, 1977).
277 See Iran - (Albala/AI (1972)), supra note 67, at 4.
278 See, e.g. , Papadatos, The Eichman Trial, 14 BULL. INT'L COMM'N JUR. 13, 14 (1962).
Although there was simultaneous translation into English, French, Spanish, and Russian at
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large number of bilingual observers present.
One solution which a number of private observers have tried with
mixed success is to ask the observer's embassy to assist in finding a
translator.279 Embassy observers can ordinarily rely on translators
from the embassy staff. But the embassy may be reluctant to provide
a translator for, and thereby identify with, a private observer. How-
ever, when an embassy arranges for an outside translator or provides
an embassy translator, he may be less subject to harassment and may
provide a more balanced translation than others. Embassies have
tended to be most helpful to prestigious observers from their home
country, such as members of the legislature or former ministers. If
the embassy is hesitant to aid the observer directly, it may suggest
local independent lawyers who have the requisite language skills and
sufficient prestige to escape harassment.
Some observers have been able to secure translators through per-
2810sonal contacts, through the local bar association,28' or with the
assistance of the sending organization.282 It is generally best to find a
translator before arrival in the country, but some observers have
been able to hire a translator upon arrival.28 3 Others have simply
appeared at the courtroom and obtained translation assistance from
journalists, 2 4 lawyers in the courtroom, or other observers. 285  But
ideally the observer should secure a translator who is legally trained,
knowledgeable, trustworthy, and, so far as possible, immune from
reprisal.28
6
the Angolan mercenary trials, the translation may not have been adequate. L. HINDS & H.
STEVENS, THE TRLAL OFTHE MERCENARIES, JUNE 7-19, 1976, at 19-20 (Nat'l Conf. of Black
Lawyers). See also Williams, supra note 5, at 30-31.
279 See, e.g., G. Gardiner, Report on Mission to Athens, 2-5 October 1972, at 3 (unpub-
lished report to Amnesty International) [hereinafter cited as Greece - Gardiner/AI (1972)]
(successful); Iran - Wrobel/AI (1977), upra note 271, at 2 (not successful).
210 See, e.g., Turkey - Noll/ICJ (1973), supra note 163; W. Booth, Report to the Interna-
tional Commission of Jurists on Windhoek, Namibia Trial 1 (March 1972) (unpublished
mimeo) (church contacts).
281 See, e.g., D. Napley, Steven Biko Inquest 1 (Dec. 8, 1977) (unpublished memorandum)
[hereinafter cited as S. Africa - Napley (1977)].
282 See, e.g., Greece - Gardiner/AI (1972), supra note 279, at 2.
283 See, e.g., Iran - Wrobel/AI (1977), supra note 271, at 12.
284 See, e.g., C. Grobet, Le procs de M. Stathis Panagoulis 18-20 janvier 1973, at 1-2
(1973) (unpublished report to the International Commission of Jurists) [hereinafter cited as
Greece - Grobet (1973)]; Indonesia - Dowd/ICJ (1974), supra note 209, at 1.
285 See, e.g., E. Poulsson, The Treason Thal in Morocco, 18 BULL. INT'L COMM'N JuR. 26, 29
(1964) [hereinafter cited as Morocco - Poulsson/ICJ (1964)].
286 In addition, the translator and the observer may each want to take notes in order to
compare notes after each day's session and improve the reliability of their findings. See, Wil-
liams, supra note 5, at 2.
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D. Briefimg the Observer
Having selected an observer, decided when to send him, and con-
sidered problems of translation, the organization or government
must brief its representative. Usually the sponsor possesses a consid-
erable quantity of information which must be communicated to the
observer. Briefing presents a particularly difficult problem when ob-
servers are selected at the last moment and the distances involved are
great.
The observer should become as informed as possible of the his-
tory, politics, economics, and law of the country to be visited.287 The
observer should obtain background information concerning the
human rights problems, foreign relations, and government officials of
the country, as well as data relating to the specific events which led
to the trial.288 The observer should also receive any organizational
guidelines for the conduct of observers and learn about the previous
relations between the sending organization or government and the
country of the trial.289
287 Obviously, each trial observer mission will require specific and up-to-date informa-
tion on the country to be observed, but there exist some general reference sources which
might begin to orient the observers. As to the criminal justice system of each country, the
U.S. military has prepared Country Law Reports on the principal nations where U.S. service
personnel might be arrested. See, e.g., U.S. Army Judge Advocate Division, Country Law
Study, German Law and the Status of American Troops in Germany (1963) (unpublished
memorandum); U.S. Army Office of the Judge Advocate, Country Law Study for Korea
(May 1, 1971) (unpublished memorandum). While overly diplomatic, these studies are very
useful outlines of the criminal procedures of many countries. Similarly, the State Department
Assistant Legal Advisor for Consular Affairs maintains a collection of legal studies for under-
standing the problems of U.S. citizens arrested abroad. These studies should also be useful to
trial observers.
More general and even more limited by diplomatic-considerations are the annual Re-
ports on Human Rights Practices in Countries Receiving U.S. Aid, but these documents are
still worthy of consideration particularly for a prospective observer for the U.S. government
to review what is officially known about the country's situation. See, e.g., note 192 supra.
Although Amnesty International intends its annual reports only as a record of what that
organization has done each year, the Al annual reports and any specific reports on the coun-
try to be visited should be useful background reading. See, e.g., notes 191-193 supra.
288 In briefing Dean Pollack for his mission to observe the Biko inquest, the Lawyer's
Committee for Civil Rights Under Law Southern Africa Project gave him a briefing paper,
including summaries of the available facts on Biko's death from newspapers, official govern-
ment statements, the writings of Stephen Biko, the South African political situation, a prior
observer's report on South Africa, and the Martin-Achard article on trial observation. See
note 170 supra; South Africa Project of the Lawyer's Committee for Civil Rights Under Law,
Stephen Bantu Biko: A Briefing Paper (undated) (unpublished mimeo); see note 178 supra.
289 In briefing a mission to observe a trial in South Africa, the International Commission
of Jurists gave the observer a copy of the I.C.J. guidelines for observers, a copy of previous
trial observer reports for the I.C.J., a typescript precis of what had happened at the first
abortive trial in the same case, and an older I.C.J. publication on the rule of law in South
Africa. See J. Lovatt-Dolan, Interim Report on Trial in Johannesburg, South Africa I (un-
dated, 1978) (unpublished report to the International Commission of Jurists) [hereinafter
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A principal source of information for the new observer is past ob-
server mission reports.29 If the observer has sufficient time before
departure, she may be able to make a considerable factual inquiry.
Legal documents are often available and the long distance telephone
is a very useful investigative tool. In addition, the observer should
receive the names of people who can serve as contacts and informants
in the country to be visited. It will often be necessary for the observer
to use personal contacts rather than relying entirely upon the sending
organization or government in this respect. 29' The contacts and in-
formants should be selected so as to avoid involving the observer in
partisan quarrels or otherwise affecting the observer's appearance of
impartiality. An observer may be able to obtain information from
expatriate political groups, but should avoid identifying with them
and make his independence clear.292
E. Travel and Housing Arrangements
The observer ordinarily must make travel and housing arrange-
ments.293 Here again, she must be circumspect. It would generally
not be a good idea, for example, to stay in the home of a defense
attorney because that would identify the observer with one side of
the trial.2 94 Similarly, the observer should arrange for her own trans-
cited as S. Africa - Lovatt/ICJ (1978)]; see also note 462 infra. Interview with George Lock-
wood in Winnipeg, Canada, June 2, 1979; Lockwood, Report on the Trial ofMercenaries: Luanda,
Angola, June, 1976, 7 MANITOBA LAW J. 183-86 (1977).
290 J. Hoss, Rapport de la mission effectu~e au Maroc du 28 Avril au 31 Mai 1976 supra
note 216, at 1; J. Portelle, Rapport de mission i la F~d~ration Internationale des Droits de
l'Homme (Feb. 1972) (unpublished report to the International Federation for Human
Rights); L. Velleman, Report on the Second Breytenbach Trial, supra note 212, at 2 (retrial
observed, so previous trial observation report can be used for comparison). Sending organiza-
tions regularly exchange information and can assist in briefing future missions to the same
country.
291 Amnesty International, Report on a Mission to Ethiopia and Sudan, 1-18 February
1975, at 4 (March 25, 1975) (unpublished report to Amnesty International); Gardiner, The
South Afican Treason Tial, I J. INT'L COMM'N JUR. 43, 44 (1957).
292 E. Schmidt, Preliminary Report on the Trial of the El Ferrol 23 (July 4, 1975) (un-
published report to the National Lawyer's Guild) (the observer was a member of the U.S.
Committee for a Democratic Spain, upon which he relied for briefing information and which
may have affected his appearance of impartiality).
293 One AI observer had not made advance hotel arrangements and was forced to waste
considerable time in finding accommodations. Y. Ersoy, Rapport sur la mission en Egypte
(19-26 mars 1975), at 2 (undated) (unpublished report to Amnesty International) [hereinafter
cited as Egypt - Ersoy/Al].
294 An AI observer spent the last night of his mission in the home of a defense attorney
without apparent impact on the independence of his mission; the observer had already estab-
lished a good "rapport" with the prosecutor, judge, the captain of the security police, and
others involved in the case. C. Thornberry, State v. Taapopi and Kashea: Report to Am-
nesty International and the Lawyer's Committee for Civil Rights Under Law on Trial Held
17-21 June 1974, supra note 226, at 1; see also note 168 supra and accompanying text.
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portation from the airport to a hotel of at least moderate prestige and
reasonable proximity to the courthouse. If the prosecution and the
defense counsel are themselves staying in a hotel, the observer might
select another hotel. So far as possible, the observer should avoid
visibly identifying with the defense by staying in the same hotel. So
long as the observer explains his conduct to the defense, he might
even err on the side of appearing to identify with the prosecution by
staying in the same hotel.
In arranging outbound travel, security might suggest that the ob-
server book a flight with a carrier other than the national airline of
the trial country. On occasion departing observers have been
harassed; under such circumstances a neutral airline might be helpful
in facilitating departure.295
F. Vzas and Enigy Fomalities
In general, sponsoring organizations try to select observers who
do not need visas to enter the country of the trial. 96 If visas are
required, difficulties and delays can imperil the mission. 97 Observers
requiring a visa have used a variety of approaches. Some have been
admitted after explaining their mission and showing the authoriza-
tion of the sponsoring organization.298 A few others have been
delayed until the trial was over. Several observers have applied for
tourist visas or stated that they were traveling on legal business. 299
The Soviet Union once complained that an observer used false pre-
295 See Czechoslovakia - Goldman/AI (1980), supra note 234, at 2, 11 (four and one-half
hours detention); A. Leaud, Rapport du proc~s de Jesus Diz Gomez et aZ, supra note 163, at 5
(20 hour detention).
296 Amnesty International evidently selected a U.S. observer for a trial in Taiwan be-
cause of his expertise, the importance of U.S.-Taiwanese relations, and because he was appar-
ently the only qualified observer already possessing a visa to enter Taiwan. See Taiwan
Seymour/Al, supra note 78 at 14.
297 See notes 71, 72, and 74supra and accompanying text. Another problem about asking
permission to observe a trial is that such a request requires an official of the government to
accept the proposition that the trial needs observing. It might be easier for the government
merely to acquiesce in the sending of the observer, because the trials are open to the public.
Further, nongovernmental organizations take the position that they have a right to send in-
ternational observers to trials. South Afiza - The United Nations Special Committee on Apartheid
anda Sabotage Trial, 17 INT'L COMM'N JUR. BULL. 41, 45-46 (1963). Hence nongovernmental
organizations have properly established the practice of merely notifying the government that
an observer is coming to the trial without requesting permission.
298 See, e.g., ARGENTINA - N.Y. BAR REPORT supra note 190, at 2; see generaly S. Africa
- Velleman/ICJ (1977), supra note 212. A British observer sought a visa to enter Egypt as a
representative of AI, but did not specifically refer to the trial to be attended. See Interview
with Michael Williams in London (June 1978) supra note 209.
299 Interview with L. Blom-Cooper, an experienced trial observer, in Tallahassee, Florida
(May 1979).
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tenses in applying for a tourist visa,"00 which suggests that it is not
advisable to misrepresent the purpose of the visit.
Rather than asking permission to send an observer,3o 1 the princi-
pal organizations have developed the practice of simply informing
the government which is holding the trial that an observer will at-
tend. 0 2 The observer need not await permission to enter since the
government's silence is taken as assent. Occasionally a government
will object to the mission and the observer may be detained at the
airport or restrained from entering the courtroom.303 It is extremely
rare for observers to be harassed for harassment is usually followed
by considerable public criticism of the government.04
Upon arrival, the observer, with or without a visa, may be ques-
tioned as to the purpose of his visit. Observer practice varies from
complete disclosure of the purpose of the mission to "legal business"
or "business." Any further inquiry could be satisfied by giving the
name of the attorneys for the defense or the prosecution.
G. Public Announcement of the Mission and Statements During
the Mission
There is considerable variation among governments and organi-
zations with regard to making public statements before or during an
observer mission. Governments generally do not publicize their ob-
server activities. The mere presence of an observer is itself a state-
ment of considerable moment; public statements might unnecessarily
antagonize the prosecuting government. The British and United
300 Soerheim, Report to Amnesty International concerning myjourney to Moscow in connection with
the trial of Ginrburg, Galanskov, DobrovosLky and Lushkova, in THE TRIAL OF THE FouR 376 (P.
Litvinov ed. 1972).
301 Having been refused entry to a 1975 trial, Al apparently made preliminary contacts
with the government of Taiwan and obtained assurances that a seat had been reserved for the
Al observer at a 1980 trial. Amnesqy International to Obsena Militay Trial in Taiwan, Amnesty
International Press Release (Mar. 20, 1980).
302 A typical telegram of introduction reads as follows: "International Commission of
Jurists representing 39,000 jurists in 62 countries [have the] honor [to] inform you that
Silverio Coppa, distinguished criminal lawyer from Rome, will attend as observer [the] trial
[of] Professor Tierno Galvan and co-accused. [We] would appreciate your cooperation [in
making] all arrangements necessary for the accomplishment [of] this purpose [Signed] Secre-
tary General, International Commission of Jurists", [Press Release] (Mar. 8, 1961); see also,
e.g., International Commission of Jurists, Telegram to Greek Minister of Justice, January 17,
1973.
303 See, eg., Poland - Hadding/ICJ (1980), supra note 74 (detained at airport).
304 In 1979, AI sent an Austrian lawyer to observe a trial and appeal hearing in Czecho-
slovakia. On one occasion the observer was detained for four and one-half hours and then
expelled from the country. AI publicly protested this treatment of the observer and also
issued a severe critique of the fairness of the proceedings. See AI, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL
REPORT 1980, at 261 (1980).
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States governments have, however, publicly protested the refusal of
Czech authorities to permit observation of political trials in that
country. Also, the United States government has publicly expressed
its concern about the fairness of several trials in the Soviet Union.
These statements may be based on information provided by observ-
ers, but they are not identified with the observers themselves. Usu-
ally diplomatic observers report only to their governments regarding
the trials they attend. Their governments may infrequently make
discreet comments to the prosecuting government, or even more
rarely to the public at large.
Nongovernmental organizations are more likely to announce an
observer mission. The International Commission of Jurists has a gen-
eral practice of announcing the selection and sending of its observ-
ers.30 5 Amnesty International announces only a few of its observer
missions; in the year 1979-80 it sponsored eighteen trial observer mis-
sions306 and publicly announced its intention to send only three.
30 7
There is a risk that in some countries, such as Kenya and Qatar,
public announcements embarrass the government and make it
harder for the observer to be admitted to the trial. In situations
where the nongovernmental organization expects to make an issue of
the government's refusal to permit an observer or where there is very
little risk of such a refusal, a press release may assist in drawing the
world's attention to the trial.30 8 In every case, the expected useful-
ness of a public statement must be weighed against the potential
consequences.
As for public statements during observer missions, Amnesty Inter-
national has adopted a relatively consistent position that observers
should make no such statements. At least three principles support
this policy. First, by assuring the government that the observer will
make no public statements, the organization may be able to persuade
the government to cooperate. 0 9 Second, the observer represents Am-
nesty International at the trial, but cannot speak for the organiza-
305 See, e.g., Following Demonstration of White Studentr in South Aft'ca, ICJ Sends Obsever to
Capetown Tial, International Commission of Jurists, Press Release (Aug. 8, 1972).
306 AI, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT 1980, at 359 (1980).
307 Id at 392, 396-97. The press office of Amnesty International limits the total number
of releases it issues during each week, so that one may not be able to infer any particular
policy as to the public announcement of observer missions from this data.
308 Rather than use overt publicity, Amnesty International has occasionally asked its far-
flung membership to send letters to government authorities asking about the prisoners to be
tried. Having received hundreds or thousands of such letters, the government may desire an
observer to clear itself of these doubts. AI, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL ANNUAL REPORT
1965-1966, at 9 (1966).
309 See International Commission of Jurists, Press Release (Mar. 8, 1961).
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tion. Only after due consultation and consideration can the
organization's position be announced. Third, public statements in
the country of trial may endanger the mission, 31 the appearance of
neutrality,3 1' and even the safety of the observer.
Other organizations do not appear to have the same strict rules
against public statements during and shortly after observer mis-
sions.312 It is not unusual for observers to issue public statements im-
mediately after their return. Media attention usually focuses on the
observer at the end of the trial and a public statement has the great-
est impact at that moment. While the sending organization may
have its own perspective, the observer certainly has sufficient exper-
tise to comment on the broad issue of fairness. Sometimes organiza-
tions experience difficulty when their observers issue conclusions to
the media, but do not acknowledge their sponsoring organization
and fail to prepare a more reasoned, complete report later.
H. Briefng After Arrival
Before arrival the observer should have an idea of whom to inter-
view. The defense will usually be most helpful in providing assist-
ance and information," 3 but the observer should also try to maintain
310 AI trial observers in Nicaragua gave the local press in the courtroom information
about Al and why they were attending; considerable local publicity resulted in communicat-
ing AI's concern to the general population, but caused the trial to be immediately postponed.
See AI NICARAGUA REPORT, supra note 73. Since the Al representatives were on a general
fact-finding mission, the publicity in this situation was probably helpful in notifying inter-
ested persons that the AI mission was in Nicaragua and could be contacted.
311 One observer gave a press conference the day he arrived to explain why he was at-
tending a trial in Namibia and that he represented the I.C.J.; he made several negative com-
ments on Namibian racial conditions to the press. Thereafter he was publicly criticized for
interfering with the trial and was placed under police surveillance. Se W. Booth, Report to
the International Commission of Jurists on Windhoek, Namibia Trial, supra note 280, at 3.
Another risk of making a press statement during the mission is exemplified by the experience
of an I.C.J. observer in Turkey who gave an interview to a government-controlled newspaper.
The observer began the interview by commenting favorably on a few aspects of the trial,
which the journalist noted. As soon as the observer began to criticize other aspects of the
trial, the journalist put away his notebook and began arguing with the observer. The next
day an article appeared quoting only the observer's complimentary remarks about the trial.
Turkey-Noll/ICJ (1973), supra note 163, at 3.
312 While wanting to avoid the risk of an interview with the press, the observer may wish
to tell the press his name, country of origin, professional qualifications (e.g. lawyer, judge, law
professor), and the name of the sponsoring organization(s). Aronstein, Acquillement h Madridou
e Franquirme ord'naire, 62 REvuE NOUVELLE 451, 456, 461 (1975). Most of this information
should be contained in the observer's Order of Mission, which might be transmitted to the
press. If the newspapers note the observer's presence at the trial, the observer may have a
greater impact on the trial participants.
313 Upon arrival, the first contact of the observer is ordinarily with the defense counsel,
who can explain the procedural posture of the case, the tactics of the defense, the applicable
laws, the court procedures, and the other circumstances surrounding the case. See, e.g., Tuni-
sia - Hassemer/AI/ILHR (1977), supra note 182, at I. The defense attorney may be able to
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a balance by making contact with the prosecutor, judge,315 govern-
ment officials,3t 6 and others who can provide useful information.31 7
As always, the observer must remain impartial, independent, and a
bit aloof.
assist the observer with introductions to other participants in the trial. See, e.g., J. Lovatt-
Dolan, Interim Report on Trial in Johannesburg, South Africa, sup-a note 289, at 1. But the
observer should try to avoid appearing as an adjunct of the defense and may thus want to
arrange for introductions by a leader of the local bar or some other uninvolved lawyer of high
prestige. On a mission to attend a Bulgarian trial, however, the observer found the defense
lawyer unwilling to cooperate. Bulgaria - Spetter/AI (1974), supra note 68. That defend-
ant, however, may not have been represented by a real advocate. In another case the defense
was not helpful to the observer, because the defense tactic was to seek a light sentence by
being cooperative with the government. See S. Africa - Morand/ICJ (1975), supra note 182,
at 1. Yet another observer found the defense counsel to be rather cool at first, but cooperation
grew through the trial and the defense counsel finally provided the observer with all the
documents needed for the mission. S. Africa - Velleman/ICJ (1977), supra note 212, at 2.
314 See, e.g., Greece - Ellman/ICJ, supra note 31, app. at 3; S. Africa - Lovatt/ICJ
(1978) supra note 289, at 7: "I explained my position and purpose of my attendance to the
prosecutors and to counsel for the defense." At best, the observer may gain the cooperation of
all participants. At worst, the observer's presence will be known to the parties and they may
be wary about their conduct.
"The legal delegate of the International Committee of the Red Cross followed thirty-five
trials of protected persons before courts in Gaza, Hebron, Ramallah, [and] Nablus. . . . In
connection with this activity he maintained regular contacts with the lawyers for the detain-
ees and with the prosecutors and Israeli judicial authorities." INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE
OF THE RED CROSS, ANNUAL REPORT 1977, at 10 (1978). See also INTERNATIONAL COMMIT-
TEE OF THE RED CROSS, ANNUAL REPORT 1978, at 32 (1979).
315 Observers frequently are invited or seek interviews to speak with the presiding trial
judge. See, e.g., Turkey - Noll/ICJ (1973), supra note 163, at 2 (by invitation); Spain -
Leaud/AI (1975), supra note 163, at 1 (clerk of the court indicated judge did not want to see
the observer before trial); S. Africa - Lovatt/ICJ (1978), supra note 289, at I (introduced by
defense counsel); C. Morand, Report on the SASO/BAC Trial 1 (Dec. 16, 1975) (unpublished
report to the International Commission of Jurists). Military observers also frequently meet
with the trial judge. See Williams Thesis, supra note 162, at 48-49. The observer's meeting
with the judge (I) may be merely a courtesy call, (2) may help to assure that the observer
will, in fact, be admitted to the courtroom and (3) be given appropriate facilities, (4) may
help to bring home to the judge the presence of the observer, and/or (5) may involve discus-
sion of the case.
316 By interviewing various high level government officials, such as the Secretary of State,
the Minister of State who was a former Supreme Court Justice, the Vice-Chief of Savak, and
the Minister of Information, an observer avoided any accusation that he had failed to learn
both sides of the story. See H. Wandschneider, Report on a Mission to Teheran, September
1-15, 1965 (unpublished report to Amnesty International) [hereinafter cited as Iran -
Wandschneider/AI (1965)].
317 One useful source of information and practical assistance may be the embassy of the
observer's home country. See ARGENTINA - N.Y. BAR REPORT, supra note 190, at 5 (U.S.
Embassy); South Korea - Sanguinetti/ICJ (1972), supra note 170 app. (British Embassy); S.
Africa - Velleman/ICJ, (1977) supra note 212, at 1 (Dutch Embassy); Ivory Coast - Pic-
ard/AI, supra note 221, at 5 (1974) (French Embassy); J. Braunschweig, L'Etat actuel de la
repression politique en Iran 1 (Feb. 6, 1976) (unpublished report to the International Associa-
tion of Democratic lawyers) [hereinafter cited as Iran - Braunschweig/AIJD (1976)] (French
Embassy). The home country embassy might also be informed of the observer mission before
arrival, upon arrival, or at some later stage, either as a courtesy or if the observer fears any
retaliation by the government of the country visited.
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Observers differ greatly in the extent to which they make contacts
with officials and undertake investigations beyond the trial itself A
few observers view their role as merely to sit at the trial and to take
notes. Most observers make efforts to interview the principal partici-
pants in the trial - the defense attorney, prosecutor, judge, and de-
fendant. A few observers have even spoken to the jury foreman and
to witnesses. 318
Some observers also view their missions in a broader diplomatic
or professional context. If the observer is in a small country, or if he
has a great deal of prestige, he may interview high government offi-
cials 319 and leaders of the bar. Such discussions help inform the ob-
server of all the circumstances surrounding a trial, particularly one
with highly political overtones. Contacts with government officials
may also increase the observer's impact on the trial process. Unfortu-
nately, some individuals who are sent only to observe a trial purport
to represent the sponsoring organization in a broader sense when
meeting with government officials. The observer should not step be-
yond the mission for which she was briefed, nor place more pressure
on the government than the sponsor believes is appropriate.
Obviously, the observer's first obligation is to observe the trial,
but during recesses and on other occasions the observer should be
able to make contacts with government officials. Some observers
may even decide not to attend the testimony of minor witnesses in
favor of interviewing critical officials.
In addition to pursuing discussions outside the courtroom, the ob-
server should prepare for the trial by obtaining copies of important
court documents. In common law countries there may have been a
preliminary hearing which will reveal a substantial portion of the
prosecution's case and may shape the cross-examination of witnesses
at the trial. In civil law countries, the file generated by the examin-
ing judge is ordinarily the central focus of the trial. Thus, it is criti-
318 Interview with J. Luthi in Geneva (Sept. 7, 1978) (concerning his observation of the
Valpreda trial in Rome).
319 An I.C.J. observer in Madagascar met with the Minister of Justice, the President of
the Supreme Court, and the Prosecutor General of the Military Court. Madagascar - Noll/
ICJ (1975), supra note 187, at 1. A New York Bar Association delegation met with the Argen-
tine Minister of Justice, the President of the Supreme Court, a member of the ruling junta,
and legal advisors to the President of Argentina. ARGENTINA - N.Y. BAR REPORT, sura
note 190, at 4-5. Another observer met with the second and third ranking members of the
Ministry ofJustice to discuss the areas of human rights concern ofnAmnesty International and
the I.CJ. S. Korea- Sanguinetti/ICJ 1972, supra note 170, at 10-12. Several observers had
meetings with the South African Attorney General. Se, e.g., S. Africa - Morand/ICJ
(1975), sura note 182, at 1; S. Africa - Velleman/ICJ (1977), supra note 212, at 1.
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cal that the observer obtain access to the defendant's file.320
Ordinarily, the defendant's counsel has access to the file and should
be able to make available all the necessary documents. In some
countries the public stage of the trial merely confirms the conclusions
of the investigatory judge. Indeed, the public proceeding may be lit-
tle more than a sentencing hearing. In any case, the observer should
obtain the key documents that will be used in the courtroom and
that will be essential to a full understanding of the trial.
I. The Observer's Eniry and Sealing in the Courtroom
In order to obtain entry and a seat in the courtroom the observer
may need to present his Order of Mission to the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, the Ministry of Justice, or to the presiding judge.3 2' Some
early observers seated themselves with the defense counsel at trial.
3 2 2
320 In observing a trial in Ecuador, the observer was given full access by the government
to the official trial records and interviewed the original examining judge as well as members
of the military court. The Tral of Professor Galarza and Others, 13 INT'L COMM'N JUR. REv. 60
(1974).
321 While a trial in Turkey was supposedly held in public, the observer would not have
been able to attend without the help of the Ministry of External Affairs: "In theory trials are
held in public, but one has to go through so many formalities to be able to attend them that
in practice it is almost impossible to do so. Formalities entail photographs and a special visa
issued by the military Martial Law Commander. The courts sit in remotely situated military
camps. The tribunal which I attended was sitting in a military veterinary school and was
very well guarded by the army. To have access to the area it was necessary to have a pass and
an additional pass was needed to get into the courtroom." Turkey - Noll/ICJ (1973), supra
note 163, at 1; C. Grobet, Trial of Five Frap Members Before the Military Court of Madrid,
September 11, 1975, at 3 (Sep. 12, 1975) (unpublished report to the F1dration Internationale
des Droits de l'Homme) [hereinafter cited as Spain - Grobet II/FIDH (1975)] (Minister of
Justice): Morocco - Jemoli/AI (1976), supra note 216, at 1 (Minister of Justice). The ob-
server might see that the judge's or minister's arrangements are communicated to any security
guards at the courthouse. Compare C. Grobet, Le proc&s en appel des 1001 ("Les Dix de
Carabanchel") devant le Tribunal Supreme de Madrid, 11 f~vrier 1975 (Feb. 12, 1975) (un-
published report to Amnesty International and the F~dration Internationale des Droits de
'Homme) [hereinafter cited as Spain - Grobet/AI/FIDH (1975)], with Egypt - Ersoy, note
293 supra. In one case, when "the observer presented himself at the courtroom doors, he was
first told that there was no room (even though the general public had not yet been allowed
in). Then when the observer presented his 'order of mission' from the I.C.J. to the head of
court security, this fellow immediately became very obliging and ordered another guard to
'show the guest' into the courtroom." Spain - Grobet/ICJ (1974), supra note 175, at 5
(rough translation from French); see also Thailand - Kopp/ICJ (1977), supra note 211, at
8-11.
The Austrian government apparently takes the position that a foreign government ob-
server should obtain prior permission from the Ministry of Justice through the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, but that observers would be given permission routinely and military observ-
ers do not need prior permission.
322 Four foreign observers were seated at their request with the defense counsel. Spain -
Aronstein/BLDHR (1972) supra note 207; see also J. Ray, Egypt Mission Report (July 1977)
(unpublished report to Amnesty International) [hereinafter cited as Egypt - AI (1977)]
(seated with defense lawyers). Another observer sat next to the wife of the defendant, which
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In doing so, they may have shown their importance to the proceed-
ings, but also may have appeared more as adjuncts to the defense
than as neutral, independent observers.
Other observers have taken seats with the public.3 23 The public,
however, is usually assigned the least desirable seating - often mak-
ing it difficult to see and hear the proceedings. 24 Also, the observer
may have little impact seated in such a low visibility and low prestige
location.
Many observers have chosen to sit among disinterested local at-
torneys so as to demonstrate their higher prestige, to permit them to
see and hear better, and to avoid identifying with the adversaries. 25
A few observers have been considered equivalent to the international
press and have sat close to the front of the courtroom, but this loca-
tion may confer less than ideal prestige on the observer.3 26
Several observers have requested special accommodations at
trial.327 At some trials of great international interest there are so
many foreign observers that a whole section of the gallery is desig-
certainly gave moral support to the defendant, but did not help the observer's appearance of
independence. Michael Williams interview, supra note 209; see also note 165 supra.
Military observers usually sit in the public gallery, although some sit with defense coun-
sel or in a more neutral spot in the front of the courtroom. Williams Thesis, supra note 162, at
49. Col. Williams recommends that military observers sit with defense counsel, so that they
can advise on lines of defense not already taken. Williams, supra note 5, at 85 n.228. Obvi-
ously, such a seating makes the military observer an adjunct of the defense, but that probably
is the inevitable position of the military observer.
323 One observer arranged seating in the front row of the public section where he was
quite visible. See Aronstein, supra note 312, at 456-57. A white U.S. observer in a South
African courtroom proceeding found that he and his companion were the only two people in
the white section of the public gallery. The observer was obviously visible in this situation,
although he was also obedient to South African racial restrictions. S. Africa - Garbusl
ILHR (1977), supra note 176, at 6. Some observers at the Angolan show trial of the merce-
naries were so poorly seated that they could not hear or see well enough to determine whether
the proceedings were fair. Angola - Hinds/Stevens, supra note 278, at 1-4.
324 See Al NICARAGUA REPORT, supra note 73 (the observers were unannounced and at-
tempted to blend in with the public).
325 See, e.g., K. Madlener, Trial of the Case Tribunal de Orden Publico 1001/1972
("Carabanchel Ten"), Madrid, December 20-22, 1973, at 1 (Jan. 7, 1974) (unpublished re-
port to the International Commission of Jurists) [hereinafter cited as Spain - Madlener/ICJ
(1973)].
326 An I.C.J. observer was seated with the international news media who sat right behind
the defense lawyers in a Moroccan courtroom. See Morroco - Suckow/ICJ (1974), supra
note 201, at 1. But see Spain - Leaud/AI, (1975), supa note 163, at 2-4 (observer sat himself
with the press without court approval). In an Iranian show trial the foreign observers were
seated with the press. Iran - Wrobel (1977), supra note 271, at 3-4; see also L. Blom-Cooper,
Iran, November, 1965 (unpublished report to Amnesty International) [hereinafter cited as
Iran - Blom-Cooper/AI (1965)] (sat in the press section).
327 While observing a trial in Sri Lanka, the observer applied to the court for daily tran-
scripts, which he received. The Cyon Coup d'Etat Trial, supra note 263. Another observer met
with the Attorney General and successfully requested that part of the proceedings be held in
English for the observer's benefit. S. Africa - Morand/ICJ (1975), supra note 182.
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nated for them. 8  One observer in an Oregon trial successfully
sought a table in the center of the courtroom so as to better hear and
see the proceedings. 329 This special accommodation both impressed
the trial participants with the observer's importance and enhanced
his effectiveness as an observer.3 °
Some observers see themselves as guests and ask for no special
privileges. 331' But such passivity may result in a loss of prestige and
effectiveness. Because every courtroom has its own architecture and
configuration, the observer must be very sensitive to the importance
of seating and should, if necessary, seek some accommodation to pre-
serve an appearance of impartiality and to facilitate observation of
the trial.
J. Introduction in Open Court
Some observers have asked to be introduced in open court so that
their presence is officially recognized by the participants and the
public. 332 If the observer has been selected for her prestige and is
328 There were five foreign observers at a trial in Tunisia who were given reserved seats in
a special section of the courtroom, although the defense attorney was required to stand with
the public. Tunisia/AI/ILHR (1977), supra note 182, at 3. There were about 25 interna-
tional observers at a Spanish trial who were seated with priority in the public section. E.
McGovern, Report on the Trial ofMarcelino Camacho and Nine Others by the Public Order
Court, Madrid 20-22 December 1973 (Jan. 8, 1973 [sic)) (unpublished report to Amnesty
International) [hereinafter cited as Spain - McGovern/Al (1973)]; Interview with E. Mc-
Govern in London (July 1, 1978). The trial of former dictator Macias was held in a theater;
30 foreign diplomats and the I.C.J. observer sat in a special section. EQUATORIAL GUINEA -
TRIAL OF MACIAS, supra note 32, at 22.
329 Interview with Brian Wrobel, Amnesty International Observer, in Strasbourg, France
(Sep. 1978). In another case a Dutch observer asked for, and was granted, seating closer to
the proceedings so that he could hear better than was possible in the public gallery. See S.
Africa - Oranje/WK (1974), supa note 269, at 1.
330 Similarly, the I.C.J. and U.S. Embassy observers at a Namibian trial sat at a special
table in front of the courtroom, while church observers with lesser prestige remained with the
public in back. Namibia - Deffenbaugh/LWF (1976), supra note 164, at 46. To increase his
visibility at trial one observer dressed in the robes he would have worn had he been attending
a trial in his own country. Aronstein, supra note 312, at 456. Military observers normally
dress in uniform to maximize their presence in the courtroom. Williams Thesis, supra note
162, at 85 n.226 and 49 n.122.
331 A Canadian observer sat initially with the public, but as soon as the court recognized
that he was a practicing barrister, it gave him a special neutral spot at counsel bench right
between the prosecution and the defense. India - Sheppard/ICJ (1976), supa note 246, at
27.
332 See Egypt - AI (1977), supra note 322. The treasurer of the local bar association
introduced observers from Amnesty International and the British Parliamentary Human
Rights Group to the court at the June 1980 opening session of an arson trial in Guyana. Two
observers from nongovernmental organizations and an observer from the U.S. Embassy were
not publicly introduced. SeegeneraIfy D. Weissbrodt, Report on First Week of the Arson Trial
at Georgetown, Guyana (July 9, 1980) (unpublished report to Amnesty International) [here-
inafter cited as Guyana - Omwale et al./AI (1980)].
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properly seated at the trial, such an introduction may be unnecessary
because everyone will recognize her.3 33 But, if the observer feels that
such an introduction would increase her impact, there is little reason
to discourage such an effort. Introduction by some neutral party,
such as the president of the local bar association, probably would
best preserve the observer's independence. If, however, the observer
only intends to remain for part of the trial, an introduction would
underscore her later absence and might be unwise.
K. Taking Notes at the Trial
There is no better way for an observer to make her presence felt
than to take copious notes. However, some countries, such as Spain,
forbid anyone from taking notes except for participating lawyers and
the press.3 34 One Amnesty International observer who had not made
specific arrangements for seating at a Spanish trial assumed that he
would be considered equivalent to the press and sat in the press sec-
tion taking notes. The observer was arrested after the court session
and expelled from the country.335
Another difficulty with taking notes, particularly after talking
with informants, is that notes may be subject to seizure or surrepti-
tious review by the police.3 6 Hence, some observers in less secure
settings take very sketchy notes and begin preparing their reports
only after departure.
L. Fact-fiding by Trial Observers
Besides reporting what they see at trial, observers often need to
make factual determinations as to events which occurred out of their
presence. Frequently, observers function as fact-finders who assess
the evidence presented at trial, add outside information, and reach
an overall decision as to the fairness of the proceedings, which may
necessarily require a judgment on the guilt or innocence of the
accused.
There is a very considerable body of intergovernmental, 337 gov-
333 In the opening speech the military judge in a Spanish trial acknowledged the presence
of international observers. Aronstein, supra note 312.
334 Spain - Madlener/ICJ (1973), supra note 325, at 4; Spain - Ziegler-Muller/FIDH
(1976), supra note 174.
335 AI, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT 1975-1976, at 168 (1976).
336 See Iran - Heldman/AI (1970), supra note 67; ef. Morocco - Hincker/FIDH, supra
note 216, at 9 (reporter, not an observer, was deprived of his notes).
337 See generaly Foster, Fact-finding and the World Court, in 7 CAN. Y.B. INT'L LAiW 150
(1969); Franck & Fairley, Procedural Due Process in Human Rights Fact Finding by Intenational
Agencis, 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 308 (1980); Franck & Cherkis, The Problem o(Fact Finding in Intera-
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ernmental, 338 and nongovernmental 3 39 experience as to fact-finding
procedures which an observer might find useful. Of course, the ob-
server usually works alone with neither the need nor the ability to
establish formal fact-finding procedures such as most international
tribunals have used. The trial itself is a source of formally presented
evidence, though the observer cannot personally question the wit-
nesses in open court, nor assure the fairness of the fact-finding pro-
cess. Instead, the observer must rely upon the contending parties to
establish the facts at trial and supplement them as necessary with
interviews outside the courtroom. 34 0
Most sending organizations do not expect their observers to base
their reports only on evidence adduced at trial. Where possible the
observer should observe the proceedings while conducting a parallel,
informal fact-finding inquiry.3 4 ' Several observers have undertaken
parallel investigations to verify the evidence offered at trial because
they found the information presented in the courtroom to be incom-
plete. An observer may want to conduct an independent investiga-
tional Disputes, 18 CASE WESTERN RES. L. REV. 1483 (1967); Ermacora, International Enquiry
Commissions in the Field of Human Rights, 1 HUMAN RIGHTS J. 180 (1968); Report of the
Secretary-General on Methods of Fact-finding, 19 U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/5694 (1964)
[hereinafter cited as Secretary-General's Report]; N. BAR-YAACOv, THE HANDLING OF IN-
TERNATIONAL DISPUTES BY MEANS OF INQUIRY (1974); [hereinafter cited as BAR-YAACOV];
W. SHORE, FACT-FINDING IN THE MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE (1970) [herein-
after cited as SHORE]; Norris, Observations "in loco ": Practice and Procedures of the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights, 15 TExAS J. INT'L L. 46 (1980); van Boven, Fact-Finding in the
Field of Human Rights, 3 ISRAEL Y.B. HUMAN RIGHTS 93 (1973).
338 See Weissbrodt, Human Rights Legislation and United States Foreign Poli, 7 GA. J. INT'L
& COMP. L. 231, 238-39 n.29 (1977).
339 Weissbrodt, The Role of International Nongovernmental Organizations in the Implementation of
Human Rights, 12 Tax. INT'L L.J. 293 (1977); Weissbrodt & McCarthy, Human Rights Fact-
fnding hy Nongovernmental Organizations, 22 VA. J. INT'L L. 1 (1981).
340 In order to get a full idea of the circumstances surrounding the trial, an I.C.J. ob-
server met with ex-detainees, those restricted by banning orders, concerned university profes-
sors, members of the legal profession, diplomats, and participants in the trial. S. Africa -
Morand/ICJ (1975), supra note 182, at 1-2. Observers have occasionally encountered diffi-
culties in obtaining interviews with defendants who are still in detention during the trial. See,
e.g., S. Africa - Thornberry/AI (1974), supra note 226, at 1. Obviously, observers must use
good judgment as to which interviews should be requested and as to what are acceptable
circumstances for interviews with a prisoner. An I.C.J. observer was permitted to interview
the defendant only in the presence of a government translator and the prosecutor. At the
outset the observer successfully insisted that the interview not be recorded and told the de-
fendant he need not answer any questions under such circumstances. S. Korea -
Sanguinetti/ICJ (1972), supra note 170, at 8. Despite the obvious limits of such an interview,
the observer was able to obtain "first hand impressions of the condition of the accused and his
treatment in prison." At minimum it is useful to attempt to speak with the defendant and to
assure that he knows of the observer's presence. See S. Africa - Velleman/ICJ (1977), supra
note 212, at 1.
341 One observer found that the defense lawyers in an Iranian proceeding were retired
members of the military appointed by the court. See Iran - Wrobel/AI (1977), supra note
271, at 12, 28.
International Trial Observers
tion if she suspects that the judge is prejudiced or that the defense
lawyers are under governmental pressure not to pursue a vigorous
defense.342 When an Amnesty International observer was sent to the
North Dakota trial at which Leonard Peltier was accused of killing
two F.B.I. agents, the observer received separate factual presenta-
tions from the prosecutor, the defense attorneys, and friends of the
defendant.343 The trial judge also spent considerable time with the
observer explaining the trial and the court's rulings. Finally, it
should be kept in mind that defense counsel may have tactical rea-
sons for not presenting in court all evidence of the defendant's
innocence.
M. Evidentiag, Standards
Traditionally, international fact-finding has not been restricted
by rules regarding the admissibility of evidence which arise in com-
mon law courts. 44 Common law rules for the exclusion of evidence
are ordinarily designed to narrow the issues presented to the jury.345
Since trial observers are selected for their legal and subject-matter
expertise, jury-oriented evidentiary rules are not necessary. Exclu-
sionary rules also discourage government misconduct in gathering
evidence - particularly in criminal trials.346 This problem applies
rarely, if ever, to fact-finding observers. In addition, courts also use
exclusionary rules to promote the reliability and integrity of the fact-
finding process. 47 Instead of using the exclusionary approach, inter-
342 One observer was so hounded by Savak agents that contacts with opposition groups
would subject them to a grave risk of retribution. See Iran - Heldmann/AI (1970), supra
note 67. The observer in such circumstances should probably be limited to trial observation
and contacts with government officials.
343 See United States - Bari/AI (1977), supra note 228, at 3, 47.
344 See general D. SANDIFER, EVIDENCE BEFORE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS 1-29,
176-96, 366-69 (rev. ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as SANDIFER]. "[T]he restrictions upon ad-
missibility of evidence sometimes encountered in municipal procedure (and connected with
the system of jury trial) have no place in international adjudication, where the relevance of
facts and the value of evidence tending to establish facts are left to the entire appreciation of
the Court." Id at 179-80 (quoting S. ROSENNE, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERNA-
TIONAL COURT 556-57 (1965)); SHORE, supra note 337, at 124-25.
345 See 1 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 2, 29a (3d ed. 1940); SANDIFER, supra note 344, at
176-78.
346 See C. MCCORMICK, McCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE
§§ 164-165 (2d ed. 1972); see, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657-60 (1961) (evidence
obtained in violation of the fourth and fourteenth amendments will be excluded from state
courts); Benanti v. United States, 355 U.S. 96, 100 (1957) (evidence obtained by state or
federal agents in violation of the Federal Communications Act is inadmissible in federal
court).
347 See general'y C. MCCORMICK, supra note 346, §§ 164-166. The problem of whether
evidence would be inadmissible by reason of its means of procurement was evidently posed to
the Commission of Inquiry of Iran, when it was presented with evidence captured in the
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national fact-finders have been disposed to consider all available evi-
dence but to weigh it very carefully.34 8 International fact-finders also
rely on a number of techniques to assure the reliability of the fact-
finding process, such as cross-checking information from different
sources, carefully questioning witnesses, and articulating burdens of
proof. Using these techniques, international observers should seek
the broadest possible range of raw evidence.
Observer inquiries outside the trial resemble interviews more
than adjudicative hearings. The effectiveness of direct examination
by the observer varies with the preparedness, incisiveness, and skill of
the questioner.349 In some ways observers conduct themselves like
civil lawjuges d'insttction ."o The observer need not demonstrate facts
to some independent body, such as a judge or jury. The questioner
both poses the inquiries and also analyzes the responses. Hence, he
can extract meaningful information through polite and sometimes
indirect questioning. Points need not be driven home. On some
more formal occasions - interviews with governmental representa-
tives, for example - observers may need to use more forceful ques-
tioning. But ordinarily polite, tactful, and carefully prepared
questions produce reliable fact-finding.
The most commonly used method of verifying human rights in-
formation is the cross-checking of evidence from different sources.
Often relying on indirect evidence, and faced with unreliable or po-
litically motivated informants, the observer should look for corrobo-
rative data from independent sources.
Observers occasionally receive government statements which par-
tially deny or inferentially admit human rights violations. Observers
usually construe such admissions strictly against the government.
Observers must also be aware of inconsistencies in a government's
position. For example, a representative of Argentina's Ministry of
the Interior denied that his government used electric prods to torture
United States Embassy and with the possibility of hearing testimony from American diplo-
matic hostages. See alto U.N. Press Release IR/1 1, March 3, 1980.
348 See SANDIFER, supra note 344, at 20, 180.
349 Interviews should be free of governmental witnesses. An Al observer talked to the
defense attorney in the presence of the Registrar of the Special General Court Martial in
Ethiopia; the observer probably failed to obtain the candid views of this attorney. See Ethio-
pia - AI (1975), supra note 274, at 7. Obviously, no rigid rules can be established as to
conditions for interviews. Ethiopia was and remains a country of such fear that an attorney
would probably feel safer speaking to an observer in the presence of an official, so that it
would be known that he had said nothing critical and thus he would survive to see another
trial.
350 Cf. Goldstein & Marcus, Comment on Continental Crimial Procedure, 87 YALE LJ. 1570,
1571 (1978) (suggesting a conflict between the concept of the juge dlrmttruaion and actual
practice).
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prisoners; yet he displayed a working familiarity with these
instruments.35 '
The demeanor of a witness at trial may lend insight into the ve-
racity of her testimony, or may merely reflect the witness's nervous
disposition. Observers who have personally interviewed the witness
can better assess the reliability of the testimony given and will have
better insight into the validity of the witness's statements. 5 2
Finally, the burden of proof serves a very significant role in deter-
mining the usefulness of independent factual findings. Observers
may discover evidence of varying weight and persuasiveness. In
drafting their final reports, the standard for significant conclusions
must be clearly defined and consistently applied.
N. Scope of Mission - Observer Instructions
In performing a fact-finding role, the observer must consider the
scope of the mission as established by the sending organization.
Some observers are instructed to consider the fairness of the proceed-
ings; 353 others are asked to determine the facts supporting criminal
charges,35 4 discover the pretrial treatment of the defendant, 35 or con-
sider how the trial reflects the general state of human rights in the
country.356 For example, the principal purpose of the International
Commission of Jurists in sending an observer to the trial of former
dictator Macias was to document the violation of human rights
under his regime,35 7 although the observer did also report upon the
fairness of the Macias trial itself.
35 8
351 See, e.g., AI, REPORT OF AN AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL MISSION TO ARGENTINA 6-15
NOVEMBER 1976, at 53 (1977).
352 In one South African trial the observers independently assessed the demeanor of the
prosecution's star witness, a security police officer, and found him to be thoroughly unreliable
and vicious. See S. Africa - Napley (1977), supra note 281, at 9.
353 "A detailed report by an observer (ofundeniable integity andjudicialstand)ng) may bring
to the light errors in judicial procedure or blatant bias on the part of the court." Al ANNUAL
REPORT 1965-66, at 8-9 (1966).
354 Amnesty International observers form a judgment as to whether the defendant has
been imprisoned for political, racial, religious, or similar reasons and has neither done nor
advocated violence, so as to qualify for AI adoption as a prisoner of conscience. AI, AMNESTY
INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK 9 (1977). See, e.g., Amnesty International, The Casablanca Tri-
als January/February 1977, at 2 (Mar. 1977) [hereinafter cited as Morocco - Frontistes/
Hoss/AI (1977)].
355 See, e.g., Greece - Bourgaux/AIJD (1973), sufira note 159, at 3.
356 See, e.g., Malawi - Kellock/AI (1968),supra note 226. AI's principal purpose in send-
ing Kellock to a trial in Malawi appeared to be his monitoring of the results of a recent report
on political detention. See also Egypt - Ersoy/AI, supra note 293, at 1 (observer was asked to
collect data on trials, arrests, oppression of opposition parties, etc.).
357 EQUITORIAL GUINEA - TRIAL OF MACIAS, supra note 32.
358 Id at 60-61.
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Observers usually receive from the sending organization a formal
letter of introduction or Order of Mission which they can show to the
court or government where the trial is held.359 Most Orders of Mis-
sion state that the observer is expected to report upon the fairness of
a particular trial, but observers may interpret these instructions nar-
rowly360 or broadly enough to cover all the surrounding circum-
stances of the trial. 61 If the observer interprets her Order of Mission
too narrowly, she may render an inadequate report. For example,
several observers of South African trials proclaimed the proceedings
fair because they looked only at the court procedure and failed to
consider the draconian, overbroad, and ultimately racist substantive
laws being enforced. 2 Most observers of South African trials take a
broader perspective.363
Ambiguous Orders of Mission should not confuse the observers.
These formal documents are designed more to induce the host gov-
ernment to cooperate with the mission than to outline the sending
organization's needs. The broader needs will either be self-evident or
communicated informally to the observer.
V. TRIAL OBSERVER REPORTS, RECOMMENDATIONS,
AND IMPACT
A. Timing and Substance of Reports
After observation, the principal responsibility of the observer is to
produce a report promptly. If the observer's mission is to be effective,
the sending organization must receive a report while the prosecuting
government is still sensitive to authoritative, independent criticism
and to public opinion."6
Almost all observers are busy lawyers whose ordinary professional
359 See, e.g., Greece - Grobet (1973), supra note 284 (I.C.J. letter of Jan. 12, 1973).
360 See, e.g., Bulgaria - Spetter Trial (1974), supra note 68.
361 While the Moroccan trial procedures were open and fair, the observers could not
ignore the repressive laws of the country and the abusive conditions of pretrial detention
revealed by the accused. See Morocco - Hincker/FIDH (1976), supra note 216, at 8-9.
362 "My impression of the proceedings so far is that, within the limitations imposed by
the governing laws, the summary nature of proceedings, and the prevailing local political
conditions (which three limitations are substantial), they have been fairly conducted, though
I have some minor reservations." South Africa - Thornberry/AI/LCCRUL (1974), supra
note 226, at 2.
363 See, e.g., C. Morand, Report on the SASO/BPC Trial, at 4 (Dec. 16, 1975) (unpub-
lished report to the International Commission of Jurists); South Africa - Morand/ICJ
(1975), supra note 182.
364 In one case the mission ended January 18, and by January 21 the I.C.J. had already
issued a press release, which was necessary to generate international pressure on Morocco to
refrain from carrying out the death sentence meted out on the 18th. Morocco - Suckow/ICJ
(1974), supra note 201, at 2.
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responsibilities once again absorb their energies unless they complete
their reports quickly upon returning home. While a good observer
report has a number of qualities, promptness is the most vital.
365
To the extent that time permits, observers should include the fol-
lowing information in their reports: (1) the instructions of the send-
ing organization and any terms of reference;366 (2) the legal,
historical, and political setting of the case;367 (3) the facts of the case
as revealed at trial and independently verified by the observer;368 (4)
the charges, applicable laws, pretrial procedures, trial, judgment (if
any), and subsequent proceedings;369 (5) a description of the condi-
365 Where it is geographically and financially possible, non-governmental organizations
should also consider asking the observer to report orally to the secretariat, so that they can
receive a rapid account of the mission. Upon return from an I.C.J. mission to South Africa in
1975, the observer was debriefed before he prepared his report. S. Africa - Archer/ICJ
(1975), supra note 76, at 11. Unfortunately, observers often come from distant countries and
do not pass close to the secretariat on their missions so that they can be debriefed.
366 In a typical observer report the observer begins with an outline of the mission's man-
date, e.g., to establish contacts, collect information, observe the trial, interview the accused,
get a private doctor to examine the accused, inquire into the conditions of detention, and
evaluate the findings under international human rights standards. See S. Africa - Thornber-
ry/AI (1974), supra note 226, at 1. The report's introduction also often indicates the name of
the observer, a summary of the observer's qualifications, the identity of the sending organiza-
tion, the name of the defendant, the charge against the defendant, the date of the mission,
and a list of the contents of the remainder of the report.
367 In reporting to the I.C.J. on his mission to a Turkish trial, the observer begins with a
brief synopsis of the recent political, economic, and social history of Turkey. See Turkey -
Simon/ICJ (1980), supra note 174, at 53-55; see also S. Africa - Gardiner/ICJ (1957), supra
note 244, at 43-47. Also, in some cases a report would not be complete without a biographi-
cal sketch of the defendant, which may illuminate the political nature of the proceedings.
Aronstein, supra note 312, at 37-38. There may be some risk that an observer's comments on
the economic, social, and political situation may be outside her area of expertise and may
appear to politicize the remainder of the report. Hence, some caution may be necessary
particularly if the observer's background comments are to be published.
368 L. Kakula & M. Kamuwanga, Report by International Observers at Leonard Peltier's
Trial, January 18-27, 1978 (unpublished report to Amnesty International).
369 One observer reported the essentials: the name of the trial; the court; the place of
trial; the dates of trial; the accused; the charge; the law violated; the order of testimony; the
conduct of the prosecutor, judge, and defense counsel; the verdict, the sentence, and the fur-
ther procedures available. See Greece:Justice in Blinkers, 1 INT'L COMM'N JUR. REV. 6, 7 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as Greece - Achard/ICJ (1968)]. The observer might usefully describe the
courtroom and the nature of audience, including any other foreign observers, police agents,
etc. See, e.g., Greece - Grober/ICJ (1973), supra note 284.
In one complicated case with numerous defendants the observer appended a very useful
chart to his report with the names of the defendants, their age, marital status, profession,
defense counsel, original sentence, revised sentence on appeal, and present prison status. S.
Suckow, Report on Observer Mission - Trial in Madrid of A. Fina Sanglas and M. Aviles
Vila and 8 Workers of SEAT, March 4-5, 1975 (Mar. 13, 1975) (unpublished report to the
International Commission of Jurists). When reporting on another case involving 15 defend-
ants, the observer prepared a lengthy appendix which fully described each defendant, the
charges against each, the substance of testimony for and against each defendant, the verdict
for each, and the sentence for those convicted. Greece - Vournas/ILRM (1972), supra note
221 app., at a-I to a-7.
Observers do not report every factual dispute or procedural issue in the proceeding, but
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tions of confinement and their impact on the mental and physical
condition of the defendant(s);37° (6) an evaluation of the fairness of
the proceedings, the applicable laws, and the treatment of the de-
fendant(s) according to national law and international human rights
standards;371  and (7) a conclusion describing any significant
problems the observer noted.372
limit their report to the critical problems which were relevant to the fairness of the proceed-
ings, based on their own observations, legal documents, interviews with participants, etc. See,
e.g., Pakistan - Williams/ICJ (1978), supra note 158, at 7; India - Sheppard/ICJ (1976),
supra note 246.
370 One important function of the observer is to report on the physical and mental condi-
tion of the defendant - particularly where there is a possibility of torture or bad prison
conditions. Such information simply cannot be gathered at long distance and thus becomes
an important duty of the trial observer. See S. Africa - Velleman/ICJ (1977), supra note 212,
at 5 (defendant's condition good); Iran - Ducreaux/AIJD (1965), supra note 188, at 2;
Greece - Gardiner/AI (1972), supra note 279, at 4. Evidence of torture may also be relevant
to the fairness of trial procedure if the court refuses to hear any evidence that confessions were
produced by torture, as occurred in Morocco. Morocco - Woesner/AI/ICJ (1973), supra
note 217, at 2.
371 Observers often draw conclusions about the vagueness, misapplication, or injustice of
the laws under which the defendant is charged. See, e.g., Greece - Achard/ICJ (1968), supra
note 369, at 8-9. One I.C.J. observer was careful to comment on the favorable as well as the
unfavorable aspects of the trial, so as to produce an apparently balanced, objective report.
Morocco - Poulsson/ICJ (1964), supra note 285, at 29. Another observer prepared 10 pages
of well-written findings on the four principal issues of fairness of the proceedings. India -
Sheppard/ICJ (1976), supra note 246, at 21-30. The observer's role is not, however, to criti-
cize a judge's evidentiary or procedural rulings that could have gone either way. Indonesia
- Dowd/ICJ (1974), supra note 209, at 13-14. But instead, the observer's purpose is to assess
the fairness of the proceedings under basic international standards of fairness, such as those
provided by the International Bill of Human Rights. See, e.g., id One experienced observer's
approach was to provide a description of the procedures for obtaining admission to the trial,
the courtroom, the general conduct of the proceedings, the charges, and the evidence (in some
detail, including verbatim testimony to highlight evidentiary shortcomings). The report then
commented on the procedural fairness (ability to present the case fully to the court), proce-
dural shortcomings, contextual fairness (were the laws under which the accused were prose-
cuted properly clear and respectful of the right to associate freely?) and whether the judgment
was based on evidence proffered by the defense (or was it ignored?). N. MacDermot, Report
and Comments on Proceedings for the Dissolution of Two Greek Associations in Athens, 16
May 1972 (June 1972) (unpublished report to the International Commission of Jurists) [here-
inafter cited as Greece - MacDermot/ICJ (1972)]. The observer notes that the trial was
procedurally fair in the sense that the accused organizations were given the opportunity to
defend their right to exist. Further, the President of the Court "was at pains to conduct the
trial fairly." Id at 9. Still, the observer goes on to note three factors which most alarmingly
indicated the general breakdown of the rule of law in Greece. Further, the observer delivers
biting criticism of the trial as a facade for authoritarian heavy-handedness. Id at 9-10. By
way of comparison, military observers must prepare a factual description of the trial, includ-
ing failures to provide procedural safeguards, and must conclude whether the accused re-
ceived a fair trial under the circumstances. Williams Thesis, supra note 162, at 47-48.
372 One observer ably summarized the major concerns about the procedural fairness and
fairness-in-context of the trial: (a) the trial was a blatantly political one; (b) the law under
which the accused were charged was hopelessly vague and, besides, it established crimes of
ideology; (c) defendants were not given the required benefit of the doubt, nor was the proof
offered at trial of probative weight; (d) there was not any evidence introduced to prove any
plot among the defendants. Iran - Ducreaux/AIJD (1965), supra note 188, at 4-5. Also, for
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The report might append (1) a copy of the Order of Mission;
(2) copies of the relevant procedural rules, court decisions, and
laws;373 (3) copies of court documents, including transcripts, pretrial
transcripts, charge sheets, and judgments; (4) a description of the ob-
server's investigative methods and copies of materials studied;374 (5) a
list of individuals interviewed (to the extent that they will not be
endangered by being named); (6) sensitive material (such as the
names, addresses, and telephone numbers of contacts who might be
endangered by public disclosure, but about whom the organization
should know); (7) copies of any newspaper articles regarding the trial
or the observer's presence;3 75 (8) additional information not strictly
within the observer's mission (such as general information regarding
political detainees, torture, other trials, or recent laws) ;376 and (9) a
list of practical problems encountered by the observer that might as-
sist future observers in the same country.377
Observers are not ordinarily requested to make recommendations
to the government concerned or to the sending organization, but
some observers have included recommendations to alleviate defects
in trial procedures and suggestions as to how the sending organiza-
tion should proceed in the matter.
3 7 8
Traditionally international fact-finders uncovered facts, but did
an excellent report and conclusion, see Greece - Grobet/ICJ (1973), sura note 284; Morocco
- Suckow/ICJ (1974), supra note 201, at 7; S. Africa - Pollak (1978), supra note 178.
373 See, e.g., Spain - Suckow/ICJ (1975), supra note 77, at app. (the most pertinent pro-
visions of the Spanish Penal Code appended); Morocco - Hincker/FIDH (1976), supra note
216 (appended copies of relevant provisions of constitution and penal code); Indonesia -
Dowd/ICJ (1974), supira note 209, at 7 (copy of law under which the defendant was charged,
with English translation).
374 One I.C.J. observer listed all the materials he had studied before, during, and after
the trial. Some of the more important material might also be copied in an appendix to the
report. Pakistan - Williams/ICJ (1978), spira note 158, at 2-3.
375 In assessing the fairness of the proceeding and the potential of the government to be
affected by the criticisms, the observer should consider the accuracy of local press coverage
about the trial. See, e.g., Tunisia - Hassemer/AI/ILHR (1977), supra note 182, at 4; S. Af-
rica- Napley (1977), suira note 281, at 1; Indonesia - Dowd/ICJ (1974), supa note 209; S.
Korean Milita7 r Using Tial, tros o Discredil Kim, Wash. Post, Aug. 22, 1980, at A22, col. 1.
The sending organization would be assisted in assessing the success of the mission if articles
mentioning the mission are appended or at least properly cited. See E. Martin-Achard, Le
Procs de Anastasios Minis et Stephanos Pantelakis devant un Tribunal Militaire Special A
Ath~nes, 19 et 20 f~vrier 1973 (unpublished report to the International Commission of Jurists)
(copies enclosed) [hereinafter cited as Greece - Martin-Achard (1973)]; Morocco -Jemoli/
Al (1976), supra note 216 (newspaper articles mentioned but not properly cited).
376 One observer not only appended a list of the forthcoming trials of interest to the
organization, but also provided a collection of photographs of the people, places, and things
observed which would be indispensible for later publicity about the trial. S. Africa -
Thornberry/AI (1974), supra note 226; see also Taiwan - Seymour/Al, supira note 78.
377 India - Sheppard/ICJ (1976), supira note 246.
378 See, e.g., Greece - Gardiner/Al (1972), supa note 279, at 5.
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not make recommendations.379 Their inquiry was limited in order to
maintain the distinction between fact-finders and arbitral tribunals
that make political judgments. Slowly this separation has broken
down as more observers and other international fact-finders have is-
sued reports and recommendations. °
Amnesty International publishes observer reports containing rec-
ommendations to the government concerned. These are not gener-
ally the conclusions of the observer, but Amnesty International's
recommendations based upon the observer's findings."' The gener-
ally prevailing practice of separating observer reports from the
human rights campaign activities of their sponsors serves to maintain
the specialized, impartial, fact-finding role of observers and should
be continued.
Nongovernmental organizations sometimes have difficulty decid-
ing when to issue the report. In one case, the International Commis-
sion of Jurists issued its mission report before the trial ended, because
it seemed that the trial would drag on for a long time.3 2 Although
organizations seek to promote fairness, such an early report may be
deemed to interfere in the trial process. Also, it is hard to assess the
fairness of a proceeding before knowing the results.
More commonly, trial observer reports are issued promptly after
trial, even though appellate review or clemency proceedings are still
available. Appellate courts are considered to be better able to deal
with the political pressures created by such reports. And, indeed, the
reports may properly point out errors which ought to be the basis for
appellate reversal or clemency.
The other major question concerning dissemination of observer
reports is whether reports should be submitted to the concerned gov-
ernment for comment or rebuttal before release to the public. One
reason for following this procedure is that the government should be
given an opportunity to make any suggested changes. Another is
that the government's failure to respond to adverse conclusions helps
support the report's findings.
Organizations regularly submit their findings to and solicit evi-
dence from the concerned state. The major drawbacks to this proce-
dure have been the delay in receiving responses from some
379 BAR-YAACOV, supra note 337, at 105.
380 Id at 109-246; Leurdijk, Fac-Fizding. Its Place in International Law and International
Politics, 14 NETHERLANDS INT'L L. REV. 141, 154-58 (1967); Secretary-General's Report,
supOra note 337, at 23-33, 60-64 (1964); SHORE, supra note 337, at 15-22, 32-36.
381 See, e.g., AI NICARAGUA REPORT, supra note 73, at 38-40.
382 S. Africa - Gardiner/ICJ (1957), supra note 244.
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governments and the refusal of other governments even to respond.
Organizations should set definite time limits for responses and pub-
lish their reports immediately upon any public comment by the con-
cerned government.
B. Farness Standards
There are several possible standards by which an observer might
judge the fairness of a trial. The observer can look to (a) the laws of
the country where the trial is held, (b) human rights treaties to which
the nation is a party, or (c) other prevailing international norms.
Far too often, observers fail to specify the standards they use to
draw their conclusions. 38 3 At other times observers explain their con-
clusions with vague references to natural justice.3 4 Some observers
rely upon an unsubstantiated opinion of what the laws of most coun-
383 See, eg., Tunisia - Hassemer/AI/ILHR, supra note 182, at 5.
384 E.g., India - Sheppard/ICJ (1976), supra note 246, at 3-4. The concept of natural
justice derives from the broader and ancient doctrine of Natural Law. Philosophers and ju-
rists have long posited the existence of a law higher than the positive law of sovereign states
which no state may transgress. For descriptions of the historic development, decline, and
resurgence of the doctrine from Socrates through Thomas Aquinas, Locke, and Kant, see, e.g.,
THE NATURAL LAW READER 47-108 (B. Brown ed. 1960); F. ETEROVICH, APPROACHES TO
NATURAL LAW FROM PLATO TO KANT (1972); Y. SIMON, THE TRADITION OF NATURAL
LAW 16-40 (1965).
International jurist H. Lauterpacht asserts that the modern development of international
law is founded on natural law theory. "Grotius called in the law of nature, to which he gave
fresh vitality and authority, in order to found the modern system of international law. But
much of the new vigour and dignity which he imparted to the law of nature came from the
fact that it was made the basis for that so much needed law governing the relations of sover-
eign states. International law, by thus endowing the law of nature with a great historic func-
tion, gave it a new lease on life and a new significance." Lauterpacht, The Law of Nations, the
Law of Nature andthe Rights of Man in PAMPHLETS ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW No. 23, at 21
(1942).
The concept of inalienable human rights derives in substantial part from the notion of
natural law. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights is said to be the "common formu-
lation of practical conclusions about man and the various rights possessed by man" that have
evolved from the ancient ideas of natural and international law. J. MARrrAIN, THE MEAN-
INC OF HUMAN RIGHTS 6-7 (1949). For further exposition on the relations of natural law to
human rights, see R. TUCK, NATURAL RIGHTS THEORIES (1979); Midgley, Natural Law and
Fundamental Rights, 21 AM. J. JURIS. 144 (1976); Murray, The Natural Law in GREAT EXPRES-
SIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS 69 (R. MacIver ed. 1950).
One fundamental human right is the right to fair treatment before the law. The English
phrase "natural justice" and its American counterpart "due process" express the Anglo-Amer-
ican conception of procedural fairness. Newman, Naturaljusttce, Due Process and the New Inter-
national Covenants on Human Rights: Prospectus, 1967 PUB. L. 274, 277 (1967); see also H. WADE,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 171-218 (3d ed. 1971) (natural justice); Newman, The Process of pre-
scribing '2)ue Process," 49 CALIF. L. REV. 215 (1961) (due process). Both phrases have escaped
precise definition.
English scholars have distilled the requirements of natural justice into two elements:
(1) a man must not be the judge of his own case, and (2) both sides must be heard. D.
HEWrrr, NATURAL JUSTICE 12 (1972). Other principles often cited as elements of natural
justice, e.g., that the parties must have timely notice, be represented by counsel, and bejudg-
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tries would provide on a certain issue, 38 5 or adopt their own coun-
tries' standards. 86 In some cases a transnational comparison is
ed by an impartial tribunal, are said to derive from the two essential rules. H. MARSHALL,
NATURAL JUSTiCE 5 (1959).
While the English legal system has moved away from the natural law source of natural
justice toward parliamentary dictates of procedural fairness, American courts have relied on
natural law concepts in fashioning the requirements of the due process clause. Compare
Miller, The Forest of Due Process Law.- The American Constitutional Tradition in DUE PROCESS
NoMos XVIII 3 (1977) with Marshall, Due Process in England in DUE PROCESS NoMos XVIII
69 (1977). The American judiciary has avoided a clear-cut formulation of due process re-
quirements and has developed a flexible standard that calls for considerations of fairness and
a weighing of competing interests. Justice Frankfurter's statement in Hannah v. Larche exem-
plifies the American approach: "Whether the scheme satisfies those strivings which due pro-
cess guarantees, must be judged in the light of reason drawn from considerations of fairness
that reflect our traditions of legal and political thought, duly related to the public interest
...as against the hazards or hardship to the individual that the attacked procedure would
entail." 363 U.S. 420, 487 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
Professor and former Justice Frank Newman has proposed an interpretation of the fair
hearing provisions of the international human rights covenants that simultaneously utilizes
and clarifies the norms of natural justice and due process. Newman, NaturalJustice, Due Process
and the New International Covenants on Human Rzhts: Prospectus, 1967 PUB. L. 274 (1967). He
concludes: "Overall, whenever a person's rights and obligations are to be governmentally
adjudicated he is entitled to a fair hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribu-
nal established by law." Id at 310. To help in assessing whether a hearing is fair he sets out
the following principles proposed by the International Commission of Jurists: "(1) adequate
notice to the interested parties of the nature and purpose of the proceedings; (2) adequate
opportunity for them to prepare the case, including access to relevant data; (3) their right to
be heard, and adequate opportunity for them to present arguments and evidence, and to
meet opposing arguments and evidence; (4) their right to be represented by counsel or an-
other qualified person; (5) adequate notice to them of the decision and of the reasons there-
for; (6) their right of recourse to a higher administrative authority or to a court." INT'L
COMM'N OF JUR., THE RULE OF LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS 21 (1966).
385 See, e.g., Spain - Madlener/ICJ (1973), supra note 325, at 10; S. Africa - Morand/
ICJ (1975), supra note 182, at 2; cf. Maki, CeneralPrinciples ofHumnan Rights Law Recognized by all
Nations.- Freedom from Arbitrar, Arrest and Detention, 10 CAL. W. INTL L.J. 272, 282-83 (1980)
(determining general principles of law by comparing both the law and the practice of the
countries).
386 United States military observers have attempted rather unsuccessfully to use U.S.
constitutional standards for judging foreign trials of American military personnel. In acced-
ing to the N.A.T.O. Status of Forces Agreement, the U.S. Senate permitted U.S. military
personnel to be tried in a N.A.T.O. country only if the country gives procedural safeguards
which are equal to or better than those available in the U.S. Because it is almost impossible
to compare the fairness of civil law and the common law countries by taking each right and
asking whether it has been observed in each system, this Senate instruction has not really
been followed. The military services have prepared "country law reports" which attempt the
impossible task of comparing the U.S. criminal justice system with the procedures of each
N.A.T.O. nation (as well as other countries where significant numbers of military personnel
are stationed). These country law reports provide a very useful introduction to the criminal
law system of other countries from an American perspective, but they invariably state that
the fairness of foreign legal systems is substantially equivalent to American rights, so as to
avoid offending other nations.
Faced with the impossible Senate-imposed standard, or with the equally impossible re-
quirements of Department of Defense Directive 5525.1 of January 20, 1966, which follows the
Senate standard, most U.S. military observers apparently develop their own norms which
essentially determine if the U.S. citizen received the same rights as local nationals or whether
under all the circumstances the accused received a fair trial. Perhaps if these military observ-
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appropriate. For example, if a leading member of the Paris Bar is
observing a trial in the former French colony of the Ivory Coast, he
may well use French legal standards, since the lawyers and judges are
probably attempting to follow the norms and procedures of French
law.38' Far too often, however, observers may unconsciously use the
customs of their own courts without adequately considering the pro-
priety of the comparison. It may be significant that the laws of most
nations forbid a certain practice at trial, but very few observers pos-
sess the expertise or take the time to make rigorous transnational
comparisons.
Observers may discover that the government disobeys its own
constitution, statutes, or judicial decisions."' Ideally, an observer
should know the jurisprudence of the country or consult local experts
on problems of domestic law.389
Observers can more confidently refer to the human rights cove-
nants and other treaties to which the nation under scrutiny is a
party.390 For example, in reporting upon an Iranian trial held in
1977, an Amnesty International observer made reference to the Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which Iran had pre-
viously ratified.91 Similarly, an observer for the International
Commission of Jurists reporting on a 1968 trial in Greece referred to
the unheeded provisions of the European Convention on Human
Rights to which Greece was then a party.392
Most nongovernmental observers refer to the International Bill of
Human Rights393 or the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
394
because of their preeminence in defining human rights standards.395
ers were aware of the standards set forth in the International Bill of Rights, they would have a
more generally applicable norm to apply, which might even conform more closely to the
Senate's intention. See notes 5, 6, 7, 8 subra; see also R. ELLERT, NATO 'FAIR TRIAL' SAFE-
GUARDS 74-75 (1963).
387 See Ivory Coast - Picard/AI (1974), supra note 221.
388 See, e.g., Spain - Aronstein/BLDHR (1972), supra note 207, at 1; AMNESTY INTER-
NATIONAL, TUNISIA IMPRISONMENT OF TRADE UNIONISTS IN 1978 (1978) [hereinafter cited
as TUNISIA - RAY/Al (1978)]; S. Korea - Sanguinetti/ICJ (1972), supra note 170, at 3.
389 The Trial of Professor Galarza, supra note 320.
390 See note 113 supra.
391 US Paliq an Human Rights andMiiap Assistance - Iran: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Int'l Organizations of the House Comm. on Int'l Relations, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 216-218 (Feb. 28,
1978) (testimony of Brian Wrobel) [hereinafter cited as Iran - Wrobel/AI (1977)].
392 See Greece - Ellman/ICJ (1968), supra note 31, at app. 1; see also, e.g., Turkey -
SimonlICJ (1980), supra note 174, at 64.
393 See note 113, supra; see, e.g., Morocco - Hincker/FIDH (1976), supra note 216, at 9.
394 See note 87, supra; see, e.g., Morocco - Poulsson/ICJ (1964), supra note 285.
395 See Buergenthal, Codfcation and Implementation of International Hauman R'ghts, in HUMAN
DIGNITY, THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 15, 17 (A. Henkin ed. 1979);
Humphrey, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Its Histop', Impact andJuridical Character,
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Article 10 of the Universal Declaration states: "Everyone is entitled
in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent tribu-
nal, in the determination of his rights and obligations and of any
criminal charge against him." '396 Article 11 provides for the pre-
sumption of innocence, public trial, "all the guarantees necessary for
[one's] defense, ' 397 and the right to be free from retroactive punish-
ment or penalties. Other provisions of the Universal Declaration -
for example, as to arbitrary arrest,398 the right to an effective remedy
or legal redress,3 99 the right to be free from torture,40 0 the right to
security of person,40' and privacy40 2 - may be relevant in particular
cases.
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights further
elaborates the rights identified in the Universal Declaration, whether
or not the nation in question has ratified the Covenant.40 3 For exam-
ple, Article 14 of the Covenant specifies minimum guarantees for
those facing criminal charges.40 4 However, the rights prescribed by
in HUMAN RIGHTS: THIRTY YEARS ArTER THE UNIVERSAL DEcLARATION 21, 28-37 (B.
Ramcharan ed. 1979); Weissbrodt, United States Ratifiation of the Human Rz'hts Covenants, 63
MINN. L. REV. 35, 46 (1978).
The corps of invited observers to the trial of the mercenaries in Angola surprisingly at-
tempted to establish their own seven basic principles of fair trial procedures without apparent
reference to the International Bill of Human Rights. Lockwood, Report on Trial of Mercenarzex
Luanda, Angola, June, 1976, 7 MANITOBA L.J. 183, 185 (1977).
396 Universal Declaration, supra note 87, art. 10.
397 Id art. 11.
398 Id art. 9.
399 Id art. 8.
400 Id art. 5; see also Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 3452
(XXX), 30 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 34) 91, U.N. Doc. A/1034 (1975); see, e.g., Morocco -
Hincker/FIDH, supra note 216, at 46-47.
401 Universal Declaration, supra note 87, art. 3.
402 Id art. 12.
403 See, e.g., Spain - McGovern/AI (1973), supra note 328, at 3.
404 Article 14 of the Covenant reads:
1. All persons shall be equal before the courts and tribunals. In the determination
of any criminal charge against him, or of his rights and obligations in a suit at law,
everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent
and impartial tribunal established by law ...
2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall have the right to be presumed
innocent until proved guilty according to law.
3. In the determination of any criminal charge against him, everyone shall be enti-
tled to the following minimum guarantees, in full equality:
(a) To be informed promptly and in detail in a language which he under-
stands of the nature and cause of the charge against him;
(b) To have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defense
and to communicate with counsel of his own choosing;
(c) To be tried without undue delay;
(d) To be tried in his presence, and to defend himself in person or through
legal assistance of his own choosing; to be informed, if he does not have
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the Universal Declaration and further defined in the Covenant still
require considerable interpretation in specific cases.
There are two general international standards of fairness which
have been the subject of greater elaboration in trial observer reports
than any other requirements of the International Bill of Human
Rights: the right of a defendant to "all guarantees for his de-
fense,"40 5 and the right to be judged by an "impartial tribunal. 40 6
Observers have found numerous violations of the right to a diligent
defense.40 7 In many cases, defense counsel have been subjected to
interruption and obstruction of their arguments at trial,40 8 intimida-
tion,40 9 theft of defense documents,4"' removal from the case,41 dis-
barment,412 banning,4 13 imprisonment, 414  or even extra-judicial
legal assistance, of his right; and to have legal assistance assigned to him,
in any case where the interests ofjustice so require, and without payment
by him in any such case if he does not have sufficient means to pay for it;
(e) To examine, or have examined, the witnesses against him and to obtain
the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same
conditions as witnesses against him;
(f To have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or
speak the language used in court;
(g) Not to be compelled to testify against himself or to confess guilt.
4. In the case of juvenile persons, the procedure shall be such as will take account
of their age and the desirability of promoting their rehabilitation.
5. Everyone convicted of a crime shall have the right to his conviction and sen-
tence being reviewed by a higher tribunal according to law.
6. When a person has by a final decision been convicted of a criminal offense and
when subsequently his conviction has been reversed or he has been pardoned on the
ground that a new or newly discovered fact shows conclusively that there has been a
miscarriage of justice, the person who has suffered punishment as a result of such
conviction shall be compensated according to law, unless it is proved that the non-
disclosure of the unknown fact in time is wholly or partly attributable to him.
7. No one shall be liable to be tried or punished again for an offense for which he
has already been finally convicted or acquitted in accordance with the law and
penal procedure of each country.
Civil and Political Covenant, supra note 113.
405 Universal Declaration, supra note 87, art. 11; see Civil and Political Covenant, supra
note 113, art. 14, para. 3, (b) & (d).
406 Universal Declaration, supra note 87, art. 10; Civil and Political Covenant, supra note
113, art. 14, para. 1.
407 To Lord Russell, Captain Dreyfus was not vigorously defended; the attorney ap-
peared docile and was unwilling to make any statements which would offend the military.
Dreyfus trial report, supra note 11, at 320.
408 See, e.g., Tunisia - Ray/Al (1978), supra note 388, at 9.
409 See S. Africa - Gardiner/IJ (1957), supra note 244.
410 See, e.g., ICJ Protests Against Police Raid on South African Attorney, Int'l Comm'n Jur. Press
Release (Oct. 20, 1977).
411 A Chilean lawyer who tried to defend his client's loyalty to the Allende government
by arguing the constitutionality of the Allende government was barred from further partici-
pation in the defense. R. de Schutter & M. Birgin, Rapport sur la mission de l'Association
Internationale des Juristes Democrates au Chile (14-21 Avril 1974) (unpublished report).
412 See, e.g., International Commission of Jurists, Recent Developments in the Pattern of
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killing for defending unpopular clients.4 15 Defense counsel may be
concerned that the most severe sentences may be reserved for those
who fail to adopt a conciliatory tone or who contest both the charges
and the law. Nevertheless, observers often find the defense to be
"courageous" and "vigorous,14 16 "extraordinarily brave, ' 4 17 quite
free to defend the interests of the accused,4 18 skilled,41 9 and
enthusiastic. 420
Similarly, observers have been sensitive to questions about the in-
dependence and impartiality of the judiciary.42 ' In one instance an
observer had to evaluate whether a judge who had previously super-
vised the prosecution could preside at the trial in keeping with the
guarantee of an "impartial tribunal" by the Universal Declaration
and the Covenant.422 Questions abound in this type of situation.
Does the extent of prosecutorial involvement determine whether the
judge was impartial? Does an observer need to find external indicia
of unfairness, or does "impartiality" require that judges not sit on
cases in which they have served in any prosecutorial capacity?
Trial observers have also commented upon far more blatant vio-
lations of impartiality, for example where judges have been arrested
for being too conscientious 423 or have been removed from office for
Criminal Justice in Hungary 9, 28-29 (undated) (mimeo) [hereinafter cited as Hungary -
Trial of Imre Nagy/ICJ (1958)].
413 See, e.g., Arnold, South Afia - The Sabotage Trial in Pretoria, 18 BULL. INT'L COMM'N
JUR. 37, 42-43 [hereinafter cited as S. Africa - Amold/ICJ (1963)].
414 See, e.g., Spain - Aronstein/BLDHR (1972), supra note 207, at 10. In Iran two law-
yers were imprisoned for having tried to justify their clients' deeds. Iran - Wandschneider/
Al (1965), supra note 316, at 1. The same problem arose in Portugal. A Political Trial in
Portugal, 15 BULL. INT'L COMM'N JUR. 50, 51 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Portugal - Rau/
ICJ (1962)].
415 See, e.g., ARGENTINA - N.Y. BAR REPORT, supra note 190, at 30, 41-42.
416 Morocco - Suckow/ICJ (1974), supra note 201, at 7.
417 Indonesia - Dowd/ICJ (1974), supra note 209, at 3.
418 India - Sheppard/ICJ (1976), supra note 246, at 25.
419 Malawi - Kellock/AI (1968), supra note 226, at 1.
420 Israel - Mortimer/AI (1975), supra note 149, at 6.
421 In the Dreyfus case, Lord Russell, the British observer, carefully weighed the imparti-
ality of the judge by considering the judge's respectfulness to all parties at trial, the judge's
ability to maintain proper decorum, the judge's willingness to accept all material evidence,
thejudge's knowledge of the law, and whether the judge properly weighed all of the probative
evidence in making a decision. Dreyfus trial report, supra note 11, at 322. In assessing the
fairness of other proceedings, one observer considered whether the court which tried the de-
fendants had jurisdiction to hear the case, whether the judges were trained lawyers (or mili-
tary officers), whether the court was genuinely independent of political control, and whether
the court was convened specifically for this case or was more permanent. Morocco -
Woesner/AI/ICJ (1973), supra note 217, at 1.
422 Guyana - Rampersaud, supra note 230.
423 The Specal Court of Dahomey, 13 BULL. INT'L COMM'N JUR. 15, 19 (1962) [hereinafter
cited as Dahomey - Ahomadegbe].
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their political views,4 24 threatened with removal for issuing the
"wrong decision," 425 subjected to political directions 426 or secret po-
lice control, 427 and replaced for refusing to pronounce the death sen-
tence.428 The most common impartiality issue arises when the
defendant is tried by judges whom the government has specifically
selected for the trial.
429
Although the broad language of the International Bill of Human
Rights leaves considerable room for interpretation, there is remarka-
bly little guidance for observers beyond the language of the docu-
ments themselves. The jurisprudence of the Human Rights
Committee as to the requirements of Article 14 is beginning to grow
as the Committee reviews more reports, but remains quite limited
and has not yet been used by trial observers.4  The European Con-
vention on Human Rights contains language very similar to that of
the International Bill of Human Rights and has an extensive juris-
prudence for observers to consult,4 3 ' but they rarely do.4
3 2
Ideally, observers should assess the trials they atten'd under (1)
domestic law, (2) relevant human rights treaties, and (3) customary
international law. Obviously, different standards may be appropri-
ate in various situations. Nonetheless, this approach is more thor-
ough than that found in observer reports which use only the
Universal Declaration, make no reference to legal standards, or
adopt the observer's own country as the world standard.
424 Greece - Ellman/ICJ (1968), supira note 31, at 38.
425 Greece - Gardiner/AI (1972), supra note 279.
426 JJ Observer Condemns Political Show Tria/ in Indonesia, 5 AM. A. INT'L COMM'N JUR.
NE.WSLErrER 9 (Jan. 1979) (hereinafter cited as Indonesia - 1978/ICJ]; Guyana -
Rampersaud,sufra note 230, at 26-27; Hungary-Trial of Imre Nagy/ICJ (1958),supra note
412, at 27.
427 J. Portelle, Rapport de mission en Iran 2 (Feb. 1972) (unpublished report to the Inter-
national Federation of Human Rights); see also Iran, 8 REv. INT'L COMM'N JUR. 5, 7 (1972).
428 Turkey - Noll/ICJ (1973), sura note 163, at 4.
429 Portugal - Rau/ICJ (1962), supra note 414, at 52; S. Africa - St. John/ICJ (1959),
supra note 244; Spain - Ziegler-Muller/FIDH (1974), supra note 174, at 5; The Cylon Coup
d'Etat Trial, supra note 263, at 15 (judiciary proved its independence by dismissing case where
panel was handpicked by the government).
430 See J. Walkate, The Human Rights Committee: Monitoring the International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights 52-63 (1980) (unpublished memorandum). See also Note,
Reporting Under the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: The First Five Years of the Human Rights
Committee, 76 Am. J. Int'l L. 142 (1982).
431 See, e.g., notes 93-94 supra.
432 Observers have used the European Convention on Human Rights as a standard for
Spain, even though Spain had not ratified that treaty. See, e.g., Aronstein, Acquittement h Ma-
drid, 127 REvuE SocAusME 37, 40, 45 (Feb. 1975). But Spain's aspiration to join the Euro-
pean Community made its violations of the European Convention significant.
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C. The Impact of Observers on Trial Participants
There are three basic sources of information on the impact of trial
observers - psychological experiments, the reactions of local attor-
neys, and the reports of trial observers themselves.
Experimental psychology has not directly evaluated the way
judges, lawyers, and other trial participants react to being observed.
The trial process is so complex that it would be difficult to make such
evaluations. 33 Nevertheless, psychologists have performed a number
of experiments in laboratory conditions which may help determine
whether observers have an impact on trials, what sort of impact they
have, and how to enhance a favorable impact.
Psychologists have established a number of principles which
might shed light on the impact of trial observers. First, people who
are observed while performing tasks that they already know tend to
perform better than usual.43 4 Second, people tend to have difficulty
learning new tasks when they are being observed. 35 Third, if the ob-
433 Seegenerally G. MCCALL, OBSERVING THE LAW: APPLICATIONS OF FIELD METHODS
TO THE STUDY OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (1975); Asch, Social Pressures and Opinions,
SCIENTIFIC AM., November, 1955, at 5; Wasserman & Robinson, Extra-legal nftuences, Group
Processes, andJuy Decision-makz'g: A Psgchologzcal Perspective, 12 N.C. CENT. L.J. 96, 135-41
(1980).
434 A 1925 experiment involved the performance of a well-learned motor task by the
subject before a group of spectators. Performance of the task improved in front of the audi-
ence. Travis, The Efect of a Small Audience Upon Eye-Hand Coordination, 20 J. ABNORMAL SOc.
PSYCH. 142, 146 (1925).
435 In a 1933 experiment, subjects took significantly longer to learn a list of nonsense
syllables when confronted with an audience as compared to an alone condition. Pessin, The
Comparative Efcts of Social and Mechanical Stimulation Upon Memorizing, 45 AM. J. PSYCH. 263
(1933).
The apparent inconsistency between the first and second findings went unexplained until
1965, when Robert Zajonc, professor of psychology at the University of Michigan, published
the seminal article which concluded that well-learned responses were facilitated by the pres-
ence of spectators, while the acquisition of new responses was impaired. Zajonc, SocialFacilita-
tion, 149 SCIENCE 269 (1965). Zajonc explained this discrepancy in terms of the Hull-Spence
theory of motivation.
The Hull-Spence theory postulates that certain events or conditions will excite or arouse
an organism. K. SPENCE, BEHAVIOR THEORY AND CONDITIONING (1956). "Arousal" has
particular physiological signs - increased secretion of hormones, for example. Mediating
between the "arousal" and the subsequent behavior is a psychological process known as
"drive." The more the organism is aroused, the greater is its level of drive. Drive serves to
increase dominant responses over subordinate responses. Dominant responses are facilitated
because of their "habit strength," that is, they have been repeated more often than
subordinate responses.
Zajonc's theory, then, is that the presence of an audience is one of those factors that
arouses the organism and increases drive level. The performance of a well-learned task will
be improved because the correct responses are dominant. Nickolas Cottrell of Kent State
University has further explained that the individual becomes aroused because of previous
negative or positive experiences when performing in front of an audience. Cottrell, Performance
in the Presence of Other Human Beings." Mere Presence, Audience and Ailiation E ctr, in SOCIAL
FACILITATION AND IMITATIVE BEHAVIOR (E. Simmel ed. 1968). The anticipation of a nega-
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served person believes the observer to be an expert capable of evalu-
ating his conduct, he will perform better. 6  Fourth, the observed
person will tend to behave more in conformance with societal norms
in the presence of an observer who shares those norms.437 Finally, the
tive or positive experience becomes unconsciously associated with (classically conditioned to)
the situation of performing before spectators. In Cottrell's theory, known as the "learned
drive view," the ability of the observer to evaluate the past experience of the observed deter-
mines the extent of the effect on performance. Id at 104.
Psychologists Shelley Duval and Robert Wicklund suggest the "objective self-awareness"
theory for improved performance. S. DUVAL & R. WICKLUND, A THEORY OF OBJECTIVE
SELF-AWARENESS (1972). The effect of the observer increases the subject's awareness of him-
self or herself as object. The subject will then take more care to perform to a higher standard
in front of an audience. Meanwhile, psychologist Milton Rosenberg of the University of
Chicago was taking note of a confounding factor in many psychological experiments: the
desire that many subjects displayed to achieve a positive evaluation from the experimenter.
Rosenberg, The Conditions and Consequences of Evaluation Apprehension, in ARTIFACT IN BEHAV-
IOR RESEARCH (R. Rosenthal ed. 1969). The subject would then try to behave in a way that
he thought would demonstrate his own mental health and maturity, rather than in the way
he would behave in the absence of the experimenter. Rosenberg called this phenomenon
"evaluation apprehension."
436 The learned drive, objective self-awareness, and evaluation apprehension theories are
all based on the same notion: that the social facilitation effect will only take place if the
subject believes that the observer has the power to evaluate him.
A number of experiments have tested the hypothesis that the presence of another with
sufficient knowledge to evaluate the subject's performance will produce a greater social facili-
tation effect than the presence of another with seemingly insufficient knowledge to evaluate
the subject's performance. This hypothesis was confirmed by Henchy and Glass in 1968.
Henchy & Glass, Evaluation Apprehension and the Social Facilitation of Dominant and Subordinate
Responses, 10 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCH. 446 (1968). On a word recognition task, per-
formance was increased in the condition in which subjects thought they were performing in
front of an expert audience. This result was repeated in two later experiments in which motor
tasks were performed. Sasfy & Okun, Form of E.valuation and Audience Expertness as Joint Determi-
nants of,4Audience Ejfets, 10 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCH. 461 (1974).
Other studies have compared the effects of a peer audience to a supervisory audience.
Hendricks and Brickman tested the hypothesis that people would enharice their statements of
performance expectancies before a higher status audience while becoming more modest
before an audience of their peers. Hendricks & Brickman, Efects of Status and Knowledeabib'
of Audience on Self Presentation, 37 SOCIOMETRY 440 (1974). Students displayed greatest self-
enhancement to their teacher, less to an uninvolved graduate student, and still less to their
peers. See also Baker, The E.fect of Threat ofEvaluation on Children's Verbal Leaming as a Function of
Sex of Subject andSocial Condition, 37(9) DISSERTATzON ABSTRACTS INT'L 4749-B (1977); Rittle
& Bernard, Enhancement of Response Rate by the Mere Physical Presence of the Experimenter, 3 PER-
SONALrrY & Soc. PSYCH. BULL. 127 (1977).
437 In the presence of an observer, teachers behave more like teachers are supposed to
behave, as an experiment by Samph demonstrated. Teachers tended to be "more like the
perceived ideal" when an observer was present in the classroom. Samph, Observer Eects on
Teacher Verbal Classroom Behavior, 68 J. EDUC. PSYCH. 736 (1976). Similarly, mothers behave
more like mothers are supposed to behave when they are being observed as opposed to when
they are not. Zegiob, Arnold & Forehand, An Eamination of Observer E.fcts in Parent-Child
Interactions, 46 CHILD DaV. 509 (1975).
Another experiment involved four subjects, three of whom were confederates of the ex-
perimenter. One confederate was selected as the victim. The experimenter ordered the other
two confederates and the naive subject to administer shock to the victim. The two confeder-
ates rebelled, and in most instances the naive subject rebelled along with them. S. MILGRAM,
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observed person will grow accustomed to the observer's presence,
causing the observer's effect to diminish over time.438
Although these experimental findings may have limited applica-
tion to the complex courtroom process,43 9 some inferences can be
drawn. From the first principle one can infer that an observer should
improve the fairness of a trial, provided that the participants are ac-
customed to treating defendants fairly. Since judges and prosecutors
may be more repressive in political trials than they would otherwise
be, the observer might help correct the balance. The second princi-
ple may not apply directly to trial observation, but if anything sug-
gests that judges who are not accustomed to being fair will have
difficulty improving their performance when observed. The third
and fourth principles strongly suggest that trial observers should be
selected for their prestige and appearance of expertise in the eyes of
the trial participants. The participants should then tend to conform
their conduct to the fairness which the observer expects. Finally, if
an observer attends a trial for a long period, her impact may decline.
Other information about the impact of trial observers may be
found in the reports of the observers themselves. Obviously, trial ob-
servers may exaggerate their impact on trial proceedings. But the
author's interviews with over 25 observers and review of more than
100 reports reveal considerable modesty. Frequently, observers relied
upon the reactions of local attorneys, including defense counsel, for
OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY 116 (1974). The subject conformed to the perceived expectations
of the two observers.
The effect of observer presence on the likelihood of the subject to behave in aggressive,
anti-social, or altruistic fashion is dependent on a number of factors. The evidence does show,
however, that the subject will frequently behave in the way he thinks the observer expects
him to behave. See B. LATANE & J. DARLEY, THE UNRESPONSIVE BYSTANDER: WHY
DOESN'T HE HELP? 123, 125 (1970); Wilson, Motiation, Modeling, and Altruism: A Person X
Situation Analysis, 34 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 1078 (1976).
438 Habituation has been studied primarily in the context of naturalistic observation in
the home. White studied the activity level of families under observation and concluded that
they habituated to the observer in a relatively short period of time. White, The EcLs of
Observer Presence on the Activitp Level of Families, 10 J. APPLIED BEHAVIOR ANALYSIS 734 (1977).
Johnson and Bolstad found that families do not adapt to the presence of an audiotape re-
corder any faster than they do to a human observer. Johnson & Bolstad, Reactivity to Home
Observatiom A Comparson of Audio Recorded Behavior with Obserers Present or Absent, 8 J. APPLIED
BEHAVIOR ANALYSIS 181 (1975). Finally, some experimenters have noted that the facilitating
effect of an audience on behavior such as physical aggression tends to decline over time. See,
e.g., Harrell & Schmitt, Efects ofa Miima/Audience on Physical Aggression, 32 PSYCH. REP. 651
(1973).
439 Most of the reported psychological experiments were conducted with participants and
observers who shared a culture and norms. In most cases trial observers also share a legal
culture, if not other attributes, with judges and prosecutors. But most observers gain some of
their prestige from being foreigners. The reported experiments do not consider this factor.
Despite the difficulties, it might be interesting and useful to design experiments which would
identify the impact of trial observers on the conduct of judges and prosecutors.
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assessing the impact of their presence. The local attorneys can see
the difference in the way the proceedings are conducted depending
upon whether the observer is present or absent.
Most observers have found their presence to improve procedural
fairness, but fewer noted an impact on the actual result of the trial.
After commenting on her possible impact upon the trial procedures
and sentences, one typical observer reported, "I believe that the judg-
ment of the Bench was not affected one jot by the combined foreign
presence."'
One observer, however, noted that his presence may have caused
the defendant's sentence to be half that demanded by the prosecu-
tion - twenty-three rather than forty-two years of imprisonment."'
In other observed cases, a defendant was acquitted of most of the
charges and received a very light sentence;' a death sentence was
not imposed" 3 although initially requested;4' relatively light sus-
pended sentences and fines were imposed;445 and sentences were re-
duced from fourteen to twenty years to two to six."
6
Observers have been told that their presence gave defense counsel
greater latitude in presenting the defense;44 7 encouraged the court to
pay more attention to the defense arguments;" 8 made the "prosecu-
tor most uncomfortable in his job;"4 2-made the judge allow the de-
fendant's family to attend the trial although admittance had been
previously denied;45 0 encouraged the local press to give more critical
attention to the trial;45' made the court's rulings on defense motions
more favorable than in earlier unobserved proceedings; 452 en-
couraged the court to hear an appeal fully whereas such proceedings
had previously averaged only ten minutes; 453 lengthened the trial;
45 4
440 Iran - Assheton/AI (1968), supra note 227, at 1.
441 Spain - Aronstein/BLDHR (1972), supra note 207, at 12.
442 S. Africa - Velleman/ICJ (1977), supra note 212, at 2.
443 South West Africa - Larson/LWF (1968), supra note 164, at 1.
444 Iran - Assheton/AI (1968), supra note 227, at 1.
445 Namibia, 8 INT'L COMM'N JUR. REV. 12, 13 (1972).
446 Spain - Suckow/ICJ (1975), supra note 77.
447 Israel - Mortimer/AI (1975), supra note 218, at 7; S. Africa - Thornberry/AI
(1974), supra note 226, at 1, 4; Spain - Aronstein/BLDHR (1972), supra note 207, at 11. The
I.C.J. commented in The Poznan TriaL, 6 BuLL. INT'L COMM'N JUR. 1, 3 (1956): "En-
couraged by the presence of foreigners and by the feeling that they had a strong backing in
Poland and in the world, counsel for the defence at the trial spoke on behalf of their clients
with a freedom and courage not hitherto known in the court proceedings of the Soviet orbit."
448 Malawi - Kellock/AI (1968), sura note 226, at 1.
449 Lesotho - van Niekerk/AI (1974), supra note 162.
450 Iran - Assheton/AI (1968), sura note 227, at 1.
451 [dj
452 Guyana - Omawale el al/Al (1980), supra note 332, at 17.
453 S. Korea - Sanguinetti/ICJ (1972), supra note 170, at 6.
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helped the defendant obtain competent defense counsel;455 or had no
visible effect.456
Another measure of the impact of observers is that they are re-
quested to return to observe later proceedings and are appreciated by
opposition groups and their lawyers. 57 But a few observers have ex-
pressed concern that their reports or press coverage might have had
an adverse impact on the actions of the authorities.458 Critical re-
ports might also cause the authorities to hold fewer public trials, de-
tain people without trial or close trials to further scrutiny.459 Other
observers have felt that the international press had more effect than
they.4 6° Additionally, it can be very difficult to separate the impact
of trial observers from the publicity their reports receive.461
On balance, it appears that observers should, and do, in fact have
considerable favorable impact on the fairness of the trials they
observe.
VI. MODEL GUIDELINES FOR ORGANIZATIONS SENDING
INTERNATIONAL TRIAL OBSERVERS
The International Commission of Jurists,462 the International
Federation of Human Rights,463 and to a limited extent, Amnesty
454 Taiwan - Seymour/AI (1975), supra note 78, at 13.
455 C. Morand, Report on the SASO/BPC Trial, at 4 (Dec. 16, 1975) (unpublished re-
port to the International Commission of Jurists).
456 Iran - Blom-Cooper/AI (1965), supra note 326, at 3.
457 See, e.g, S. Africa - MacDermot/ICJ (1974), supra note 180, at 5; S. Africa -
Lovatt/ICJ (1978), supra note 289, at 5.
458 Cf Dreyfus trial report, supra note 11, at 317 (only U.S. and Russia were friends of
France; comments in German and English press antagonized the French); Malawi - Kel-
lock/Al (1968), supra note 226, at 2 (observer recommended his report not be published be-
cause of government obliviousness to criticism).
459 C. Bourguet, Rapport de Ia r6pression en Iran, 21-28 f6vrier 1972, at 2 (Mar. 4, 1972)
(unpublished report to the International Association of Democratic Lawyers); E. Martin-
Achard, Le proc~s de Burgos 1 (undated) (unpublished report to the International Commis-
sion of Jurists); Spain - Suckow/ICJ (1975), supra note 77.
460 Indonesia - Dowd/ICJ (1974), supra note 209, at 7.
461 Greece - Ellman/ICJ (1968), supra note 31, at 3; Greece - Martin-Achard (1973),
supra note 375; Aronstein, supra note 312, at 41.
462 International Commission of Jurists, Guidelines for ICJ observers to Trials (1978)
[hereinafter cited as ICJ Guidelines]. Only after nearly twenty years of sending observers did
the I.C.J. begin to give its observers specific guidelines. These I.C.J. guidelines are a basic
source for the guidelines proposed in this study. The I.C.J. had previously established more
general fact-finding guidelines: Int'l Commission of Jurists, Outline for Reports by Persons
Travelling on Missions for the International Commission ofJurists, November 1961 (mimeo);
Int'l Commission of Jurists, Missions on Behalf of the International Commission of Jurists,
January 1963 (mimeo).
463 The International Federation of Human Rights (F.I.D.H.) has publicly issued a
"Code de d~ontologie des observateurs judiciares de la F.I.D.H." The Code is stated in far
more general and less useful terms than the I.C.J. guidelines.
International Trial Observers
International464 have developed rules of conduct for their observers.
These organizational rules and the substantial experience of many
observers set forth in this study can form the basis of a set of model
guidelines for sponsoring organizations. These guidelines should as-
sist both future observers and newly organized sponsoring groups.
These guidelines clearly cannot be imposed arbitrarily upon ob-
servers or their sponsors. Each organization or government may
have different objectives in sending trial observers. Furthermore,
whatever detailed guidelines might be suggested, the basic rule for
observers must be to use their best judgment in responding to the
situation at hand.
Bearing in mind that strict adherence to inflexible procedures
could limit the effectiveness of a trial observer mission, it is possible
to distill a few useful lessons from experience. Hence, the following
guidelines are suggested:
A. Justif&ation for Observers
International trial observers have been sent by governments and
nongovernmental organizations to trials of political or human rights
interest at least since the end of the 19th Century, when Queen Vic-
toria sent the Lord Chief Justice of England to the Dreyfus trial. Ob-
servers attended significant trials in Nazi Germany during the 1930's
and the 1956 Poznan trials in Poland. Given the several hundred
trials observed during the past twenty-five years, it is fair to conclude
that an international practice of sending and receiving trial observers
has developed. The work of trial observers is based on the interna-
tionally recognized right to an open trial and does not impermissibly
interfere in the domestic affairs of states.
The purposes of an observer mission usually are: (a) to prepare
an independent, impartial, and objective report on the fairness of the
trial taking into account its legal, economic, and political context; (b)
to help assure the defendant a fair trial through the influence of the
observer; (c) to give the defense counsel, the defendant, and the de-
fendant's supporters a sense of international concern; and (d) to ex-
press the sponsor's concern about the fairness of the proceedings
without prejudging whether the trial is fair.
Different trials may require a distinct emphasis among these four
principal purposes. Also, the purposes may conflict in some circum-
464 Amnesty International, Rules to be Observed by All Persons Charged with Attending
Trials or Carrying out other Missions on Behalf of Amnesty International, December 16, 1975
[hereinafter cited as A.I. Rules]. The A.I. Rules are quite brief, specific as to a few items, but
not as comprehensive as the I.C.J. Guidelines.
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stances. Accordingly, the observer must be free to exercise judgment
in conducting the mission as the situation requires.
The observer should conduct himself or herself with dignity, im-
partiality, independence, and humanitarian concern, keeping in
mind the sensitive nature of trials and the objectives of the sponsor-
ing organization.
B. Selection of Trials
Trials should be selected for observation in light of the purposes
outlined above, as well as the political or human rights significance
of the proceedings, the media attention given the trial, the possible
role of unjust laws, the political or cultural importance of the defend-
ant, the invitation of the government involved, and the financial re-
sources of the sponsor.
C. Selection of Trial Observers
The principal factors to consider in choosing a trial observer in-
clude the individual's (a) prestige and reputation for impartiality; (b)
knowledge of the legal system in which the trial will occur; (c) knowl-
edge of the language in which the trial will be held; (d) availability
on short notice; (e) appropriate nationality and other personal char-
acteristics given the country where the trial will occur; (f) ability to
enter the country of trial without a visa; (g) distance from the trial in
terms of expense and traveling difficulty; (h) trustworthiness in fol-
lowing directions and familiarity with the sponsoring organization;
(i) experience as a trial observer; and j) knowledge of international
human rights standards.
D. Informing the Host Government
The sponsoring organization should give the observer several cop-
ies of an Order of Mission setting forth the purposes of the mission,
the trial to be observed, the identity and qualifications of the ob-
server, and a request for the cooperation of the local authorities. The
sponsor should also send a telegram to the Minister of Justice of the
country concerned, indicating the identity of the observer and the
trial to be observed, and requesting the usual facilities.465
E. Briefing
Before commencing the trial observation mission, the observer
465 The principal souce of this section is the I.CJ. Guidelines, su/pra note 462.
International Trial Observers
should be briefed as to (a) the approach, policies, methods, and inter-
national status of the sponsoring organization; (b) the background of
the case, with emphasis on the concerns of the sponsor; (c) the spe-
cific objects of the assignment; (d) the names, addresses, telephone
numbers, and backgrounds of lawyers, translators, and other appro-
priate contacts; and (e) the means of communication with the spon-
sor while the mission is in progress.466
F. Translators
If the observer requires a translator, either she or the sponsor
should make the necessary arrangements before or soon after arrival.
Because the choice of a translator will substantially affect the inde-
pendence, impartiality, and impact of the observer, the translator
should be selected with as much care as the observer. Ideally, the
translator should be familiar with legal terminology, impartial, and
immune from government retaliation. The translator should sit next
to the observer at trial and give a simultaneous translation solto voce.
G. Visas and Ent Formalities
(1) Wherever possible observers are selected who do not require
visas to enter the country concerned or are selected from among
those who already possess visas. If a visa is required, the observer
should in general apply for a visa by submitting a copy of the Order
of Mission and stating that the purpose of the visit is to attend the
trial in question as an observer for the sponsoring organization.
(2) Observer practice varies greatly as to the amount of informa-
tion offered authorities regarding the purpose of the observer's mis-
sion, and no generalization regarding appropriate disclosure is
possible.4 67
H. Public Statements Before, During, and After the Missions
(1) In general, neither the observer nor the sponsor should pub-
licly announce the mission unless there is no risk that the observer
will be refused entry to the country, or a refusal is anticipated and
publicity will enhance the chance that the observer will be admitted.
(2) Since there is a considerable variety of practices concerning
public statements by observers during their missions, no general
guideline can be proposed which will cover all organizations; rather,
466 The principal source of this section is the A.I. Rules, supra note 464; see also AI, Rules
for Observers and Other Missions (undated draft).
467 The principal source of this section is the I.C.J. Guidelines, supra note 462.
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the observer should carefully follow the rules of the sponsoring
organization.
(3) In the absence of guidance from the sponsor, the observer
should not make any public statements before the conclusion of the
case, except as may be necessary to confirm to the press that he or she
is a representative of the sending organization, that he or she is not
authorized to make public statements before or during the trial, and
that he or she will, upon completion of the mission, submit a report
to the organization, to which all inquiries may be directed.4 68
(4) In the absence of instructions to the contrary, if at the end of
the trial there is a significant matter which calls for immediate com-
ment, the observer should have discretion to make a statement to the
press - preferably after leaving the country. A copy of any such
press statement should be transmitted immediately to the sponsoring
organization.
I. Travel and Hotel Arrangements
(1) If possible, there should be arrangements for the observer to
be met at the airport by a neutral, respected individual who may be
able to assist with entry problems, who is not involved in the trial,
who can transport the observer to the hotel, and who may provide an
initial briefing.
(2) The observer should stay in a hotel which is both moderately
prestigious and close to the courthouse. The observer should decline
invitations to stay with the defendant's attorneys or supporters.
(3) In arranging air travel, the observer should make reservations
with an airline other than the national carrier of the country con-
cerned - particularly for the departure.
J. Contacts, and Interviews After Arrival
(1) The observer should make contact, before trial if possible,
with the defense attorney, prosecutor, and judge. The observer
should maintain an appearance of impartiality in balancing contacts
with the defense and prosecution. The observer should arrange for
an impartial and respected attorney (or if not, a defense attorney) to
introduce him or her to the judge before proceedings begin. At this
initial meeting the observer should exchange the usual courtesies, ex-
plain the purpose of the mission if asked, and make arrangements for
entry to the courtroom and for seating.
4 69
468 The principal source of this subsection is the A.I. Rules, supra note 464.
469 The principal souce of this subsection is the I.C.J. Guidelines, supra note 462.
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(2) Depending upon the sponsor's instructions and the nature of
the case, the observer should contact not only individuals who can
facilitate matters such as entry into the courtroom, but also the Min-
ister of Justice and other government officials who can provide back-
ground information, or who should be contacted as a courtesy. The
observer should explain that he or she has been sent by the sponsor-
ing organization to observe the trial and prepare a report, but that he
or she does not (absent specific instructions or an official position)
represent the organization in a more general capacity.
(3) The observer should attempt to interview the defendant in a
location that would permit maximum confidentiality while allowing
the observer to ascertain the defendant's mental and physical state
and the conditions of confinement.
K. Seating in the Courtroom, Introductions in Court, and Taking Notes
The observer should sit in a prominent, neutral location in the
courtroom. He or she may arrange to be introduced at the beginning
of the court session by an impartial and respected attorney. He or she
should be seen taking full notes of the trial.
L. Timing, Preparation, and Substance of the Observer's Report
(1) Immediately after departing from the country the observer
should begin to prepare a report on the trial. He or she should com-
plete the report as promptly as possible - generally within one
month - and send it in confidence to the sponsoring organization.
(2) In preparing the report, the observer should carefully consider
his or her instructions, the information collected in and outside the
courtroom, the reliability of the information, and the methodology
used.
(3) Insofar as time permits, the observer should consider the fol-
lowing outline for the report:
(a) the observer's instructions;
(b) the background of the case;
(c) the facts of the case as revealed at trial and by independ-
ent fact-finding, with particular emphasis on the prosecu-
tion and defense evidence;
(d), the charges, applicable laws, pretrial procedures, trial
process, judgment (if any), and subsequent proceedings;
(e) the mental and physical condition of the defendant and
the conditions of confinement;
(f) an evaluation of the fairness of the proceedings, applica-
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ble laws, and treatment of the defendant under national
and international standards; and
(g) a conclusion.
(4) The report should append such material as:
(a) a copy of the Order of Mission;
(b) copies of relevant procedural rules, court decisions, and
laws;
(c) copies of charges, transcripts, and the court's judgment;
(d) a description of the observer's methodology, including
materials studied and persons interviewed;
(e) sensitive material which should be omitted from any
published report;
(f) copies of newspaper articles referring to the trial or the
observer's presence, with the names of the newspapers
and dates of publication;
(g) additional information not strictly within the observer's
mission (such as information about other prisoners, other
trials, and recent laws);
(h) practical observations for the guidance of future
observers.
(5) The observer should specify whether and how long certain
parts of the report must be kept confidential.470
(6) The observer should prepare the report in the language which
will be most useful to the sponsoring organization; the organization
should specify the desired language.4
(7) If the official text of the judgment or decision is not available
when the observer departs from the country, arrangements should be
made to send a final copy to the observer and to the sponsoring
organization. 2
(8) Absent instructions to the contrary, the observer should report
only to the sponsoring organization. The report and all other mate-
rial acquired by the observer in connection with the mission should
be considered the property of the organization for its sole use and
disposal. 3
(9) If the mission was jointly sponsored, the observer should sup-
ply his or her report and related material to each sponsor. 4
(10) If there is any matter that calls for urgent comment by the
470 The principal source of this subsection is the I.C.J. Guidelines, supra note 462.
471 Id
472 d
473 The principal source of this subsection is the A.I. Rules, supra note 464.
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sponsoring organization, the observer should immediately alert the
organization.475
(11) In the case of a protracted trial, the observer will usually
attend only some of the proceedings. In such cases, the observer
should immediately prepare an interim report and then submit a
final report when the trial is completed.
M. Standards to be Used
The observer should assess the trial under (1) the law of the coun-
try concerned, (2) any relevant human rights treaties, and (3) cus-
tomary international law. The observer should particularly refer to
the International Bill of Human Rights for applicable standards.
476
N. Financial ,4rrangements and Sponsorship
(1) Unless otherwise agreed in writing by the sponsoring organi-
zation, the observer should not accept any concurrent mandate,
financial assistance, or material support from any other organization
or source. The sponsoring organization should be solely responsible
for the expenses of the mission.
(2) At the end of the mission, the observer should promptly sub-
mit a complete expense report to the sponsoring organization.477
These are general guidelines only. Observers should follow them
only insofar as they are helpful. Sponsors will necessarily modify
these instructions to fulfill their objectives. Ultimately, observers
must rely upon their own good judgment.
475 The principal source of this subsection is the I.C.J. Guidelines, supra note 462.
476 See note 393 supra and accompanying text.
477 The principal source of this section is the A.I. Rules, supra note 464.

